In Malta Today, an interview with artist Evgletta Shtohryn.
How are you tackling the concept of time in this particular exhibition, and what led you to choose this path in particular?
Exploring the limits of now, hence the name of my project – ‘Now no longer – Now not yet’, it comes from Heidegger’s ‘Being in Time’, but what I am mostly interested in is the hyphen in the middle. The limits of now, the fluidity of it, the duration of the Now, when does it become the past?
From The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic:
The then arises from and in an expecting, and it permits of various
unambiguous definitions, within certain limits, of course.
These are possibilities that are not important for us now, since we
are seeking something else. But what we laid out regarding the
"then" is true of the "formerly" and the "now" in a corresponding
way. The "formerly" always pronounces a retention of something
previous. It is irrelevant here to what extent and how precisely we
recall what is previous; we could even have forgotten it. In other
words, the "formerly" is equally the utterance of a forgetting. The
"now" accordingly pronounces being toward what presences
[Anwesendes], and we term this being toward presencing things a
holding in attendance or, more generally, making present.
Let us tum again to the phenomenon of the then. It emerges
from expecting as such and is neither a property of objects nor of
subjects. Yet we have not thereby finally exhausted its essential
character but have, for the moment, overlooked something quite
essential. The then, which is utterable and arises in making present,
is always understood as "now not yet" (but rather: then).
Whichever then I may choose, the then as such always refers in
each case back to a now, or more precisely, the then is understood
on the basis of a now, however inexplicit. Conversely, every formerly
is a "now no longer" and is as such, in its structure, the
bridge to a now.
The Evening Standard reviews Don DeLillo's Zero K.
Part two of the novel, much more readable, sees Jeff back in New York, turning down his father’s job offer, describing his changing relationship with a teacher, Emma, who has a strange son adopted from the Ukraine, Stak. They visit an art gallery displaying a single huge natural rock and Jeff quotes Heidegger: “Man alone exists. Rocks are, but they do not exist. Trees are, but they do not exist. Horses are, but they do not exist.”
"The proposition 'the human being exists' means: the human being is that
being whose Being is distinguished by an open standing that stands in the
unconcealedness of Being, proceeding from Being, in Being." MH, P 284.
the terms of the entire debate on higher education by showing that
the functional imperative of fitness for purpose, appearances
notwithstanding, underlies both the liberal humanist and the
technocratic university. The difference is not one of principle but
merely of degree of generality of the end in question. Both models
of education are strictly vocational in the sense of naming the body
according to a functional identity. In the former case, the body
becomes politically fit subject of the state, while in the latter, the
body becomes economically fit commodity for circulation in civil
society. In coordination and contradiction, political formation for
subject-value and economic formation for exchange-value are, for
Heidegger, twin expressions of a generalised will to will in
education, where the aim is ultimately to increase the manipulation
and control of the body for its own sake. Thus, neither state nor
capital, self-aggrandising social forces that bend higher education to
their interests, is fundamentally explanatory of the university,
because they are but technologies of modern warfare against the
body characteristic of an age under the rule of technique. This is a
pivotal point in Heidegger's analysis, which can easily be obscured.
The mediated political or economic determinism of education which
Heidegger brings into relief is itself always rooted in the
metaphysics of the will to power. So the twentieth-century shift in
the formative task of the university from subjectivity to commodity
is, in Heidegger's view, a function of something more general,
namely, increased efficiency of control, which raises the fitness-value
of the body as manipulable object. Indeed, the logical perfection of
this functional idea of fitness for purpose, then, is that fitness comes
to take itself as object, turning education into a matter of fitness for
fitness, of pure technique devoid of substantive purpose.
It’s my hypothesis he was compelled to write this sort of philosophy because he was a pretty rotten person most of the time. Meaning, he was very much like those of you who remain subject to Original Sin. If you’re having trouble understanding that, then you are probably subject to Original Sin.
can be clarified philosophically only
through the distinction between beings and being, i.e., through
the splitting off of being from beings, a splitting off that is still
termed the “ontological difference” at the beginning of the 1930s.
Being itself is the fully other to beings. It is so much other that
it must be thought as the not-being
(Sein) withdraws itself, is concealed, and can be experienced only
as the “truth of beyng,” in the sense of a concealment, of a withdrawal
into particular and fundamental moods. Since it contains
nothing known and usual, it can be characterized as the “ever-strange.”
We can extend Heidegger’s thought a bit further. We can pose
a question concerning the atopography of the foreign, an atopography
that could liberate the foreign and its place or placelessness
from a boring dialectic of foreign and familiar. In such
a xenology, a philosophy of the foreign as the foreign of philosophy—
i.e., as a thinking of the foreign that would not itself
remain untouched by this—could perhaps develop. Heidegger’s
thinking of the foreign shows how extreme he thought the consequences
of revolution to be and how radically he thereby destroyed
every form of politics—even the Platonic. The revolution
was for him a total being-historical
upheaval, not only of
the accustomed lifeworld, but also of philosophy, science, art,
and religion. Clearly, the National Socialists could not have held
something like this to be anything but the remote idea of a daydreamer.
Heidegger well knew why he entrusted such ideas only
to the Black Notebooks, why he—as he says—“kept them silent.”
Such questions of philosophy are certainly not unknown
since the Neoplatonism of a Plotinus, since the mystical theology
of a Pseudo-Dionysius,
or since certain sermons of Meister Eckhart.
Seen this way, Heidegger shows himself to belong to a particular
tradition of thought that acknowledges the foreignness
of philosophical truth and defends this against comfortable simplifications.
All in all, we can say that behind the revolutionary
pathos of Heidegger’s style, for which the taste of the times is responsible,
there stand enticing philosophical questions.
Heidegger saved me because he gave me the language to write about race in such a way as I’d never written it before. Heidegger enabled me to write in this way because he has made me think about how to think. Of all the philosophers I know and the theorists I read, Heidegger stands apart because he is the only thinker I know who explicitly sets himself the task of thinking thinking. This is, above all else, what draws me to Heidegger: to ask myself, again and again, what it means to think. And thinking, in Heidegger’s rendering, is nothing other – in other words, it is everything – than asking oneself what it means to be an intellectual. It is all good and well to insist, as I have done, that the work of an intellectual is simple, straightforward: to think. It is entirely another matter to confront oneself with the question of what thinking is – this is the kind of question that can take over your life. And because it overwhelms you, it can, in the most crucial moments, also save you. Maybe it is all that can save you.
[A] science whose most proper object is also its origin, and whose proper conceptuality must not only be rooted in but must also thematize its fore-conceptual basis Heidegger calls Fundamental ontology. This science necessarily deals with the fundament of all science as an explicit theme in the course of accessing its proper object. At the same time, this science relates to its objective domain for one reason and one reason alone: to make explicit the fore-conception in terms of which that objective domain gets founded.
Finally, there’s the man who inspired Derrida’s articulation of deconstruction with his call for a destruktion–the word is intentionally ambiguous; it means both destruction and reconstruction–of Western philosophy in Being and Time. Yes, that man is Martin Heidegger, a former seminarian and a bad Catholic all his life.