Friday, June 23, 2006
Walter Brogan on Aristotle, phenomenology and all that:
Both Heidegger and Aristotle were engaged in the project of winning back a discovery of beings that were already hidden and distorted in the way they showed themselves. Both thinkers recognized that only by giving an account of this privative character of beings, as an intrinsoc way in which they can be, could a genuine access to the phenomenon itself be recovered. "What already shows itself in appearance prior to and always accompanying what we commonly understand as phenomena, though unthematically, can be brought thematically to self showing." [SZ 31] Phenomenology places the self-showing of these beings on a more radical footing. Phenomenology is the way, the method, in which the being of these beings can be approached and brought to light. The self-showing of beings is the starting point of all phenomenological investigation. But because being reveals itself in beings that are always already interpreted in some way, there must be a movement from our ordinary experience of beings to the phenomenological. This in turn grounds and makes accessible in its being the being that shows itself. Aristotle takes the ordinary experience of natural beings that shows itself. Aristotle takes the ordinary experience of natural beings as moved beings and asks what their being must be if they show themselves in their way.¶ 7:03 AM
By returning to the Greek roots of the word "phenomenology," Heidegger shows that there is an inner connection between what is meant by the Greek notion of phainomenon and the meaning of logos. Phainomenon means the self-showing, what is manifest. Logos lets something be seen from itself. Hence, Phenomenology means: "To let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself." [SZ 34] Heidegger's analysis of the greek roots of the term and his understanding of phenomenology in terms of the Greek understanding of being places phenomenology on a new path. Husserl's call to return "to the things themselves" urged an analysis of the transcendental ground that makes possible the disclosure of beings. For Husserl, this was the transcendental consciousness, and the task was to unfold the intentional structure of consciousness that constitutes the what and how of what it experiences. For Heidegger, the task of phenomenology is rather to make explicit, to bring to language and to formulate, what already shows itself, not in the human subject, but in itself. As Aristotle says: "the cause of the present difficulty (the seeing of aletheia) is not in the matter but in ourselves. For, as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the nous in our soul to that which through physis is most manifest of all" (Met 993 b8ff).
P. 28-29
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Good post. But you still need to go back to 'access to being' and not sidestep this issue on the B&T blog. Aristotle was a very basic kind of guy. For the sake of both of us, we need to see the difference in the way he looks at the access to being; that way we can see the way that we differ on Heidegger.
Aristotle sees being through the logic, then through the metaphysics. This is how you get to being.
Heidegger has a different move.
He sees the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle as having presuppositions. He sees phenomenology as having presuppositions.
They need to be fleshed out for B&T to work.
That is why I have offered to substitute Husserl's phenomenological categories or anybody else's categories as substitutes for Aristotle's.
So that people can see what Heidegger is doing and not read him like he is a kind of secular Bible.
If you want to have a Bible study, fine. Just let me know. I'll be Kierkegaard's John of Silence.
Aristotle sees being through the logic, then through the metaphysics. This is how you get to being.
Heidegger has a different move.
He sees the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle as having presuppositions. He sees phenomenology as having presuppositions.
They need to be fleshed out for B&T to work.
That is why I have offered to substitute Husserl's phenomenological categories or anybody else's categories as substitutes for Aristotle's.
So that people can see what Heidegger is doing and not read him like he is a kind of secular Bible.
If you want to have a Bible study, fine. Just let me know. I'll be Kierkegaard's John of Silence.
The folks on the B&T blog can speak for themselves, but your telling me what I must or should do to satisfy your requirements doesn't amount to much. Unless I wake up and discover you are grading my final exam.
Aristotle discusses the Parmenidean ontology of a single being (to on), as contrasted to non-being, and then proposes understanding being through energeia, dynamis, kinesis, physis, and logos, amongest other things. As he put it to on legetai pollachos, being is said in many ways. Logic and metaphysics were words introduced by later librarians to organize Aristotle's texts. We have those texts, so if you want to use Aristotle as the authority on Aristotle, you might as well cite him directly--as Heidegger does. That way we can distinguish easily between what Aristotle actually wrote and Mauberly's interpretation. Regarding categories, note how Brentano refers to them "in Aristotle" rather than as Aristotle's. I bring that up as a hint of Aristotle's problems with categorical definitions of being, useful as categories may be for classifying beings.
Aristotle discusses the Parmenidean ontology of a single being (to on), as contrasted to non-being, and then proposes understanding being through energeia, dynamis, kinesis, physis, and logos, amongest other things. As he put it to on legetai pollachos, being is said in many ways. Logic and metaphysics were words introduced by later librarians to organize Aristotle's texts. We have those texts, so if you want to use Aristotle as the authority on Aristotle, you might as well cite him directly--as Heidegger does. That way we can distinguish easily between what Aristotle actually wrote and Mauberly's interpretation. Regarding categories, note how Brentano refers to them "in Aristotle" rather than as Aristotle's. I bring that up as a hint of Aristotle's problems with categorical definitions of being, useful as categories may be for classifying beings.
Nobody is grading exams.
Aristotle can be viewed as saying that being is said in many ways. He says so. Being is substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, action, passion, time, position, state.
It matters not what categories they are but how being is presupposed by them, whichever ones you pick, whether they are static or dynamic, latinized or simonized. Heidegger has a particular thesis in Being and Time. It needs to be explained.
Then the analysis of Greek terms can possibly confirm the approach, but it cannot be primary. Otherwise, he would not say that there is one access to being, i.e., phenomenology.
So if you are going to reason your way through the text and not read it like Corinthians, you need to address the question of access, because it is the “ownmost” question of Being and Time.
Reason tells you what to do, not me. The question of access is central; MH says so.
The Heideggerian needs to show how MH's ontology is presupposed by this access.
If you can't do that you are accepting his view as a kind of religion.
Which is fine with me; I get along fine with Baptist preachers. I just don't do philosophy with them.
Aristotle can be viewed as saying that being is said in many ways. He says so. Being is substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, action, passion, time, position, state.
It matters not what categories they are but how being is presupposed by them, whichever ones you pick, whether they are static or dynamic, latinized or simonized. Heidegger has a particular thesis in Being and Time. It needs to be explained.
Then the analysis of Greek terms can possibly confirm the approach, but it cannot be primary. Otherwise, he would not say that there is one access to being, i.e., phenomenology.
So if you are going to reason your way through the text and not read it like Corinthians, you need to address the question of access, because it is the “ownmost” question of Being and Time.
Reason tells you what to do, not me. The question of access is central; MH says so.
The Heideggerian needs to show how MH's ontology is presupposed by this access.
If you can't do that you are accepting his view as a kind of religion.
Which is fine with me; I get along fine with Baptist preachers. I just don't do philosophy with them.
Heidegger wrote a book. It's a difficult book. People want to read it together to help themselves understand it. If you want to read it with them and point out inconsistencies or other problems in the book, then that's great, but I don't see why it is incumbent upon them to have to explain some point to your satisfaction. Nor why their failure to do so makes anyone religious.
I read sections 14-16 of B&T as using phenomenology to produce ontological insights. Common things in the everyday world are discussed. I read no appeals to anything of a religious nature.
I know where Heidegger says thinking is the access to being. Where does he mention access to being in B&T? Perhaps you could point that out, and your objections to what Heidegger wrote in the B&T blog?
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I read sections 14-16 of B&T as using phenomenology to produce ontological insights. Common things in the everyday world are discussed. I read no appeals to anything of a religious nature.
I know where Heidegger says thinking is the access to being. Where does he mention access to being in B&T? Perhaps you could point that out, and your objections to what Heidegger wrote in the B&T blog?
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