For Heidegger the creation of radical uncertainty is standard operating procedure in our techno-commercial world. In such a world everything becomes “raw resource”: consumption machines, code machines, speed machines, and virtual machines. The knowledge class is driven to excess in an accelerating economy of immaterial exchange, cut off in a no-time realm where history vanishes and is replaced by ‘presentism‘ of an eternal now. We are at the beginning of a new cycle in which Heidegger will ask: “What kind of humanity is capable of the unconditional completion of nihilism?” A humanity that is no longer human, but rather inhuman: the technical realization of the posthuman.
Martin Heidegger contrasted mere things, like a boulder, or slab of granite, with what he called equipment, artifacts manufactured by us to serve this or that use. The work of art, he argued, was a kind of hybrid. Like equipment, and unlike granite, it is made not found. But unlike equipment, and in this respect like the granite, the artwork is autonomous of the uses to which we might put it. Heidegger also believed that artwork carries all sorts of invisible meanings and kinds of importance precisely for human beings who live in a cultural world that wouldn't be what it is if not for the existence of art.
“A thing,” then, corresponds to a real need we have, to catalog and group together the items of cultural experience, while keeping them at a sufficient distance so that we can at least feign unified consciousness in the face of a world gone to pieces.
The stock response by less tractable, ‘hardcore’ Heideggerians to previous attempts to establish links between his philosophy and his politics was rather dismissive, owing, in the main, to the philosophical shortcomings of these attempts. And, to be fair, these studies are rightly dismissed by Heideggerians who can quickly point to the interpretive deficiencies of these texts. However, with that, one is not then entitled to summarily dismiss any question as to a possible relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and his politics.
As it happens, Heidegger’s philosophy simply cannot be straightforwardly reduced to his political views; however, this is something that needs to be demonstrated, since it is Heidegger himself who says explicitly and repeatedly that the basis for his political views lies in the essence of his philosophy. Not only that—and this is something that has not been sufficiently acknowledged in previous incarnations of the Heidegger controversy—throughout the 1930s, Heidegger feverishly looks to articulate a political philosophy on the basis of key concepts in his thought, including central notions from Being and Time.
But he failed to articulate a political philosophy. And it wasn't a particularly interesting Holwege neither.
¶ 7:18 PM0 comments
Neutrality has no ontological status; it is the Impensé of the metaphysical
quest for ontologies (in the sense of Heidegger’s understanding of metaphysics as
undissociably ontological and theological (Heidegger 2004).
leads us to the atopical location where the subject is – or rather, because the subject “is”
not, since it is not part of the logics of sets – the subject “subjectives” (in the verbal mode
– exactly in the way Heidegger famously wrote das Nichts nichtet in Was ist Metaphysik?).
The truth is of course not the degenerated, ontic (as
Heidegger said) notion of logical truth; it is the truth in its original ontological sense,
constituted through the triad of the subjectification of the subject, the advent of the
event, and a given truth protocol (according to Badiou’s theory of the ways to truth).
Heidegger, M. (2004) Introduction to Metaphysics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
That citation's date is a farrago of the dates of two real editions.
¶ 7:30 AM0 comments