Another possible tack on this is Heidegger's. He translates the fragment thus: "along the lines of usage; for they let order and thereby reck belong to one another (in the surmounting) of disorder". Needless to say, this rendering of the fragment looks quite different from the standard ones. Heidegger leaves off the first part of the fragment due to an obscure habit of Greek scholarly citation pointed out by John Burnet, whereby an author's text is often `blended' in with the beginning of a citation from another author's text. There are several questionable links that Heidegger makes in the philology of his translation (not the least of which is the insertion of the `in the surmounting of' prior to adike). What interests me, however, is the way in which Heidegger translates one particular word: tisis. Tisis is normally translated as a penalty or recompense in punishment for some unjust deed. Likewise, in the widely accepted translations of the fragment, it is translated `penalty' -- the individual beings must `pay penalty' for their injustice. Heidegger, however, against the juridical reading claims that the original meaning of tisis is `esteem' and in the eventual translation, he uses the word `reck'. [Keep in mind that time, one's publicly recognized worth has the same root as tisis, so this is not too far fetched]. The latter word is the forgotten German root of ruchlos -- `reckless' -- and is related to the middle high German ruoche and the modern verb geruhen. All of these words circle around the notion of respect, solicitude, and above all, order. Heidegger chooses `reck' as the proper translation because, in the fragment, the word tisis stands in direct relationship to dike (dike kai tisis), which Heidegger translates as order (fug in the German -- a word that Heidegger employs often in his readings of Pre-Socratic thinkers). In light of this, we find that the `order' of `esteem' is required as recompense for injustice. The individual beings must `esteem', or give `reck' to the other individual beings to restore the order disrupted by their stepping beyond their proper sphere, which, according to Heidegger, is here represented as the will to outlast one's `while'. Individual beings stand against the passing of the proper time allotted to them and hence must `pay esteem' to those things coming into being with their passing away.

¶ 9:40 AM