The existential philosopher, Martin Heidegger coined the term "existential schizophrenia" to describe a general cultural morass already in the early 20th Century when crazy-making, repetitive factory work and the madness of war had already set in.
Would that be an existentielle or an existential Schizophrenie? I can't find the coinage in the blockchain.
¶ 5:27 AM3 comments
In Memory Theatre, Simon Critchely digs through Michel Haar's archives.
To my complete astonishment I found the original copies of a triangular correspondence between Jean Beaufret, Jacques Lacan and Martin Heidegger, which concerned the latter's vistit to Cerisy-la-Salle near Saint Lô in Normandy in 1955 to deliver the lecture, 'Was ist das - die Philosophie?', the title of which had always made me laugh. I don't know why. Most amusingly, some of the correspondence between Lacan and Beaufret deals with the topic of what Herr und Frau Heidegger might chose to eat for breakfast chez Lacan during their passage through Paris. Lacan had made complex plans to obtain specially imported Schwarzbrot from Alsace, together with hard cheeses and ham. Beaufret spends some paragraphs reassuring Lacan that the Heideggers looked forward to nothing better than some croissants, a café crème and perhaps a little tartine.
In Telos, Panajotis Kondylis pinpoints significant weaknesses and deficiencies in B&T.
[A]lthough the ontology of man’s Being may search for the dimension of depth beyond cognitive-philosophical but also beyond moral concepts, it remains marked by axiological likes and dislikes. Heidegger, of course, denies that he is moralizing or criticizing culture, but anyone familiar with 1920s German literature and journalism will easily recognize the origins of his motifs. The tendency to evaluate does not follow the well-trodden path of moral theory—on the contrary, current bourgeois morality is indirectly attacked; it is articulated as a confrontation between “authentic” and “inauthentic” existence, as the latter supposedly prevails at the level of the anonymous mass.
According to Heidegger, the act of listening is necessary for thinking as well as
learning. As a matter of fact, we do not just start to think; we must learn how to
think, and, in order to learn this, we need to listen. The teacher, to whom the students
listen, must learn to learn: ‘Lernen geht auf wissendes Aneignen und Eigentum des
Wissens, aber je auf ein Eigentum, das nicht uns gehört, sondern dem wir gehören’
(P. 190). In a conventional translation, this citation would read something
like this: ‘Learning rises from knowing appropriation and property of knowledge,
but always from a property which does not belong to us, instead to which we
belong.’ However, in this translation, almost all the meaning is lost. Gone is the
etymological relation to Ereignis —the event—in which we are related to Being.
Gone also is the bond to the verb hören, which here can be understood as ‘to belong
to’ (e.g. zugehören), but which also has to do with listening: we must listen to the
way in which Being speaks to us. Being speaks to us, Heidegger says, and Being
often speaks to us with a silent voice, a lautlose Stimme. Listening to the voice of
Being, we are attuned, gestimmt , to it. When Heidegger lectures on Heraclitus, trying
to show how logos is related to a German verb like lesen (here, not ‘read’ but
‘choose’), he concludes that, through his lecture, one can hear the sounding of the
basic words of the beginnings of thinking. They may be monotone, but they are the
‘tonic of this originating Greek thinking’(P. 298). Without this tone, it would
not be possible to listen to the beginning.
The act of making-sense or understanding is directed primarily not
to individual things and to general concepts. Instead, it is alive in one’s
firsthand lived world and in one’s world as a whole. In this act of
sense-making, the world is opened up for existence. This disclosure is
the uncovering of the current form of a being’s suitability-for, whereby
it is present as a being. Whatever gets opened up this way can be held
on to, even when the worldly thing in question is not itself present.
That is, the opening-up of the world—which unfolds in the act of
understanding or sense-making—can be possessed and preserved as
meaning, i.e., as a world of understanding in which existence
Manchester's criticism is thoughtful and imaginative. The gist of it is that when Heidegger claims that now-time measures time, he does not take into account the fact that the clock which he says is measuring time has a graduated clock face. It is these units that make the movement of the hands on the clock a measurement. Manchester concludes from this that Heidegger's claim that clock time is matter of counting nows is untenable. Manchester also claims, as I mentioned earlier, that we use clocks primarily to tell time, not to measure it. He says that the clock helps us to coordinate with what Heidegger calls the temporality of everydayness, making it not so much a measure of time as a way of telling time in average, everyday life.