Parvis Emad on what's discordant between the ontological difference and beyng--be-ing
in this instance.
The ontological difference is a discording distinction because it introduces discord into the thinking of being by intimating that to think being in its own right it is enough to determine the beingness of beings, which is precisely what happens in the 'first beginning.' Specifically, this distinction does not heed the manner in which a being's shining forth, its manifesting, is inseparable and yet different from the manner in which be-ing as such appears. Had this distinction accounted for the manner in which a being's appearing proves to be inseparable and yet different from be-ing's way of appearing, this distinction would have recognized that when viewed in the light of be-ing, a being is not--beings are not. However, if we carefully ponder the question whether we can attribute to beings the same "is" that distinguishes be-ing as the same "is-ness" peculiar to beings, that is, to what is extant, "exists," and has an essence, then we realize that "be-ing can no longer be thought of in the perspective of beings; it must be enthought from within be-ing itself" [P. 5].
Ontological difference is a discording distinction because it fails to take into account the distinction between the "is" peculiar to be-ing and the "is-ness" peculiar to beings. Ontological difference is a discording distinction because it suggests that be-ing can be thought in its own right within the perspective of beings. Insofar as this difference does not lead to awareness of the distinction between the "is-ness" peculiar to beings and the "is" that belongs to be-ing, it introduces a discord into the onefold of be-ing and a being. This onefold, in spite of the discordant ontological difference, must be thought at all costs.