As Heidegger observes, in our comportment towards the picture,
our glasses become invisible, withdrawing from presence, insofar
as we are directed towards the painting. Heidegger wishes to argue
that this demonstrates that there is a more fundamental spatiality
than that of Euclidean or Newtonian space, where proximity
is defined not by metric closeness, but rather by our concernful
dealings with the world around us. In these concernful dealings,
we look through our glasses. What is close in lived experience is
not the glasses, but rather the picture we are regarding in our
concernful dealings. [...]
The situation is the same with signs, texts, and messages.
Signs draw our thought beyond the vehicle that carries them—the
signifier through which they are transported—to whatever signified
they might be about. What we forget in our dealings with
signs—and what Heidegger forgets when he talks about the spectacles—
is that in order for signs to refer to something beyond
themselves in the first place, it is necessary for signs to themselves
be material entities that are present.
Fordham hosts video of Peter Trawny, Roger Berkowitz and Babette Babich discussing the black notebooks.
¶ 2:32 AM0 comments
Saturday, April 12, 2014
In the Telegraph, Michael Inwood comments on the black notebooks.
Why did he authorise the publication of the Black Notebooks? Perhaps he wanted to defy the finality of death by being read and discussed after his bodily demise. He arranged the publication of his notes and lectures in stages for this purpose. He came to realise that his Nazism, far from being an obstacle to this project, could be exploited to serve it. His philosophical writings would need to be explored in order to make sense of their mysterious author. Like the Greek hero, Achilles, Heidegger aspired to eternal renown. So far the plan seems to be working.
Daniela Vallega-Neu on the turning in the appropriating event.
The appropriating event cannot be represented
in terms of a linear process such that
some “being” appropriates another “being,”
namely Da-sein, but instead oscillates between
the truth of beyng and Da-sein, such that
both occur simultaneously. Heidegger speaks
in this context of the Kehre im Ereignis, the turning in the appropriating event. He
articulates this turning as well in terms of
an oscillation between the appropriating
call (Zuruf) and a belonging (zugehören).
The truth of beyng as event discloses only in
Da-sein, in the moment of appropriation and
belonging. Furthermore, Da-sein (now written
with a hyphen) does no longer designate
a human entity at all, nor does it designate
simply human being, although it does require
humans as the ones who are (-sein) the there
(Da), the open site of a historical time-space.
Philosophers like Martin Heidegger argue that humans are fundamentally temporal beings. This basically means we know our time on this planet is limited, and are thrown in situations where negotiating life in the present is fraught with inclinations to draw out lessons from the past, while also projecting future possibilities. We’ve ultimately got to decide what is a mere instrumental chore to be crossed off a to-do list, what recurring experiences should be actively chosen because they are intrinsically valuable and make life fuller, and what special, singular events we should strive for once before we die. Each of these has a different life logic, and the big question goal tracking apps beckon us to consider is how they should be represented and pursued.
If I wrote a goal track app, I'd name it Bestellen. Then my life could be orderable for a
¶ 6:10 PM0 comments
Months before Heidegger gives his phenomenological interpretations of the first Kritik, Heidegger is introducing to his students, in the Grundprobleme lectures of 1927, the problem of ontological difference, and he is doing so precisely through a destruktive meditation on Kant's categories of modality as they circumscribe the bounds of real predication. Although Heidegger had previously penetrated the Transcendental Analytic before the Phenomenological Interpretations in his 1925 Logik lectures, there it was self-evident why his examination had to limit itself in range and scope. By contrast the Phenomenological Interpretations, like the controversial Kantbuch that followed it, stood in need of some justification, and the Grundprobleme proffer that in linking the interpretation of Kant with the elaboration of the ontological difference.