enowning
Tuesday, April 22, 2014
 
In the Huffington Post, why Buddhism is not the answer.
Martin Heidegger and Albert Camus agreed that the absurdity of the human condition is not something to release ourselves from (in a Buddhist sense), but they also believed that it was not something to rise above by finding meaning within (in a Nietzschean or Franklesque sense). They argued that absurdity, along with the anxiety that accompanies it, is an inescapable condition of humanness that must not be denied or avoided: our job is to live authentically by acknowledging absurdity and persevering in spite of it.
 
Friday, April 18, 2014
 
In Aeon, Lisa Guenther on solitary confinement.
[W]e exist as Being-in-the-world, in a complex interrelation with the situation into which we have been thrown. The work of phenomenology is to make this web of relations visible, so that we can appreciate the complexity of even the most simple, everyday experiences. Solitary confinement presents a challenge to my practice of phenomenology, both because I have not had this experience myself, and also because the testimony of survivors suggests that the experience of prolonged isolation is also an unravelling of experience: a deterioration of the senses, a becoming-invisible, an annihilation. If the task of phenomenology is to show how we make sense of the world through lived experience, then what should a phenomenologist make of prisoners’ accounts of a living death that no longer makes sense?
 
Thursday, April 17, 2014
 
Simon Critchley and Tom McCarthy deliver the International Necronautical Society statement on digital capitalism.

OWA is referenced.
 
Monday, April 14, 2014
 
Levi R. Bryant on the situation of the spectacles.
As Heidegger observes, in our comportment towards the picture, our glasses become invisible, withdrawing from presence, insofar as we are directed towards the painting. Heidegger wishes to argue that this demonstrates that there is a more fundamental spatiality than that of Euclidean or Newtonian space, where proximity is defined not by metric closeness, but rather by our concernful dealings with the world around us. In these concernful dealings, we look through our glasses. What is close in lived experience is not the glasses, but rather the picture we are regarding in our concernful dealings. [...]
The situation is the same with signs, texts, and messages. Signs draw our thought beyond the vehicle that carries them—the signifier through which they are transported—to whatever signified they might be about. What we forget in our dealings with signs—and what Heidegger forgets when he talks about the spectacles— is that in order for signs to refer to something beyond themselves in the first place, it is necessary for signs to themselves be material entities that are present.
 
Sunday, April 13, 2014
 
Fordham hosts video of Peter Trawny, Roger Berkowitz and Babette Babich discussing the black notebooks.
 
Saturday, April 12, 2014
 
In the Telegraph, Michael Inwood comments on the black notebooks.
Why did he authorise the publication of the Black Notebooks? Perhaps he wanted to defy the finality of death by being read and discussed after his bodily demise. He arranged the publication of his notes and lectures in stages for this purpose. He came to realise that his Nazism, far from being an obstacle to this project, could be exploited to serve it. His philosophical writings would need to be explored in order to make sense of their mysterious author. Like the Greek hero, Achilles, Heidegger aspired to eternal renown. So far the plan seems to be working.
 
Thursday, April 10, 2014
 
A new season of Entitled Opinions has started. The opening monologue has a bit about Heidegger's space and place.
 
 
Daniela Vallega-Neu on the turning in the appropriating event.
The appropriating event cannot be represented in terms of a linear process such that some “being” appropriates another “being,” namely Da-sein, but instead oscillates between the truth of beyng and Da-sein, such that both occur simultaneously. Heidegger speaks in this context of the Kehre im Ereignis, the turning in the appropriating event. He articulates this turning as well in terms of an oscillation between the appropriating call (Zuruf) and a belonging (zugehören). The truth of beyng as event discloses only in Da-sein, in the moment of appropriation and belonging. Furthermore, Da-sein (now written with a hyphen) does no longer designate a human entity at all, nor does it designate simply human being, although it does require humans as the ones who are (-sein) the there (Da), the open site of a historical time-space.
P. 283-4
 
For when Ereignis is not sufficient.

Appropriation appropriates! Send your appropriations to enowning at gmail.com.

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