The question then for those in the tech sector, and the problem concerning technology, is then how does one ensure that one is creating without determining? How does one let the world presence itself through modern technology, rather than determining how and for what it appears? The problem for most human beings concerns how to authentically appropriate technology such that it does not extend its technologization into areas that dehumanize: not all technologization is necessarily bad, a hammer and a pencil both technologize the user every bit as much as a computer keyboard does.
Heidegger writes in Being and Time that the “call ‘says’ nothing which might be talked about,” and which “gives no information about events,” much how Kafka is silent about Gregor’s devolving mechanism, and which “points forward to Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being,” that is, being another species below even what the racists refer to as the lowest race, “and it does this as a call which comes from [the] uncanniness” of “thrown individualization”. Is this not Gregor’s real instantiation of the racial, thrown into being a cockroach, in his uncomfortable, uncanny carapice?
In Phenomenological Reviews, Anthony Crisafi reviews Peter Sloterdijk's Not Saved: Essays After Heidegger.
[T]he substance of Sloterdijk’s critique of Heidegger is that Heidegger, in eschewing the cosmopolitan city for the village, never fully understood how humanity expands. Instead, Heidegger sought to impede modern growth by insisting on a philosophy of anti-expansion, one in which, according to Sloterdijk in the later works of Heidegger, becomes a parochial return to the Catholic-Augustinian acceptance of the human as a deeply flawed being incapable of overcoming this fall except through some metaphysical/spiritual intercession. Heidegger sought to ground the person in Ursprunglichkeit (origin), but for Sloterdijk this was a false consciousness: The human is anthropotechnic by nature, one whose growth is dependent on creating and recreating itself and its world through constant kinetic movement forward. In this instance, for Sloterdijk, the “The People” is a fiction, as this assumes, like Heidegger, that there is an essential essence which is what connects people together. But if we reject this Heideggerian Ursprunglichkeit for a more mobile ontology, we see that what connects people together is not essential ideology, but rather necessary technics of desire.
spent the whole course positing my own ethical system
While other college students emptied kegs
Information ethics, cyberethics — both since taken —
Said: Maximize the information flow
Toward a hypothetical end state in which the cosmos
Consists entirely of our info
And at the highest level possible, not only data
But data about data dot dot dot
Or life on top of life on top of life, et cetera
Heidegger gives a spatial presentation of the neighbor in “Building, Dwelling, Thinking.” Though this text is concerned foremost with dwelling and building, not the neighbor, Heidegger purposely attaches dwelling to neighbor in his etymological tracing of the German nachbar (“neighbor”). This German word has its root in the Old English neahgebur: “neah, near, and gebur, dweller.” Heidegger thus defines the neighbor as “the near-dweller, he who dwells nearby.” This definition seems simple enough and, upon first impressions, bears little significance. But, for Heidegger, “dwells” in this definition assigns it greater importance, because dwelling in the case of this essay replaces the traditional word for being. That is, “man is insofar as he dwells.” Heidegger goes so far as to declare that “Dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth.” The neighbor, therefore, is he who dwells near me, the one who is near to me.
[O]utdoors where the Boy Scouts took me — in the woods or on the rivers — I began to fashion an identity beyond myself, anchored in a sense of time and place. The 20th century German philosopher Martin Heidegger had a word for this — Dasein — “being there.” Humans are not simply isolated subjects (“I think, therefore I am”). Rather, we truly exist only in relation to the rest of the world. That’s when we’re most alive.