In next month's Philosophy Now, Raymond Tallis on being here.
One of the problems that bothered me was that [Heidegger's] ontology of human being was one-legged. You cannot, I argued, have a ‘being-there’ without also a ‘being-here’ for ‘there’ to be defined by. So Da-sein requires a complementary Hier-sein, as recto requires verso or as a view ‘out there’ requires a viewpoint ‘here’.
Meanwhile, back at the Heidegger.
The “Da,” as a concept understood with respect to the history of beyng,
does not have a directional character according to which it is distinguished
from the “over there” (here and there [da und dort]). Even the
“there” is a Da or, more precisely, is in the Da (Da ≠ ibi and ubi).
The Da signifies the appropriated open realm—the appropriated
clearing of being.
Capobianco proceeds to argue convincingly that the later terms Ereignis, Lichtung, and Es Gibt "say the same" as Being, and are not, therefore, structurally prior to Being as some commentators have suggested. Above all, this chapter demonstrates that, despite the many different ways Heidegger attempts to say Being, his philosophical focus remained, from beginning to end, "the pure appropriating . . . of what appears (beings) in the fullness of appearing (beingness)"; in other words, Being's 'manifestive' activity.
In NDPR, Alan D. Schrift reviews Robert Nichols's The World of Freedom: Heidegger, Foucault, and the Politics of Historical Ontology.
Nichols here argues that "After Being and Time, Heidegger shifted his focus away from [hermeneutic] questions of intelligibility and meaning toward [more practical] questions of truth and freedom". Although Nichols continues to link his discussion of Heidegger back to Division Two of Being and Time, the claim here is that after Being and Time, "the ontological characterization of freedom . . . is expressed as indeterminacy, contingency, and nonclosure in the historical presencing of a lifeworld". Freedom, now understood as "epistemological indeterminacy," manifests itself in world-disclosure as the outcome of human practical activity, and as such, freedom is ontologically tied to truth as that unconcealment revealed through this world-disclosure.
Günter Figal (Freiburg) resigned his position this past Thursday as chair of the Martin Heidegger Society in the wake of the publication of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks (Schwarze Hefte), which many believe show that Heidegger’s antisemitism was more central to his thinking than previously thought.
In NDPR, H.A. Nethery IV reviews Arun Iyer's Towards an Epistemology of Ruptures: The Case of Heidegger and Foucault.
[F]or Heidegger, conceptual knowledge is founded on a prior asubjective and anonymous form of inceptual thinking. For Iyer, the beginning of this argument can be found in Heidegger's book on Kant, in which Heidegger argues that in order for us to have a split between subject and object, we must first form a kind of "preliminary horizon" within which beings can be encountered at all. This preliminary horizon, according to Iyer, is for Heidegger primarily temporal: the transcendental power of the imagination we find in Kant is a prior arrangement and application of temporality to pure understanding and pure intuition. Iyer interprets this as a form of thinking prior to thinking, and thus that "the dualities [of subject and object] are all secondary with regard to a primordial unity (or a fundamental root) from which these dualities stem".
Even beyond the ‘Heidegger case’ – and he did indeed stoop to vulgar anti-Semitism – it is of the utmost importance to shout from the rooftops that someone could be, or could have been, an anti-communist, a Stalinist, a philo- or anti-semite, hostile to women, a feminist, a monarchist, a democrat, a militarist, a nationalist, a partisan, a Nazi or Mussolinite, gay, sexually conformist, internationalist, colonialist, egalitarian, aristocratic, an elitist or friend of the masses, and so on and so forth… and be a philosopher of the greatest importance.
Death understood as a possibility in this existential sense, then – that is, as something into which I project – cannot be the event at the end of my life, but must instead be a dimension of existence accessible to me, something immanent in the phenomenal structure of my being-in-the-world. How is my own death manifest and accessible to me while I am still alive? Not in my being-at-an-end (
), Heidegger says, but in my being toward the end (
Sein zum Ende
). Indeed, Heidegger says, “Death is Dasein’s ownmost (
) possibility” (SZ