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Friday, December 31, 2010
 
More from James L. Perotti on responding to Kant.
Thus in Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger described his task as that of laying the foundation of metaphysics and then noted that this task is in service of a later determination of the question about god (theology), world (cosmology), and man (psychology). In other words, Heidegger is anticipating that once he settles the laying of the foundation for metaphysics, he can then attend to building the disciplines which rest on that base.

Heidegger does succeed in laying the foundation for metaphysics, in a qualified way. In fact, he seems to have thrice succeeded: in Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics, in Being and Time, and in "What is Metaphysics?" Yet none of these "successes" satisfy him. In demonstrating the possibility of the comprehension of Being in Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics and Being and Time, he came to see the problem in a more original way, which undermined the success of the attempts. So he posed the question again in "What is Metaphysics?" and the Introduction to Metaphysics. These result in an ever better grasp of the problem; consequently he realizes the inappropriateness of his metaphysical direction and "overcomes" it. Because the question of god was to be addressed immediately after the foundational questions were determined, Heidegger never moved forward; the more orignal posing of the question of Being proved to have made a successful laying of the foundation less possible rather than more. Heidegger, despite his early anticipations, backed away from the question of god. Indeed, his way leads away from posing the question.

The Kantian task of laying the foundation for matephysics focuses one's attention on principles or grounds. Traditional scholastic metaphysics, as we have seen, used god as the ground for all things as creator and the ground of truth or knowledge, since the essences of created things are knowable (ontologically true) due to the manner of the divine creative action. Kant gave priority to the question of the ground of truth or knowledge but sought the ground within men. As a result, metaphysics could be grounded only on a demonstration that man is capable of knowning the Being (Seiendheit) of beings, capable of getting beyond an experience of the appearance of beings to their essences (their Being).

Kant failed to show how this could be possible. Heidegger succeeded by explaining the transcendental imagination as the human faculty which institutes transcendence, forms the horizon of objectivity within which the Being of beings is perceptible.

Pp. 9-10
 
Comments:
... As a result, metaphysics could be grounded only on a demonstration that man is capable of knowning the Being (Seiendheit) of beings, capable of getting beyond an experience of the appearance of beings to their essences (their Being).

Kant failed to show how this could be possible. Heidegger succeeded by explaining the transcendental imagination as the human faculty which institutes transcendence...


Perusing Perotti's comments and a bit of MH's Kantbuch one notes criticism of the humanist elements of Kant, his unwillingness to affirm theological tradition, the synthesis as a type of flaw, not accepting mere phenomena or noumena, but demanding Being--Heidegger sounds nearly neo-Leibnizian and close to the traditional catholics' view on Kant--or Aristotelian- conservatives for that matter (Ayn Rand detested Kant). That's understandable to some degree but....there's another side to that story is there not--e.g. Kant and empiricism for that matter as a reaction against scholasticism, and theology as a whole (and couldn't we read read MH as neo-Thomist of sorts? tho' with substantial differences).
 
Without pretending to speak with authority, I would suggest caution in response to Perotti's sweeping thesis. It is true that MH in KPM identifies Kant's project as establishing a ground for metaphysics, but as I recall MH does not propose there a similar project for himself. For by that time, MH has his Beitrage, even while it remained unpublished, and that collection surely offers the conditions for "another beginning" of metaphysics. The absence of any mention in the quoted materials of the Beitrage also raises a red flag. It seems a matter of general agreement that MH identifies the understanding of Being in terms of the 'Being of beings" as an error in classical metaphysics rather than a solution.

I would be interested to know where I can find MH's investigation of transcendental imagination. I have only studied Kant's First Critique and read bits and pieces and commentaries on the Second and Third. It is my recollection that what is most distinctively new in the Third is Kant's appeal to transcendental imagination. If that is also to be found in MH, so far I have missed it.
 
Caveat noted, Jan. Pro- Kantian Im not either--my reading mostly from 1st Kritik-- but one can hardly not note the similarities of Heidegger's critique of Kant--tho the Kantbuch's a rather thick continental brew--to other, mostly catholic critiques, which Perotti hints at. It's no hasty dismissal--in fact quite respectful-- but..the anti-Kantian -ism of Heid. and others may have been politically motivated for the most part--as with Nietzsche's savage remarks on Kant the protestant liberal, sort of a quasi-chinaman, etc. Soft.

In addition to Nietzsche, catholics--lest we forget, Bavaria and Austria are primarily roman Cat., even more so a century ago-- disapprove of Kantian skepticism for the most part (even Comrade Zizek might agree, tho probably not with my stoopid Amerikanische bourgeois phrasing)
 
PS. I do recall now that MH mentions transcendental imagination near the end of KPM. But my recollection is that it seems just mentioned in passing rather than as a feature of his developed philosophy. But I am more than a bit hazy about it.
 
J, the one comment from Perotti that rings most true for me is his characterization of Kant as ignoring the need to trace all authority back to God and affirming human deliberation.

In a Kant class I once indicated that Kant was Lutheran. The prof, himself from Deutschland itself, corrected me and told me Kant was a Pietist. They came in several varities but most notably stern independents who tried to live a holy life.

I was most surprised to learn that whereas Kant's book "Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone" developed the idea of Jesus as perfect model of the good, it had no doctrine of God. So anti-scholasticism he was, indeed.
 
his characterization of Kant as ignoring the need to trace all authority back to God and affirming human deliberation.

--Not sure I would term Kant's critique of Aquinas's "Quinque viae" as "ignoring the need to trace all authority back to God". His counter-arguments may not be the final word on the classical arguments for God but are rather cogently presented (and informed by Copernicus, Galilleo, Newton, etc, rather than Aristotle and Ptolemy). IK's central point was that scholasticism/Thomism--or Leibniz, another of his targets (via Wolff), a point many altar boys forget-- did not have airtight, necessary metaphysical arguments which would prove the existence of Gott--they are at best something like logical modalities--"possible worlds".

--re the second part of your statement, I assume you mean Kant affirms human deliberation (not ignoring it). So ...Kant's ethics rather than the 1st Kritik. Yes, that appears to be the case, but it's done via the categorical imperative isn't it? Not merely utility but all acts should be considered as possible universal maxims. And...he's no mechanist---humans are free, autonomous, etc. (Tho Im not certain that Kant really adequately dealt with the determinism issue--then, neither have most philosophers. Wm James did).
 
One of the profs who taught me Kant identified "modern" with deliberation about human freedom. I take Kant's rebuttals to the ontological argument as advancing such modernism.

At the same time, the part of the First Critique I did not study was his commentary on logic. So I do not know to whom or what he gives credit for its, or the synthetic apriori's, existence. I assume those are noumenal and therefore divinely inspired.

Kant affirms immortality as necessary because otherwise justice languishes. My hero Emerson also affirms his own "compensation," which I have yet to become able to accept.
 
Most Kantians interpret Noumenal as speculative, possible, and perhaps valuable to think so, but not necessary, or even knowable: and G*d, Freedom, and immortality are noumenal are they not. Saying a God could exist would probably not please the priest or preacher, nor would the humanistic elements. So Im inclined--slightly --to agree with those who detect a certain skepticism in Kant as far as religious issues go (also noted in his points against the ontological argument). But....one can understand the attacks on Noumenon (from Nietzsche, et al).
 
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