The human condition, Heidegger says, is to be there. Probably it is the theater, more than any other mode of representing reality, which reproduces this situation most naturally. The dramatic character is on stage, that is his primary quality: he is there.
At the symposium I tried to argue that despite the queasiness and shame one sometimes feels when browsing a meditation on Heraclitus or Hölderlin and encountering some tawdry episode of the German struggle decked out with all the dignity of the majestic Event, we must continue to read Heidegger -- especially because he is the origin of a share of the greatest, most essential thinking of the last 50 years.
TLS reviews Barbara Cassin's Dictionary of Untranslatables.
The best articles – among them those by historians of philosophy of the calibre of Brague or Alain de Libera – tease out the complex relations of meaning and etymology across the languages of Europe. But the choice and relative sizes of entries are eccentric. We have “demos” but not “democracy”; the very different ideas of “description” and “depiction” get a shared entry; “idea” gets half a page, “Imagination” the same. “Event” gets a quarter of a page, but “Ereignis” (as used by Heidegger) gets a page and a half.
In next month's Philosophy Now, Raymond Tallis on being here.
One of the problems that bothered me was that [Heidegger's] ontology of human being was one-legged. You cannot, I argued, have a ‘being-there’ without also a ‘being-here’ for ‘there’ to be defined by. So Da-sein requires a complementary Hier-sein, as recto requires verso or as a view ‘out there’ requires a viewpoint ‘here’.
Meanwhile, back at the Heidegger.
The “Da,” as a concept understood with respect to the history of beyng,
does not have a directional character according to which it is distinguished
from the “over there” (here and there [da und dort]). Even the
“there” is a Da or, more precisely, is in the Da (Da ≠ ibi and ubi).
The Da signifies the appropriated open realm—the appropriated
clearing of being.
Capobianco proceeds to argue convincingly that the later terms Ereignis, Lichtung, and Es Gibt "say the same" as Being, and are not, therefore, structurally prior to Being as some commentators have suggested. Above all, this chapter demonstrates that, despite the many different ways Heidegger attempts to say Being, his philosophical focus remained, from beginning to end, "the pure appropriating . . . of what appears (beings) in the fullness of appearing (beingness)"; in other words, Being's 'manifestive' activity.
In NDPR, Alan D. Schrift reviews Robert Nichols's The World of Freedom: Heidegger, Foucault, and the Politics of Historical Ontology.
Nichols here argues that "After Being and Time, Heidegger shifted his focus away from [hermeneutic] questions of intelligibility and meaning toward [more practical] questions of truth and freedom". Although Nichols continues to link his discussion of Heidegger back to Division Two of Being and Time, the claim here is that after Being and Time, "the ontological characterization of freedom . . . is expressed as indeterminacy, contingency, and nonclosure in the historical presencing of a lifeworld". Freedom, now understood as "epistemological indeterminacy," manifests itself in world-disclosure as the outcome of human practical activity, and as such, freedom is ontologically tied to truth as that unconcealment revealed through this world-disclosure.
Günter Figal (Freiburg) resigned his position this past Thursday as chair of the Martin Heidegger Society in the wake of the publication of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks (Schwarze Hefte), which many believe show that Heidegger’s antisemitism was more central to his thinking than previously thought.