In NDPR, Pol Vandevelde reviews Daniel Dahlstrom's The Heidegger Dictionary.
[T]he entry “Appropriating event (Ereignis)” explains how the notion includes both an element of coming to one’s own, an element of event, and an element of history. The entry indicates some of the variations the term has undergone in Heidegger’s thought and explains what role it is supposed to play in various periods of Heidegger’s reflection. Each entry is thus a kind of cross-section of the soil of Heidegger’s thought, bringing to the fore a stratified picture of his thought as a whole.
Director Yuval Adler answers questions about his film Bethlehem.
Q. Because you have a Ph.D in philosophy, I was wondering whether there are skill sets from that field that carry over to directing a film. Is there any relationship at all?
A. There is, but not directly. In philosophy you have to have a certain openness to phenomenon, and I think that sensibility is very good in film. You don’t come already with a paradigm. There is no technique or worldview that I bring intellectually to the film. It’s just that ability to look, or as Heidegger would put it, to let the thing show itself. Because when you talk, it doesn’t show itself. You look and you open up, and suddenly the thing shows itself. That’s what you need to learn to do.
In NDPR, Antonio Calcagno reviews Rocco Gangle's François Laruelle’s Philosophies of Difference: A Critical Introduction and Guide.
Chapter Four turns to the work of Heidegger, examining his treatment of finitude. Laruelle admires Heidegger for his onto-theological critique of western philosophy, as it allows Laruelle to clear the way for his own reading of the in-One or the between-relations mentioned above. Gangle maintains that there are two distinct layers that constitute Heidegger’s analysis of difference understood as finitude.
the first stratum of Heideggerean Finitude, for Laruelle, consists of a lifting of the empirically derived notions of forgetting, inauthenticity and finitude to the a priori characterisation of philosophy as metaphysics. . . . This first level is . . . the dimension in which Heidegger delimits Western philosophy as metaphysics, or metaphysics as such. . . . the second stratum . . . [:] The tautological turn of Heidegger’s late thought allows this rigorously finite Finitude to be ‘let be’ (Gelassenheit) and thus to become minimally manifest (as essential withdrawal) without thereby determining any correlative and reciprocal syntax.
Ultimately, Gangle notes that though Heidegger is the thinker who most closely approximates Laruelle’s understanding of difference, Heidegger cannot “manage to unveil a clear and visible alternative to the tradition he critiques.” This may be true, if we read the unfinished Being and Time, but Heidegger’s later works certainly give us possibilities, which Laruelle does not fully explore here.
This just in. French ready release of L'affaire part trois, but it is only expected to grow to a category 4 scandale.
Nothing in English yet. But I'm sure the usual circus of professional haters are busy preparing their condemnations to whip up diatribes. So far as I can tell the host this time around is Peter Trawny.
At Speakout, Ahmed R Teleb reviews Nancy J. Holland’s Ontological Humility: Lord Voldemort and the Philosophers.
The fatal error Heidegger saw in most philosophy since Plato is its attempt to squeeze things and beings through a flat window of perception or project their shadows onto a screen of representational thinking–this error he called “not letting beings be.” This tendency to put beings in human terms, especially in terms of human use, reached its ultimate limits in his era–our era–as suggested by the very title of his work, “The Age of the World Picture.” Man’s desire to apprehend, control, put to use, on the rise since Descartes, not only alienates man from nature and others, but from himself and from an authentic life. In the “Cartesian Self” he saw not just a fantasy–that wishes away the background context that makes life possible–but a dreadfully poor one. The Cartesian Self for Heidegger is as great a threat as the nuclear age. The modern view of the world as thing to be conquered, used, employed ignores the “gift” that is the ultimate ground of Being.
In matters concerning the life giving and sustaining environment, the questions on the type of value or moral consideration, typical of early ethical theory, is merely a distraction from the essential questions, and can even become detrimental to life. Heidegger offers a valid approach that provides a more thoughtful basis to my relationship with the environment than would other value based theories. Instead of inquiring into the value of the environment as some object, I can simply accept the self-evident value of life and instead ask how I can most effectively live with and within the world – as it actually is.
While we democrats fight over which kind of all-encompassing herd to belong to, Nietzsche raises the awkward possibility that any kind of all-encompassing herd is “an attempt to assassinate the future of man” — that nihilism awaits at the end of any egalitarian humanism. This is a really European position to take. In America, we've developed in a way so different from the Old World that we can almost literally play with fire without getting burned. In Europe, Heidegger is fuel for an unprecedented cataclysm of human destruction. In America, he is but one of many ingredients in the broth of semi-spiritual life pragmatism.