Sunday, October 19, 2014
In Appendix 1 of GA 40, Heidegger reflects on Introduction to Metaphysics.
The lecture course gets stuck halfway, not just because in its narrow way of posing the question it is not brought to an end--cf. projection! from the understanding of Being to the happening of Being!--but because at bottom it does not escape from the shackles of the understanding of Being. And it fails to do so because the question--even the fundamental question--in no way draws into the essential, that is, into the essential unfolding of Being itself.
The explication of the concept of Being and its history is important--the fact of the understanding of Being and its factuality is important, but all this only if the oblivion of Being is opened up as an authentic happening and thrust into this history, i.e. into the disempowerment of phusis, into the end of "metaphysics," into the urgency of the necessity of the other inception as the grounding of Being-here.
Pp. 233-4
Saturday, October 18, 2014
For your fragrant consideration: Dasein.
We borrow our name from existentialist philosophers Hegel and Heidegger, who used the term 'Dasein' (prounounced: DAH-zyne) to define 'human being' as the marriage between self awareness and sensual experience.
Wednesday, October 15, 2014
In the Jewish Review of Books, Seyla Benhabib responds to Richard Wolin's contentions and shortfalls.
Wolin has always misconstrued how Arendt transformed and indeed subverted Heideggerian categories, for example by translating “das Man” into human plurality; “being-unto-death” into natality; and by emphasizing the human condition of acting and speaking in the world with others. Had Arendt slavishly followed Heidegger’s thinking, which, as she observed many times, is destructive to the political realm, she would not have been one of 20th-century’s greatest political thinkers. But for Wolin, Arendt is always a foolish woman in love!
Friday, October 10, 2014
The Globe and Mail is underwhelmed by the new Douglas Coupland.
Coupland is right that technological advancement deserves meditation on these positives and negatives, and that sometimes it seems like “this sort of reflection is nonexistent.” This has been a truism of technological philosophy since McLuhan, and even since Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology (1954). But isn't this book – or any piece of sci-fi doomsday prophecy about sentient computers enslaving mankind – precisely that sort of reflection? Coupland seems to believe that companies should be mulling over the far-reaching, abstracted end-results of their R&D, that they should retain an in-house media guru. But can he really believe that CEOs are debating the deeper ethics of their bottom line?... When he gets to them, Coupland’s conclusions feel more like premises: the Internet connects people! The Internet is good… but also, sometimes bad! We prefer faster Internet to slower Internet! That he arrives at these basic deductions while sipping literal scotch in a glass tower overlooking Shanghai is nothing short of infuriating; a caricature of a man out-of-touch.
He did once coin the term Microserfs, which sums up modern work more succinctly than a stack of Harvard Business Reviews.
Thursday, October 09, 2014
Simon Critchley's Bowie book arrived last week.
If I were even more of a Heideggerian bore than I am, we could talk about the link between voice (die Stimme) and mood (die stimmung) as that basic activity through which a world is disclosed to us, and disclosed, moreover, emotionally rather than rationally. Bowie's genius, then, is one of interpretation in the sense of Auslegung, or laying (legen) something out (aus), making it accord with us or resound for us sonorously in a way that can hit us hard or soft.
But we need to add an important caveat to this line of thought. Music like Bowei's is not a way of somehow recalling human beings affectively to a kind of pre-established harmony with the world. That would be banal and mundane, literally. Rather, Bowie permits a kind of deworlding of the world, an experience of mood, emotion, or Stimmung that shows that all in the world stimmt nicht--i.e., is not in agreement or accord with the self. In this sense, music is a discord with the world that can allow a certain demundanization, a withdrawal that might permit us to see things in a utopian light.
Wednesday, October 08, 2014
In NDPR, Stefan Kristensen reviews Frank Chouraqui's Ambiguity and the Absolute: Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty on the Question of Truth.
The Deleuzian objection has to do with the conception of Being as fullness or as identical with becoming; Deleuze criticizes phenomenology for operating with a concept of intentionality directed towards things, which then, in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, would concern Being as such. In form of a question, this objection would be: Is there any way to conceive of Being as full, as completely possessed by intentionality, i.e., is there any way to establish a truth concerning Being as such? The Heideggerian objection is that Nietzsche never actually overcomes the idea that Being is the whole of all beings, that is, he didn't formulate the "question of Being" as such. In other words, Nietzsche's position according to Heidegger remains metaphysical (interrogating what things are and finding that they are characterized by the will to power), and doesn't reach ontology (interrogating what it means for the things to be).

Aphelis on Haneke's Amour.
[L]ove is always also about the eventual disappearance of the loved one. In this regard, presence and absence are not contradictory, but instead allow for one another to take place. To love is not to possess because what love grasps is always fleeting: in a sense, it is the fleeting itself. This is why in regard to Stolorow’s observation, one must add that existence is not constituted by the loss of something in particular, but by loss as such: a primordial loss, without anything lost in the first place. Here, we may begin to understand how love has to do with existence as the experience of properly grasping the impropriety of someone else’s existence. In Haneke’s film this experience is given as the appropriation of the ultimate inappropriable: death. This may be another way of thinking about what the experience of the “exappropriation” in the work of Jacques Derrida. It also open an atypical path towards the interpretation of the concept of Ereignis in the work of Martin Heidegger. In On Time and Being, Heidegger states “Expropriation [Enteignis] belongs to Appropriation [Ereignis] as such.”. Giorgio Agamben explored this path in his essay on “The Passion of Facticity” where he argues that “the problem of love, as passion, shows its proximity to that of the Ereignis”.
Tuesday, October 07, 2014
Film is the language of Godard
For when Ereignis is not sufficient.

Appropriation appropriates! Send your appropriations to enowning at gmail.com.

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