Both in “Anaximander’s Saying” and in What is Called Thinking?, Heidegger asserts that insofar as τά ὄν is a participle it can be used either as a noun that refers to a Seiende, i.e., a particular being (or even, what-is in general, one may add ), or as a verb that refers to the act of being as such (seiend). Thus, one thing is to refer to a particular being, and a very different one to refer to the act of being that constitutes that particular, or any particular for that matter. The Seinsfrage is hence the question about the act of being, that is to say, the basic act that constitutes what-is. In the formulation ‘the question of being’ we need to hear the verbal sense of the term ‘being’ (be-ing), rather than an ossified noun.

¶ 1:26 PM