Related to the ever-moving formless quality of water, Bruce Lee also once stated:
In Science we have finally come back to the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus, who said everything is flow, flux, process. There are no “things.” NOTHINGNESS in Eastern language is “no-thingness”. We in the West think of nothingness as a void, an emptiness, an nonexistence. In Eastern philosophy and modern physical science, nothingness — no-thingness — is a form of process, ever moving.
Those of you familiar with Heidegger will of course know about his fascination with the pre-Socratic philosophy and his (in)famous notion of ‘the Nothing’ (das Nicht), which also features in ‘The Thing':
Death is the shrine of Nothing, that is, of that which in every respect is never something that merely exists, but which nevertheless presences, even as the mystery of Being itself. As the shrine of Nothing, death harbors within itself the presencing of Being.
For even better similitude, try:
is not the annihilation of things, and it does not come from an act of negation. Annihilation and negation cannot account for the action of the no-thing. The no-thing itself propels us into meaning.
The existential philosopher, Martin Heidegger coined the term "existential schizophrenia" to describe a general cultural morass already in the early 20th Century when crazy-making, repetitive factory work and the madness of war had already set in.
Would that be an existentielle or an existential Schizophrenie? I can't find the coinage in the blockchain.
¶ 5:27 AM3 comments
In Memory Theatre, Simon Critchely digs through Michel Haar's archives.
To my complete astonishment I found the original copies of a triangular correspondence between Jean Beaufret, Jacques Lacan and Martin Heidegger, which concerned the latter's vistit to Cerisy-la-Salle near Saint Lô in Normandy in 1955 to deliver the lecture, 'Was ist das - die Philosophie?', the title of which had always made me laugh. I don't know why. Most amusingly, some of the correspondence between Lacan and Beaufret deals with the topic of what Herr und Frau Heidegger might chose to eat for breakfast chez Lacan during their passage through Paris. Lacan had made complex plans to obtain specially imported Schwarzbrot from Alsace, together with hard cheeses and ham. Beaufret spends some paragraphs reassuring Lacan that the Heideggers looked forward to nothing better than some croissants, a café crème and perhaps a little tartine.
In Telos, Panajotis Kondylis pinpoints significant weaknesses and deficiencies in B&T.
[A]lthough the ontology of man’s Being may search for the dimension of depth beyond cognitive-philosophical but also beyond moral concepts, it remains marked by axiological likes and dislikes. Heidegger, of course, denies that he is moralizing or criticizing culture, but anyone familiar with 1920s German literature and journalism will easily recognize the origins of his motifs. The tendency to evaluate does not follow the well-trodden path of moral theory—on the contrary, current bourgeois morality is indirectly attacked; it is articulated as a confrontation between “authentic” and “inauthentic” existence, as the latter supposedly prevails at the level of the anonymous mass.
According to Heidegger, the act of listening is necessary for thinking as well as
learning. As a matter of fact, we do not just start to think; we must learn how to
think, and, in order to learn this, we need to listen. The teacher, to whom the students
listen, must learn to learn: ‘Lernen geht auf wissendes Aneignen und Eigentum des
Wissens, aber je auf ein Eigentum, das nicht uns gehört, sondern dem wir gehören’
(P. 190). In a conventional translation, this citation would read something
like this: ‘Learning rises from knowing appropriation and property of knowledge,
but always from a property which does not belong to us, instead to which we
belong.’ However, in this translation, almost all the meaning is lost. Gone is the
etymological relation to Ereignis —the event—in which we are related to Being.
Gone also is the bond to the verb hören, which here can be understood as ‘to belong
to’ (e.g. zugehören), but which also has to do with listening: we must listen to the
way in which Being speaks to us. Being speaks to us, Heidegger says, and Being
often speaks to us with a silent voice, a lautlose Stimme. Listening to the voice of
Being, we are attuned, gestimmt , to it. When Heidegger lectures on Heraclitus, trying
to show how logos is related to a German verb like lesen (here, not ‘read’ but
‘choose’), he concludes that, through his lecture, one can hear the sounding of the
basic words of the beginnings of thinking. They may be monotone, but they are the
‘tonic of this originating Greek thinking’(P. 298). Without this tone, it would
not be possible to listen to the beginning.
The act of making-sense or understanding is directed primarily not
to individual things and to general concepts. Instead, it is alive in one’s
firsthand lived world and in one’s world as a whole. In this act of
sense-making, the world is opened up for existence. This disclosure is
the uncovering of the current form of a being’s suitability-for, whereby
it is present as a being. Whatever gets opened up this way can be held
on to, even when the worldly thing in question is not itself present.
That is, the opening-up of the world—which unfolds in the act of
understanding or sense-making—can be possessed and preserved as
meaning, i.e., as a world of understanding in which existence