enowning
Thursday, August 17, 2017
 
On being-at-work in B&T.
As our dealing geared to equipment in Being and Time is included in the work-world, so is the work-character of the world also in this lecture understood in relation to human being as worker. As equipment only is in our dealing geared to equipment and in our focus on its work, so is the relation with timber here characterized in the following way: the timber is originary at work, provided that the carpenter has it in hand. “What is able-to-be (the wood lying before in the workshop), that is in work, is there as able-to-be precisely when it is taken up into work.” The whole of nature is therefore being-at-work—the phusis is “worker of itself”—but originary being-at-work is nature precisely in our dealing with it: “In work, one has the surrounding world (also that which is of interest, and the like). We are concerned with the surrounding world in hand.” Work is thus understood in a relational way, as the unity of the being-at-work of the work-world and human work with regard to this world, and concerns therefore the appearance of the world as being-at-work and our human responsiveness to the world of work as worker.
Also in Being and Time, our dealing geared by equipment is explicitly called “work”; the work-world “is found when one is at work,” we meet other people “at work,” etc. It is precisely this handling or working with equipment with regard to the works of labor, which is called being-in-theworld by Heidegger.
P. 66
From Vincent Blok's Ernst Jünger’s Philosophy of Technology Heidegger and the Poetics of the Anthropocene.
 
Tuesday, August 15, 2017
 
In Goodreads, Chungsoo Lee reviews Ryan Coyne's Heidegger's Confessions: The Remains of Saint Augustine in Being and Time and Beyond.
Through careful reading of Heidegger’s crucial texts at every juncture of the latter’s thought development, Coyne forces Heidegger into confessing that he (Heidegger) had to rely on theological language in order to “de-theologize” (Heidegger’s term) his thought. In showing this, Coyne establishes his own thesis: That the ‘thoughtful’ language that seeks to describe the movement of Beyng beyond metaphysics, beyond the language of onto-theology, ends up heavily dependent on such language. Indeed, a language beyond onto-theology is not possible, as Heidegger’s philosophic development (Coyne hopes) shows—with the consequence that philosophy of religion (an oxymoron for Heidegger) cannot move beyond the ontic language of history, traditions, and of theology.
 
Monday, August 14, 2017
 
Vincent Blok on Heidegger and the gestalt.
The problem for Heidegger is this: in the metaphysical tradition, being is understood out of beings (beings as such), whereas Heidegger tries to think being as such. When Heidegger, at the same time, states that being has to establish itself in a being, then the question arises as to how this established being is differentiated from the metaphysically understood beingness of beings (i.e., ontological indifference).
Our discussion of Heidegger’s destructed concept of the gestalt in the previous sections made clear that it cannot be understood as the beingness of beings. And yet, later Heidegger came to see that he could not withdraw his concept of the gestalt completely from this tradition, because it is inherently related to beings and thinks being out of beings. For instance, when Heidegger in his Rectorial Address is talking about the task before the Germans of finding their identity and when this identity can be found in a gestalt of the German people, then it is not clear how this gestalt is differentiated from an onto-typology, or from the beingness (gestalt) of beings (Germans). As long as the truth of being has to establish itself in a gestalt, being as such is not only thought of in relation with beings, but also out of beings, and we are then incapable of differentiating it from the beingness of beings. That is why Heidegger, in his Contributions, finally rejects the establishment of the truth in a gestalt and attempts to think the truth of being without beings: “Mindfulness transports the man of the future into that ‘in-between’ in which he belongs to being and yet, amidst beings, remains a stranger.” Because the concept of the gestalt is, according to Heidegger, inherently bound up with beings, the departure of establishment implies also the departure of the gestalt.
P. 99
 
Sunday, August 13, 2017
 
The Sydney Morning Herald on irrational ordering of fears.
As phenomenologist philosophers such as Edmund Husserl​ and Martin Heidegger​ pointed out in the last century, we have an attitude or intention towards everything that confronts us in our world. Telling me I should fear the horror of falling out of the sky in a bombed Airbus A380 less than I fear driving to work, because the latter is statistically more of a threat, is like telling me I should cease to be a human being and become an abacus.
 
Saturday, August 12, 2017
 
The Irish Times on the forgetting of objects.
The trouble with your own home is that its very familiarity leads it to become almost invisible. German philosopher Martin Heidegger had something to say about this. In his frequently impenetrable but otherwise fascinating quest to understand the concept of being, he looked at how in day-to-day life we necessarily forget to look at everyday objects such as tables, doorways, knives, forks and plates. If we didn’t, we’d become so distracted we’d forget to get on with the dinner.
 
Tuesday, August 08, 2017
 
At Crisis Magazine, sexual liberation ergo transhumanism.
[T]he inherently technological nature of modern liberalism’s spirit of revolution is not often appreciated. Here liberalism’s ostensible neutrality again works to obfuscate the underlying reality. Heidegger points out something similar at the beginning of The Question Concerning Technology: “Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology.” The liberal conceit of value-neutrality conceals the fact that the logic of liberalism is technological.
 
Sunday, August 06, 2017
 
In the Guardian, words matter.
Most people believe that they have certain feelings first, followed by a thought to themselves about how they feel. Not quite. The language you use has a direct and powerful in-the-moment impact on your feelings. The German philosopher, Martin Heidegger, said: “Language is the house of being,” while his compatriot, Hans-Georg Gadamer, insisted: “Without language nothing exists.”
 
Saturday, August 05, 2017
 
Franco Volpi's précis of B&T.
La differenza fondamentale rispetto ad Aristotele è che Heidegger eleva queste determinazioni pratiche a connotazioni ontologiche dell’essere stesso dell’uomo. Per Heidegger, cioè, il Gewissen e la Entschlossenheit non sono per così dire il frutto di una ἕξις produttivamente e positivamente conseguita da un soggetto morale, ma sono strutture ontologiche che connotano la finitudine stessa dell’essere dell’esserci, il quale esiste solo sul fondamento di un essere-gettato che non è lui stesso a porre.
Heidegger e Aristotele, chapter 3, paragraph 94. [dontcha u juz h8 the lack of pagination in e-books?]
His fundamental difference with Aristotle is that Heidegger elevates these practical determinations to ontological overtones of man's being itself. For Heidegger, thus, Gewissen and Entschlossenheit are not so to speak the fruit of a ἕξις, productively and positively achieved by a moral subject, but are ontological structures that imply the finiteness of the being of being-there, which only exists on the basis of a being-thrown that it didn't cast.
 
For when Ereignis is not sufficient.

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