In NDPR Thomas Nenon reviews Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann's Hermeneutics and Reflection: Heidegger and Husserl on the Concept of Phenomenology, translated by Ken Maly.
In the early 1919 lectures such hermeneutical phenomenology is described as a form of "understanding looking" that is fundamentally different from "theoretical knowing, whose known is only things, what is reified, or what is ob-jectified", including consciousness itself as an object of reflection. What makes Heidegger's phenomenology hermeneutic is the fact that "Understanding looking accompanies the sense of enactment of living-experience and is thereby capable of interpreting the pre-theoretical essence that is own to lived-experience". It is attuned to the things with which we concern ourselves as they present themselves to us against the backdrop of lived experience that is the most basic or original "event" or "Ereignis" from which hermeneutic phenomenology proceeds.
It’s astonishing to me to read the sense of beleaguerment among scholars of Heidegger (or related thinkers) when confronted with his anti-Semitism. Just as Europe lived from the violence of slavery and colonialism, Christian Europe lived from anti-Semitism. It helped define nations, boundaries (what is Europe? not a continent, even as it’s called “the continent,” but there is of course the religious boundary), and entire modes of cultural and political life. It’s a part of Europe, not as a marginal feature, but, like slavery and colonialism, part of the infrastructure of its own self-realization and meaning. To say Europe is entangled with racism is uncontroversial. To engage Europe without thinking hard and systematically about entanglement? That requires some serious justification.
Physic majors should do a semester on Heisenberg's entanglement. Aeronautical engineers on von Braun's. Opera students. Heck, all music students. Logicians and analytical philosophers, to the front of the queue.
At its worst, Minecraft reinforces an already predominant worldview in which everything can be reduced down to common-denominator monads–in this case, blocks. An over reliance on rigid, angled, quantifiable ways of being in the world eliminates the equally important soft fuzzy curves of qualitative ambivalence. Martin Heidegger once wrote, “being is not something that can be found in the nature of a table, even if the table were to be broken down to its smallest parts.” On some level, we all know that the world is not actually made of extractable resources (human or ecological) available for guilt-free rape and pillage. Still, for some reason, we choose to see it that way.
The inherent characteristics of the tool-in-hand (the TDR in use) can and does have an influence upon reflective practice. However, this tool-focused approach overlooks one important factor. As the German philosopher Martin Heidegger once said, 'A tool is only a tool insofar as it is used as such to achieve an expected goal'. That is, the designer brings his or her expertise, skills, knowledge and judgment to TDR choice and use (or lack thereof); their understanding of a tool's strengths and limitations, in terms of the requirements of design practice (or lack thereof), has clear implications for the extent to which the design tool influences the design practice.
I haven't come across that "A tool is only a tool..." quote before. The only link in Google is the blog post.
¶ 7:45 AM0 comments
Sunday, July 20, 2014
Opinionator has Michael Marder on the uses of the Black Notebooks.
Of course, none of the recent revelations about Heidegger should be suppressed or dismissed. But neither should they turn into mantras and formulas, meant to discredit one of the most original philosophical frameworks of the past century. At issue are not only concepts (such as “being-in-the-world”) or methodologies (such as “hermeneutical ontology”) but the ever fresh way of thinking that holds in store countless possibilities that are not sanctioned by the prevalent techno-scientific rationality, which governs much of philosophy within the walls of the academia.
Best to suppress thinking before it corrupts the youth of technutopia.
¶ 10:42 PM0 comments
I'm inclined to follow philosopher Martin Heidegger down a different, deeper, and darker path of speculation.
Heidegger proposed that we human beings are uniquely terrified of our own mortality because we're more keenly aware than any other animal of all we have to lose by dying. Each of us inhabits a world overflowing with meaning. We care deeply, almost infinitely, about ourselves, our lives, our loved ones. And the prospect of losing it all — of the world and everything in it winking out of existence when we cease to be — is unspeakably horrifying.
Heidegger also suggested that we spend much of our lives fleeing from the fact of our finitude, throwing ourselves into the world and its concerns, including technological distractions and diversions.
Science and religion ask different questions about different things. Where religion addresses ontology, science is concerned with ontic description. Indeed, it is what Orthodox theologian David Bentley Hart calls their “austere abdication of metaphysical pretensions” that enables the sciences to do their work. So when, for instance, evolutionary biologist Jerry Coyne and pop-cosmologist Lawrence Krauss dismiss the (metaphysical) problem of how something could emerge from nothing by pointing to the Big Bang or quantum fluctuation, it is difficult to be kind: Quantum fluctuations, the uncertainty principle, the laws of quantum physics themselves—these are something. Nothing is not quantum anything. It is nothing. Nonbeing. This, not empty space, is what “nothing” signifies for Plato and Aquinas and Heidegger, no matter what Krauss believes. No particles, no fluctuation, no laws, no principles, no potentialities, no states, no space, no time. No thing at all.