Invoking Heidegger's analysis of the distinction between Being and beings (Being is neither a "principle" for beings nor can it be understood out of "entities"), Thanassas argues that the speech on truth may be read neither as articulating the "principles" of things nor as presenting Being as a transcendent entity. This leads to an understanding of Being as the Being of the beings in the cosmos. In Thanassas' view, Heidegger's ontological distinction finds support in Parmenides' statement about Being and thinking (Fr. 3) which Thanassas interprets as saying that Being is related to thinking because only thinking is capable of unifying our unavoidably plural sensory experiences. The underlying assumption of Thanassas' argument is that thought necessarily implies the interdependence and mutual correlation of Being and thinking: Being only emerges within thinking, but conversely, thinking also needs Being as its significant object if it is to rise above the senses and affirm ontological truth. Hence "Being appears rather as Thinking's task and goal".

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