Before going on with our discussion, let’s take some examples of deception and the covering-over of beings. Say I am walking in a dark woods and see something coming toward me through the fir trees. “It’s a deer,” I say. The statement need not be explicit. As I get nearer to it, I see it’s just a bush that I’m approaching. In understanding, addressing, and being concerned with this thing, I have acted as one who covers-over: the unexpressed statement shows the being as something other than it is.
We can point out how the three conditions are present in this deception:
1. It is necessary that beforehand I already have something given to me, something coming toward me. If something did not already encounter me from the outset, there would be no occasion to regard it as . . . Always already there is a priori disclosure of world.2. It is also necessary that, as I approach the thing, I take it as something. In other words, in the field of everyday experience, I don’t just stand there, as it were, in the woods and have something simply and immediately in front of me. A situation like that is pure fiction. Rather, in an unexpressed way, I encounter something that I already understand, something that is already articulated as something and, as such, is expected and accepted in my way of dealing with the world. Only because I let whatever encounters me encounter me on the basis of the act of envisioning something (say, a deer), can that thing appear as a deer.3. And the encountering-being can show itself to my act of envisioning “as this thing” and “in this way” only because, along with the encountering-being and the other things present in this world (particularly in the lived world of “forest”), something like “a deer” can indeed be present among the trees. This is so insofar as the encountering-being entails the general possibility of synthesis, a possibility which, with regard to concrete deception, is always oriented objectively, i.e., includes within itself a range of indications. To take the above example, I would not, in fact, think that what was approaching me was the Shah of Iran, even though something like that is intrinsically possible. The Shah is a being that could appear among the trees in a German forest at night, whereas there is not a chance that I would see anything like the cubed root of sixty-nine coming toward me.These three conditions of the possibility of falsehood are obviously interconnected. The decisive question is: How?
Pp. 158-9