Friday, May 27, 2016
Das Inzwischen in today's Peanuts.
The appropriating event is consigning incursion, such that it eventuates, in appropriating and clearing, amid (beings) as the in-between for their truth.
The event is the inaugural “between”—the beginning of the clearing and hence is the abyss of the in-between, the consignment as Da-sein.
Beyng is the luster of the beginning in the in-between wherein what is true has illuminated itself and, as a “being,” inceptually “is.”
Pp. 156, 164, 190
CounterPunch on hands in politics.
Heidegger cuts Jaspers off abruptly. “Education is irrelevant,” the moral philosopher of Nazism shouts. “Just look at his wonderful hands!”
Monday, May 23, 2016
In Malta Today, an interview with artist Evgletta Shtohryn.
How are you tackling the concept of time in this particular exhibition, and what led you to choose this path in particular?
Exploring the limits of now, hence the name of my project – ‘Now no longer – Now not yet’, it comes from Heidegger’s ‘Being in Time’, but what I am mostly interested in is the hyphen in the middle. The limits of now, the fluidity of it, the duration of the Now, when does it become the past?
From The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic:
The then arises from and in an expecting, and it permits of various unambiguous definitions, within certain limits, of course. These are possibilities that are not important for us now, since we are seeking something else. But what we laid out regarding the "then" is true of the "formerly" and the "now" in a corresponding way. The "formerly" always pronounces a retention of something previous. It is irrelevant here to what extent and how precisely we recall what is previous; we could even have forgotten it. In other words, the "formerly" is equally the utterance of a forgetting. The "now" accordingly pronounces being toward what presences [Anwesendes], and we term this being toward presencing things a holding in attendance or, more generally, making present.
Let us tum again to the phenomenon of the then. It emerges from expecting as such and is neither a property of objects nor of subjects. Yet we have not thereby finally exhausted its essential character but have, for the moment, overlooked something quite essential. The then, which is utterable and arises in making present, is always understood as "now not yet" (but rather: then). Whichever then I may choose, the then as such always refers in each case back to a now, or more precisely, the then is understood on the basis of a now, however inexplicit. Conversely, every formerly is a "now no longer" and is as such, in its structure, the bridge to a now.
P. 202
Thursday, May 19, 2016
The Evening Standard reviews Don DeLillo's Zero K.
Part two of the novel, much more readable, sees Jeff back in New York, turning down his father’s job offer, describing his changing relationship with a teacher, Emma, who has a strange son adopted from the Ukraine, Stak. They visit an art gallery displaying a single huge natural rock and Jeff quotes Heidegger: “Man alone exists. Rocks are, but they do not exist. Trees are, but they do not exist. Horses are, but they do not exist.”
"The proposition 'the human being exists' means: the human being is that being whose Being is distinguished by an open standing that stands in the unconcealedness of Being, proceeding from Being, in Being." MH, P 284.

Saturday, May 14, 2016
The Committee of Public Safety on the self-assertion of the German uni.
Heidegger recasts the terms of the entire debate on higher education by showing that the functional imperative of fitness for purpose, appearances notwithstanding, underlies both the liberal humanist and the technocratic university. The difference is not one of principle but merely of degree of generality of the end in question. Both models of education are strictly vocational in the sense of naming the body according to a functional identity. In the former case, the body becomes politically fit subject of the state, while in the latter, the body becomes economically fit commodity for circulation in civil society. In coordination and contradiction, political formation for subject-value and economic formation for exchange-value are, for Heidegger, twin expressions of a generalised will to will in education, where the aim is ultimately to increase the manipulation and control of the body for its own sake. Thus, neither state nor capital, self-aggrandising social forces that bend higher education to their interests, is fundamentally explanatory of the university, because they are but technologies of modern warfare against the body characteristic of an age under the rule of technique. This is a pivotal point in Heidegger's analysis, which can easily be obscured. The mediated political or economic determinism of education which Heidegger brings into relief is itself always rooted in the metaphysics of the will to power. So the twentieth-century shift in the formative task of the university from subjectivity to commodity is, in Heidegger's view, a function of something more general, namely, increased efficiency of control, which raises the fitness-value of the body as manipulable object. Indeed, the logical perfection of this functional idea of fitness for purpose, then, is that fitness comes to take itself as object, turning education into a matter of fitness for fitness, of pure technique devoid of substantive purpose.
Wednesday, May 11, 2016

Cosmos The In Lost continues it's personalist twist.
It’s my hypothesis he was compelled to write this sort of philosophy because he was a pretty rotten person most of the time. Meaning, he was very much like those of you who remain subject to Original Sin. If you’re having trouble understanding that, then you are probably subject to Original Sin.
Tuesday, May 10, 2016
Pete Trawny on atopographical thinking.
The “ever-strange” can be clarified philosophically only through the distinction between beings and being, i.e., through the splitting off of being from beings, a splitting off that is still termed the “ontological difference” at the beginning of the 1930s. Being itself is the fully other to beings. It is so much other that it must be thought as the not-being (Nicht-Seiende). This being (Sein) withdraws itself, is concealed, and can be experienced only as the “truth of beyng,” in the sense of a concealment, of a withdrawal into particular and fundamental moods. Since it contains nothing known and usual, it can be characterized as the “ever-strange.”
We can extend Heidegger’s thought a bit further. We can pose a question concerning the atopography of the foreign, an atopography that could liberate the foreign and its place or placelessness from a boring dialectic of foreign and familiar. In such a xenology, a philosophy of the foreign as the foreign of philosophy— i.e., as a thinking of the foreign that would not itself remain untouched by this—could perhaps develop. Heidegger’s thinking of the foreign shows how extreme he thought the consequences of revolution to be and how radically he thereby destroyed every form of politics—even the Platonic. The revolution was for him a total being-historical upheaval, not only of the accustomed lifeworld, but also of philosophy, science, art, and religion. Clearly, the National Socialists could not have held something like this to be anything but the remote idea of a daydreamer. Heidegger well knew why he entrusted such ideas only to the Black Notebooks, why he—as he says—“kept them silent.”
Such questions of philosophy are certainly not unknown since the Neoplatonism of a Plotinus, since the mystical theology of a Pseudo-Dionysius, or since certain sermons of Meister Eckhart. Seen this way, Heidegger shows himself to belong to a particular tradition of thought that acknowledges the foreignness of philosophical truth and defends this against comfortable simplifications. All in all, we can say that behind the revolutionary pathos of Heidegger’s style, for which the taste of the times is responsible, there stand enticing philosophical questions.
Pp. 48-9
Translated by Andrew J. Mitchell.
Monday, May 09, 2016
Grant Farred on why Heidegger saved his life.
Heidegger saved me because he gave me the language to write about race in such a way as I’d never written it before. Heidegger enabled me to write in this way because he has made me think about how to think. Of all the philosophers I know and the theorists I read, Heidegger stands apart because he is the only thinker I know who explicitly sets himself the task of thinking thinking. This is, above all else, what draws me to Heidegger: to ask myself, again and again, what it means to think. And thinking, in Heidegger’s rendering, is nothing other – in other words, it is everything – than asking oneself what it means to be an intellectual. It is all good and well to insist, as I have done, that the work of an intellectual is simple, straightforward: to think. It is entirely another matter to confront oneself with the question of what thinking is – this is the kind of question that can take over your life. And because it overwhelms you, it can, in the most crucial moments, also save you. Maybe it is all that can save you.
For when Ereignis is not sufficient.

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