enowning
Wednesday, August 24, 2016
 
The Open Commons of Phenomenology has a B&T PDF, and other texts.

I've found with my Gestausgabe App that the problem is not getting the texts, but getting high quality texts. There are a lot of PDFs circulating with OCRs of books. While the scans of each page in the PDFs are legible, the actual text content (obtained by OCRing the scans) is very low quality. Most munge umlauts and Greek, even if they do a decent job of plain text. In order to have a quality digital archive -- searches will find what you're looking for -- the texts needs to be cleaned up. And that's the medieval aspect of the enterprise. Using just the GA PDFs circulating today (over seventy volumes by my count), it would take a dozen monks or grad students years to clean up all the texts. With my GA App, I'm principally using texts from ebooks from the publishers. They usually have the original text, including authors' errata, although in some cases, they still use odd encodings for the Greek, which require coding a module to translate to Unicode.
 
 
In EPIC, Benjamin Ahnert from ReD on premium selling driving dwelling.
To understand what happens when people are stuck in their cars, we looked to Heidegger’s concept of “dwelling”. Heidegger once wondered whether a lorry driver, “at home” on the motorway, could be said to dwell there. For Heidegger, dwellings are much more than mere spatial extensions, and are not just defined by their mathematical extension. When Heidegger encourages us to “reflect on the relationship between man and space” to better understand what is so special about actual dwellings, he reminds us that “there is not man and then also space”. Rather, our experience of space is inextricably tied to the meaning created by the physical constituents and spiritual connotations of a space.
 
Tuesday, August 23, 2016
 
In NDPR, David G. Stern reviews Andrew Inkpin's Disclosing the World: On the Phenomenology of Language.
Inkpin argues that any interpretation of Heidegger’s account of the role of language in disclosure has to resolve an apparent tension between two desiderata that Heidegger tried to respect. On the one hand, Heidegger insists that language is “continuous with other meaningful activities”, and that the use of language can be understood as a particularly sophisticated form of tool-using activity, progressively building from lower to higher levels of determinacy. This pragmatic approach is developed in detail in §§28-33 of Being and Time, and naturally lends itself to a view of language on which it only plays a peripheral role in disclosure, as a supplement to our pre-linguistic skills. On the other hand, in §34 of Being and Time Heidegger insists that linguistic articulation has a quite specific form, namely being about something, and saying something of it, and that this is sharply distinct from other forms of intelligent behavior. This constitutive approach, which appears to draws a firm line between language and other meaningful activities, lends itself to a view of language on which all understanding shares a specifically linguistic structure.
 
 
In PopMatters, the moral quandary at the center of existence.
We are thrown into a world not of our making and not of our choosing. Thus our existence appears arbitrary, an improbability made concrete. This thrown-ness (Heidegger’s concept of Geworfenheit) foists certain responsibilities and encumbrances upon us—we are born into a specific situation, with specific customs and duties. Our situation, upon being born, is determined. The choice to conform to or rebel against those customs and duties, the choice of how to comport oneself within that thrown situation, however, is not determined. We are free but not utterly free; we move willfully within constraints.
 
Friday, August 19, 2016
 
In NDPR Scott M. Campbell reviews Sacha Golob's Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity.
[W]hen Golob talks about truth, he deviates from the more common understanding of truth in Heidegger as unconcealment prior to correctness and incorrectness by saying that Heidegger is a minimal representationalist whose notion of truth must contain "accuracy conditions". Golob argues that for Heidegger, truth involves meaning, and thus understanding, and something can always be understood either correctly or incorrectly. As such, to understand Being involves the correct or incorrect understanding of the properties of a thing, which constitute its essence. For Golob, an entity cannot simply be disclosed or given. It must be contextualised, the "a" variable must be located within the "b" variable, and with the "a as b" structure an accuracy condition is operative.
 
Thursday, August 18, 2016
 
In Phenomenological Reviews Elad Lapidot reviews Reading Heidegger's Black Notebooks 1931-1941.
So much Heidegger hermeneutics, so little time. Yes, reading takes time, takes lives. The question of reading “philosophically”, seriously, rigorously, the so far approx. 2,000 published pages of the series of fragments that make out half of the entire Black Notebooks, in the context and as the last 7 of the 102 volumes of Heidegger’s Collected Writings – is a real life question, existential question: is Heidegger worth our limited time?
 
 
In Phenomenological Reviews Gregory Jackson reviews Ponderings II–VI. Black Notebooks 1931–1938.
Heidegger felt Being and Time never brought him his ‘Great enemy’ [he capitalises the G], for its only effect is to have increased ‘prattle about “being”’. In the end it is Heidegger himself, in his own view at least, who takes Being and Time on as the ‘sharpest opponent’, for although a failed work its intentions can still be effectuated.
 
Monday, August 15, 2016
 
Also in NDPR, Andrea Staiti reviews Alessandro Salice and Hans Bernhard Schmid's The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality: History, Concepts, Problems.
Jo-Jo Koo discusses the early Heidegger's views of sociality and situates them in the context of the"non-summative constructionism" that characterizes much contemporary philosophy of sociality. This is the view that collective intentionality is not reducible to the intentions of the individuals involved, and yet emerges out of some kind of interlocking among them. However, Koo is very much aware of important differences between Heidegger and contemporary theorists. He nicely summarizes Heidegger's distinctive contribution in the following terms: "Whereas analytic social ontologists are primarily concerned with the process or mechanism by means of which interacting individuals can construct social or collective entities (collective beliefs, intentions, actions, agents, institutions, etc.), early Heidegger's crucial move emphasizes the conditions under which all entities, including social and collective ones, can make sense at all". Koo's analysis emphasizes the role played by Heidegger's famous notion of the anyone (das Man), as the condition that enables individuals to have a referential nexus of practical possibilities that are governed by a set of publicly shared norms.
 
For when Ereignis is not sufficient.

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