enowning
Sunday, May 20, 2018
 
Theodore Kisiel scrutinizes the horizon.
the lecture courses of 1927 – 30 seek to further elaborate the ecstatical-horizonal unity of temporality, which was begun in § 69c of Being and Time in a section entitled “ The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World. ” Toward the end of this period, the single yet threefold horizon of time is subjected to increasing critique in view of its blatant objectifying tendencies, in particular, the objectification of being itself. As it was hinted above, horizonal temporality will eventually be displaced and replaced by grounding Dasein in the temporal playing field (Zeit-Spiel-Raum), usually simply time-space (Zeit-Raum) (GA65 18/CP 16, GA65 234235/CP 184–186), which is located in the integral moment (Augenblick) of holistic insight and decision.
The talk that Heidegger first delivered in 1962 entitled “ Time and Being ” most clearly makes the turn into the source and derives meaning and meaningful presence (Anwesen) from out of this meaning-giving source. The source, at first identified neutrally as an It, is initially said to let or allow meaningful presence, Anwesenlassen . The letting is more originally understood as a giving, such that It gives being, It gives time. The giving is then specified further as It sends being, It extends time, or more precisely, time-space. And the It itself? The It that gives is das Ereignis, which “ appropriates being and time into their own out of their relationship ” (GA14 24/TB 19). Moreover, in giving, “ the sending source keeps itself back and, thus, withdraws from unconcealment ” (GA14 27/TB 22). The meaning-giving source itself is self-concealing and remains insuperably concealed, the ultimate facticity beyond which we can go no further.
Pp. 171-2
 
Saturday, May 19, 2018
 
The heaviness of the clearing.
This clearing cannot be explained from beings; it is the “between” [Zwischen] and in-between [Inzwischen] (in the time-spatial sense of the originary time-space). The “of,” “as,” the “in the light of” are not beings, they are nothing and yet not null and naught; on the contrary: they are totally “important” [wichtig], of the heaviest weight [Gewicht], the proper heavyweight and the only thing in which everything that is a being (not merely as beingness, objectness, statehood) as a being “is.”
The clearing is the a-byss as ground, the nihilating counterpart to all that is [das Nichtende zu allem Seienden] and thus the heaviest thing. It is thus the “ground” that is never “present-at-hand” and that is never found, the “ground” that refuses itself in the nihilation as clearing—the supporting-founding one that decides, the one that e-vents—the e-vent.
P. 36
 
Friday, May 18, 2018
 
Charles Guignon and Kevin Aho on sensing reality.
The distinction between what is in the mind, on the one hand, and what is “out there” on the other, between the “subjective” and the “objective,” seems to force the classical questions on us: Can we know about a world that exists independent of us? Or is what we call “reality” an invention of our own minds, a product of our mental categories and forms of perception? Or is it shaped by the language and conceptual schemes of a particular historical culture?
... On the one hand, Heidegger insists that “what-is” in the broadest sense is already there, independent of our choices and creative activities. “Entities are never of our making,” he says (GA 5: 39/BW 178), though we are self-making beings in the sense that we decide, within limits, our own fates. On the other hand, he shows us that what-is can show up as counting for anyone as such and such—as being something or other—only if Dasein lets it be what it is. Dasein “lets what-is be involved” in particular ways. A poker, for example, can show up as a fireplace tool or as a murder weapon. To say that, regardless of its uses, the poker is still an iron object is not to get at what it is independent of any way of being taken up in our letting-be. Instead, it is just one additional way of letting the poker be, in this case, the way of impartial, objective science. So what counts as “real” is always the result of an interplay between Dasein’s way of letting-be and what we encounter as thrown into the midst of what-is. This letting-be should not be thought of as a passive withdrawal in any sense. On the contrary, it involves receptivity, openness, and insight into the ways things are taken in our own community. Neither does this notion imply an “anything-goes” relativism. There are constraints on how we can let things be (though poets, artists, philosophers, and scientists can bring about shifts in our sense of how to let things be). It is because there are background constraints of this sort that we are largely in agreement concerning so much of our “sense of reality.”
P. 176
 
Thursday, May 17, 2018
 
Andrew J. Mitchell on thinking things after Heidegger.
To be a thing is to exist relationally, not objectively. Such a state thus requires that there be no subject present who objectifies the thing in question. But this is not to say that the human is to do nothing in the face of things. Doing nothing is still doing something. Rather it is a matter of doing that which facilitates the relational unfurling of the thing. Heidegger terms this comportment guarding (bewahren). This non-objectifiying coming-intorelation with things allows them to reach us. And because we are not doing nothing in this relation, it allows us to reach them as well. This contact is the appeal of things—that we might touch them and that they might touch us. Heidegger does not term this relation ethical, but, in my view, it is the ethical end of any thinking after Heidegger. Across the history of philosophy, there seems to have been an increasing expansion of the beings toward which we are willing to behave ethically. We have accorded such respect to other rational beings, to other human beings, to other living beings, and now after Heidegger we should continue the thought and accord that respect to things (and objects and commodities as well!). Ethical action would be measured action and measured action need not be restricted to beings like us. It can apply to all, especially those least like us. Perhaps that is where both an ethics after Heidegger and a thinking after Heidegger should begin.
P. 308
 
Wednesday, May 16, 2018
 
Daniela Vallega-Neu on time-space.
In Being and Time, Dasein designates human existence, but in his non public writings of the 1930s, Heidegger attempts to think Da-sein (now written with a hyphen) in terms of a not-only-human site of being in which a world discloses itself in a fuller way. He thinks of Da-sein as a concrete time-space in which truth occurs. Such a time-space (Da-sein) happens only with beings, with words, works of art, or deeds that “shelter” truth and configure a concrete site of being, something that Heidegger elaborates, for instance, in his essay from 1936 “The Origin of the Work of Art.” Thus, we may be struck by words or works of art that open up for us a fuller sense of being or a fuller sense of world. In essays from the 1950s (for instance, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” and “The Thing”), Heidegger writes how things “gather” the world understood as the fourfold of earth and sky, mortals (humans), and divinities. His meditations on how in partaking in the configuration of a concrete site of being, things may occur in a way that they shelter truth or gather a world—these meditations occur against the backdrop of his experience of how currently in the West, things don’t really happen in this way, how they don’t shelter truth and don’t gather a world but are encountered in advance as disposable commodities swallowed up in the demand for calculability, productivity, and enjoyment.
P. 301
 
Tuesday, May 15, 2018
 
Richard Capobianco on leaping to time-space.
[A] “leap” out of transcendental-phenomenology to—what kind of thinking? We could say that this is precisely what Heidegger attempted to answer for himself over the remaining nearly fifty years of his lifetime of thinking and writing. Even so, what he does make evident here, if we read carefully enough, is that with this “leap,” the transcendental framing of Being and Time had to be abandoned and left for ruins. The Being-question survives, but little else. Indeed, there should be no surprise or puzzlement among commentators that so many of the thematic elements of Being and Time—such as the tool analysis—vanish in the later Heidegger’s thinking. The “leap” left these transcendental micro-analyses behind once and for all.
Yet, again, a leap whereunto? He offers a sketch of where (his) thinking must go, and we recognize in the dense sentence of the entry several of the key features of his later thought. Thus thinking must make a “leap” over the transcendental analysis of Dasein’s Zeitlichkeit in Being and Time to the Temporalität of Being itself. To think the “temporality” of Being itself means bringing to language “primordial time” and “primordial space” as they “essence” or unfold together. In the later thinking this is the leitmotif of the “time-(play)-space” (the Zeit-Raum and Zeit-Spiel-Raum) of Being itself. It was the “time-space” of Being that was sought after in Being and Time but which could never be attained by remaining within the transcendental paradigm. Only with a “leap” in thinking can we arrive at the fundamental temporalizing-spatializing of Being itself, which is the (groundless) ground of the human being’s own temporal-spatial existence.
From "The 'Turn' Away from the Transcendental-Phenomenological Positioning of Being and Time to the Thinking of Being as Physis and Aletheia"
 
 
In the Manila Standard, the need to act.
So yes, there is truth, and it is knowable, but it requires engagement for us to know it. The Greek word, made famous again by Martin Heidegger, in the 20th century, is Aletheia—being or reality disclosed, unconcealed. The truth does not come all at once; it requires an effort on our part to uncover what is there. We use reason, the natural and social sciences, logic, our own categories, even our passions, a combination of all of these to get to the truth. Sometimes, it takes decades to verify a hypothesis, to validate an informed guess, but even as we await that, we must already act. The world does not stop even when the truth has not yet fully emerged. And even when the truth is much clearer, there are those who will still deny it for their own interests.
 
 
Machines à penser an upcoming exhibit in Venice, with a diorama of Heidegger's hut and a reconstruction of Wittgenstein's.
 
For when Ereignis is not sufficient.

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