Thursday, September 20, 2018
Thomas Sheehan on the condemned of ἀληθεύειν.
Once Husserl had put “phenomenological eyes in my head,” as he said in 1923 (GA 63: 5.22–23), Heidegger fought against the naïve objectifying realism of the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics he had been steeped in, which held that “the real” is id quod habet esse or id cui existentia non repugnat, i.e., that which exists independent of any subjective constitution by human beings. In that traditional view the realness of a thing is its existentia or Vorhandensein, its “mere existence” (1) outside of nothing and (2) out there in the real world. The phenomenological attitude breaks with that naïveté and draws us back reflectively and thematically to where we always already stand without noticing it: within meaning-giving fields of possible intelligibility. There we relate to things not merely as objects positioned spatio-temporally in the universe, independent of us, but rather in terms of their significance, their meaningful presence to us as personally, socially, and bodily engaged with them. From the start of his career Heidegger affirmed, “I live in a first-hand world of meaning; everything around me makes sense, always and everywhere” (“In einer Umwelt lebend, bedeutet es mir überall und immer: GA 56/57: 73.1–8). Heidegger’s philosophy, like all phenomenology worthy of the name, is correlation research. For us “the real” is not simply what’s-out-there-now; it is the meaningful—not necessarily the “true,” but always the meaningful. Huis clos: there is no hors-texte, no exit from meaning. For us who are condemned to λόγος, outside of meaning there is only death.
Monday, September 17, 2018
In LARB, Brad Evans interviews Gil Anidjar on destruction.
Learning from Avital Ronell, I have tried to argue that Heidegger is among a handful who did pursue a thinking of destruction. Heidegger did not advocate for destruction — he was no Nietzsche — but he proposed a typology of destruction (incidentally, a highly troubling one, as troubling as other and very much related issues that have attracted much more attention), where he discriminates between destruction, extermination, and devastation.
Sunday, September 16, 2018
Absurd Being on Introduction to Metaphysics.
Saturday, September 15, 2018
In the Buckinghamshire Daily Echo: Woman to break jug and glue it back together again.
And it's inspired by an essay called The Thing by German philosopher Heidegger. Her event is part of ArtVaults: Live - taking place in the ruins of Canute's Palace on Porter's Lane.
We used to do this as kids: build a model-airplane from a kit, blow it up with a ladyfinger, glue the new piece back together, repeat; hours of fun—naively oblivious to the ontological import.

Friday, September 14, 2018
Introduction to Heidegger for Muslims
Thursday, September 13, 2018
In The Spokesman-Review, the music for the film Gavagai.
Throughout the film, Trezenga weaves together his twin fascinations with the works of German philosopher Martin Heidegger, and Norwegian author and poet Tarjei Vesaas.
“‘Gavagai’ is about poetry and Heidegger/Hölderlin, Godard/Tarjei Vesaas as poets reaching into ‘the abyss,’” Tregenza explains in his director’s commentary. “The method of creation is to employ the language of a poet, Tarjei Vesaas, and the practice of cinema to uncover how Being and death can call for a different, more meditative event. Gavagai has its origin in thoughts on Being. We follow a forest path set forth by Martin Heidegger, not on a country lane in the Black Forest of Germany, but in Telemark, Norway.”
The film is concerned with the impossibility of perfect translation, the movement between media: most literally with a husband’s attempt to finish his wife’s work, and, more abstractly, the filmmaker’s cinematographic application of an unconventional Heideggerian time concept.
Wednesday, September 12, 2018
In NDPR Catherine Zuckert reviews Susan Meld Shell's The Strauss-Krüger Correspondence: Returning to Plato through Kant.
Reputed to be Heidegger's most promising student, [Krüger] was lecturing at the University of Marburg. Some of the letters contain Strauss's requests for assistance from his friend in finding a supervisor for his habilitation as well as, more urgently, employment. The letters thus reveal the problems Jewish scholars in Germany faced even before the Nazis took power. The primary reason why the letters are of interest today, however, is that, agreeing that modern philosophy is fundamentally defective, Krüger and Strauss point to different, one might even say, fundamentally opposed paths from Heidegger. For Krüger, Heidegger's re-raising the question of being pointed to the importance of ontology, which involved theological and moral as well as strictly philosophical issues.
Tuesday, September 11, 2018
In NDPR Anthony D. Traylor reviews Bradley B. Onishi's The Sacrality of the Secular: Postmodern Philosophy of Religion.
Heidegger's breakthrough discovery (beginning with the summer lecture course in 1919) is that all Neo-Kantian talk of "value" (the stuff of "worldviews") presupposes a more original encounter with the world which is prior to its theoretical articulation by both science and philosophy. Understood pre-theoretically, meaning is something that arises immediately out of lived-experience (Erlebnis) and takes hold of me directly. This recovery of pre-objectified experience (what Heidegger calls the "es weltet" or the "it worlds") before it has undergone a process of "de-vivification" (Ent-lebnis) marks, for Heidegger, the critical juncture not only for the fate of meaning but for the future of philosophy itself if we are to avoid the "abyss" of worldly reification, or as Onishi has it, Weberian disenchantment. Insofar as the es weltet unfolds within the temporal flow of "factical life," it resists reduction to rational mastery and reveals a certain "uncanniness" or layer of mystery that situates worldly meaning in close proximity to what we normally think of as the "sacred."
For when Ereignis is not sufficient.

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