enowning
Monday, April 14, 2014
 
Levi R. Bryant on the situation of the spectacles.
As Heidegger observes, in our comportment towards the picture, our glasses become invisible, withdrawing from presence, insofar as we are directed towards the painting. Heidegger wishes to argue that this demonstrates that there is a more fundamental spatiality than that of Euclidean or Newtonian space, where proximity is defined not by metric closeness, but rather by our concernful dealings with the world around us. In these concernful dealings, we look through our glasses. What is close in lived experience is not the glasses, but rather the picture we are regarding in our concernful dealings. [...]
The situation is the same with signs, texts, and messages. Signs draw our thought beyond the vehicle that carries them—the signifier through which they are transported—to whatever signified they might be about. What we forget in our dealings with signs—and what Heidegger forgets when he talks about the spectacles— is that in order for signs to refer to something beyond themselves in the first place, it is necessary for signs to themselves be material entities that are present.
 
Sunday, April 13, 2014
 
Fordham hosts video of Peter Trawny, Roger Berkowitz and Babette Babich discussing the black notebooks.
 
Saturday, April 12, 2014
 
In the Telegraph, Michael Inwood comments on the black notebooks.
Why did he authorise the publication of the Black Notebooks? Perhaps he wanted to defy the finality of death by being read and discussed after his bodily demise. He arranged the publication of his notes and lectures in stages for this purpose. He came to realise that his Nazism, far from being an obstacle to this project, could be exploited to serve it. His philosophical writings would need to be explored in order to make sense of their mysterious author. Like the Greek hero, Achilles, Heidegger aspired to eternal renown. So far the plan seems to be working.
 
Thursday, April 10, 2014
 
A new season of Entitled Opinions has started. The opening monologue has a bit about Heidegger's space and place.
 
 
Daniela Vallega-Neu on the turning in the appropriating event.
The appropriating event cannot be represented in terms of a linear process such that some “being” appropriates another “being,” namely Da-sein, but instead oscillates between the truth of beyng and Da-sein, such that both occur simultaneously. Heidegger speaks in this context of the Kehre im Ereignis, the turning in the appropriating event. He articulates this turning as well in terms of an oscillation between the appropriating call (Zuruf) and a belonging (zugehören). The truth of beyng as event discloses only in Da-sein, in the moment of appropriation and belonging. Furthermore, Da-sein (now written with a hyphen) does no longer designate a human entity at all, nor does it designate simply human being, although it does require humans as the ones who are (-sein) the there (Da), the open site of a historical time-space.
P. 283-4
 
Wednesday, April 09, 2014
 
Forbes on goal track apps.
Philosophers like Martin Heidegger argue that humans are fundamentally temporal beings. This basically means we know our time on this planet is limited, and are thrown in situations where negotiating life in the present is fraught with inclinations to draw out lessons from the past, while also projecting future possibilities. We’ve ultimately got to decide what is a mere instrumental chore to be crossed off a to-do list, what recurring experiences should be actively chosen because they are intrinsically valuable and make life fuller, and what special, singular events we should strive for once before we die. Each of these has a different life logic, and the big question goal tracking apps beckon us to consider is how they should be represented and pursued.
If I wrote a goal track app, I'd name it Bestellen. Then my life could be orderable for a requisitioning.
 
Thursday, April 03, 2014
 
In-der-Blog-sein

Seynsgeschichte on Kant's Transcendental Dialectic.
Months before Heidegger gives his phenomenological interpretations of the first Kritik, Heidegger is introducing to his students, in the Grundprobleme lectures of 1927, the problem of ontological difference, and he is doing so precisely through a destruktive meditation on Kant's categories of modality as they circumscribe the bounds of real predication. Although Heidegger had previously penetrated the Transcendental Analytic before the Phenomenological Interpretations in his 1925 Logik lectures, there it was self-evident why his examination had to limit itself in range and scope. By contrast the Phenomenological Interpretations, like the controversial Kantbuch that followed it, stood in need of some justification, and the Grundprobleme proffer that in linking the interpretation of Kant with the elaboration of the ontological difference.
Link fixed. Works without a feed reader.
 
Tuesday, April 01, 2014
 
The Nation piles on.
As for his view, made much of in the Times article, that the Third Reich was a counter-civilization, preserving the naturalness of human existence against the remoteness of modernity—it was and remains preposterous. Are we to believe that the regime that organized the industrialization of extermination, ceaselessly developed advanced weaponry and looted the rest of Europe with bureaucratic precision only intended to return to the playfulness of original human existence?
He had changed his mind - the german reich was just as caught up in the technological way of thinking as the anglo-saxon capitalists and the slav bolshies - before the war started. The notebooks may help pinpoint that turn more precisely.
 
For when Ereignis is not sufficient.

Appropriation appropriates! Send your appropriations to enowning at gmail.com.

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