I think we can see today where Heidegger went wrong and where his theory falls short. Among such points I would include: (1) ‘modern’ technology is not a fundamental break in the ontological order, (2) technology is not a strictly human affair; animals, at least, make extensive use of tools, (3) his essence of modern technology (“Enframing”) is too abstract and vague to serve as a useful concept, (4) the effects of technology on the environment are critical and cannot be overlooked, (5) technology has an undeniably ‘mental’ aspect to it, and thus essentially involves the concept of mind, and (6) the “saving power,” if there is one, involves more than mere artistic activity, and more than simply “watching over” technology, as Heidegger suggests.
if, on the one hand, with the intention of opposing the unilateral Husserlian determination of the subject on the basis of categories taken from θεωρία, Heidegger found in Aristotle's practical philosophy the elaboration of the original determinations of human life, on the other hand he extrapolates these determinations from the context of the theory of moral action and absolutizes them, causing them to become fundamental ontological determinations.
In NDPR, Charles Bambach reviews Andrew J. Mitchell and Peter Trawny's Heidegger's Black Notebooks: Responses to Anti-Semitism.
We also find there repeated claims about German exceptionalism and greatness that go beyond mere chauvinism and national pride, as when Heidegger claims that "only the German can say and poetize being in a new, originary way." What emerges from the pages of these notebooks over a 17-year period (1931-1948) is a vision of Germany's vocation as the only possible hope for "saving the West." The loss of the war, the revelations about the extermination camps, the personal crises that Heidegger faces with the French l'epuration commission in Freiburg -- none of these fundamentally shattering phenomena alter Heidegger's faith in the chosen status of the Germans to save the West from an apocalyptic collapse.
The correspondence between Gewissen and φρόνησις that Heidegger notes does not then appear completely unjustified. In fact, as the conscience directs the being-there towards the authenticity of choosing itself, so φρόνησις represents to Aristotle the practical knowledge that can guide the actions and choices of man in a morally good sense, directing it to live well, towards the best type of life.
As a teenager during that same period, a philosopher friend of mine bought his first copy of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time in an Iowa mall’s Waldenbooks, with money earned from a summer of corn detasseling. Like it or not, the mall offered access to a broader world than flyover country could easily access.
Now, in that series of analyzes of everyday life that trendy existentialism has misunderstood, but at the same time made famous, Heidegger shows how it is so because of the structure of the having-to-be, in which in having to take charge of its own being, da-sein is confused and tends mostly, in daily attitude, get rid of this burden; it thus acts out its being not for itself, but according to the ways of the common impersonality of the They (Man) foreshadow and provide, and which da-sein assumes in an inauthentic manner. This disorientation (Unheimlichkeit) and this tendency that Heidegger calls fallenness (Verfallen) is unnatural to da-sein, precisely because having to choose for oneself in practice puts it inside its own structure is something that cannot be avoided, but is the necessary consequence of his way of being.