In truth, the Heidegger who Arendt eventually let back in her life, like many older men nostalgic for what they once were, was a bit of a numpty, a narcissist who called her his “wood” and mythologised their past. The slightly creepy fascination with their affair has underplayed the significance of her relationship with her second husband, the super-smart and ever-fanciable Heinrich Blücher. True, Blücher was also fanciable to other women, including her friends, but here too Arendt was a realist. Blücher picked up her dropped commas and always looked at her with a sparkle in his eye. If she forgave Heidegger in the end, it was because he needed her more than she did him.
Heidegger, the cunning fox who turned out not to be so cunning after all, had set a trap for himself by his own self-absorbed thinking.
For scientists, philosophers or [Ben Shapiro] to assume that they can completely bracket out all emotionality is for them to be inauthentic or, to put it in Sartrean terms, they’re in bad faith with this assumption. To argue that facts are what they are without any relation to feelings is to ignore the fact that Dasein is always already attuned and that this attunement is a condition of the establishment of facts. Sorry, Ben, but your fundamental presupposition is bucko bullshit. There is an intrinsic connection between facts and feelings. Facts (knowledge) depend of feelings. Facts do care about your feelings.
In Epoché, Stephen Hoffman looks back in Parallax.
It’s not quite accurate to say that Ulysses is a book about language. It “is” language — and not just a minute portion of it enclosed between the covers of one, albeit brimming, book. Rather it is “the thing itself” in its entirety, language in what Heidegger called the “second beginning” (anderer Anfang). The “first beginning” (der erste Anfang) was Heidegger’s name for the first stab of unadulterated wonder which inaugurated the 2,500-year history of western metaphysics as forgetfulness of Being in Heraclitus and Parmenides. You could say that the Greeks were too busy being overwhelmed with awe at the advent of Being to take much interest in the fact that they were being overwhelmed with awe. What we call history followed from that understandable lack of attention. The history of western metaphysics is a history of withdrawal. “History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake,” says Stephen Dedalus
As Holland notes, aletheia is irreducible to a realist conception of truth (e.g. real gold) as well as a subjectivist account of truth as judgment (e.g. I believe that it is real gold). Rather, aletheia names the ontological event between a being concerned with the significance of beings and the manifest emergence of those beings. As Holland notes, in this event Dasein "discloses a world of entities that would simply be undifferentiated 'stuff' unless we encountered them". For Heidegger then, it is only against this primordial background that one can subsequently situate representational paradigms in which a derivative correspondence conception of truth applies.