Monday, November 07, 2011

Sub Specie Aeterni on Badiou’s Critique of Heidegger.
Rather than viewing truth as judgment, or as a comment on the adequation of a proposition to the world, Badiou prefers to think of truth as what he calls, following Lacan, “a process in the real.” This means that, no matter what historical situation one finds oneself in, a truth can be had. Truth is not a respecter of locations. For Heidegger, truths may only be located where propositions are absent, and it is not out of bounds to label this as a sort of totalization by restriction. The discoveries of 20th century mathematics cannot have, for Heidegger, produced any level of truth because they were directionally misappropriated from the beginning. Heidegger has determined this area a philosophical crime scene, and no one is allowed in but the forensic specialists, the phenomenologists.
I clicked too fast and deleted January's comment:

At the level of generalization offered by Sub Specie Aeterni, I understand MH's point to be that truth is not metaphysical. Hence, should one be capable of a non-metaphysical proposition, might it not "by chance" reveal truth consistent with MH?
What's a non-metaphysical proposition? An apophantic assertion?
"What's a non-metaphysical proposition? An apophantic assertion?"

I hadn't thought of that. Somewhere Stambaugh writes that "The Open is Being" is the only nonmetaphysical statement she's aware of.

My intention was simply to offer a clever construction to try to match Sub S.A.'s cleverness. Avoidance of stating that Badiou's position is nominalism (for which a whole host of traditional objections can be raised) struck me as an attempt to slough the issue.
Occasionally Ive wondered how the
Truth issue relates to Heidegger's writing (and .. Pomo)..assuming it does.

Truth does seem rather metaphysical IMO
Well, the modern understanding of truth is correspondence: the results of the experimenbt correspond with what the theory predicted. and then there's that other notion that truth is unveiling into presence.
The analytical/synthetic divide still remains a consideration--with correspondence theory usually on the "synthetic" side (or empirical broadly). All synthetic "truth" may not be correspondence but some is (ie, "he's guilty"). Probability an issue as well usually.

But tautologies--e.g. the law of the excluded middle-- are not a matter of correspondence are they, but true a priori. A computer's either on or off. And one might say..logic/math. as a whole is a priori (a constructivist theory possible, tho' rather daunting)
That was my short answer to how truth relates to MH. For the longer answer, well, the struggle continues.
Heidegger's idea of "alethia" seems ..primarily aesthetic. I don't deny something like that may occur (ie, the "truth" of Macbeth is "unveiled" perhaps)..but, one, I don't think that's what Aristotle meant, and two, that's not enough to defeat the correspondence theory or axiomatic truth ie, tautologies--(Ari. aware of law of excluded middle and law of non-contradiction, the Organon, geometry,etc)
Aristotle pretty much invented logic explaining what was true. MH doesn't disagree with logic, but he thinks that rational systems for specifying what is true rest on an ontological understanding of truth, which also supports other forms of truth that don't contradict rational systems, yet aren't explained by rational systems.
yes but does logic rely on a correspondence theory? no.

ergo analytical/synthetic divide (as Kant pointed out in first critique)---logic/mathematics being separated from natural sciences (at least until Quine where all is synthetic a posteriori) . The arts something different

I understand Heidegger wants to overcome mere logic chopping-but where is his "knowledge" (Dasein, etc) in terms of anal./syn. divide? IM not sure but seems aesthetic.
To MH epistemology (systems of knowledge), anal/syn divide are within the same metaphysics.
none the less he makes truth claims of a sort--ie, Dasein exists, it's known in some way, right/ (via moods angst,etc) does he not? "being is in the world" advances a proposition of a sort. It's not revelation is it (but one might say ..it's a problem if not communicable..as much as a mystic's reports might be, or abstract artist)
In The Finitude of Being, Stambaugh quotes from the Beitrage and then explains MH's reference there to Hegel's Logic:

"Developed being itself (as it is developed in Hegel's Logic) first makes possible (in a speculative counterthrust) being-God."

The term 'speculative' is here meant in contrast to 'metaphysical'. It was Hegel's insight that subject and predicate in the speculative proposition do not remain inertly in their fixed positions but interact, work over and transform each other. Pp 43-4.
Danke for clarification, Jan (and honestly I don't know the Beitrage apart from a few excerpts)
Yes the dialectic is quite different than Aristotelian/modern logic...but still observable in some sense, supposedly, according to Hegel (via History itself) isn't it. Pro-Hegelian Im not but he often sounds rather empirical (ie, his discussion of Laplace..)--so the truth question still relates to something like correspondence--can one note the working of the dialectic in history or elsewhere? (as Hegel and Marx insisted on....).

The relation between Hegel and Heidegger is not entirely clear (or paraphrasing Searle, all those dreaded german philosophers whose names start with H.)
Heidegger has called Hegel something like the greatest metaphysician of all times. At the same time, MH regards dialectic as a philosophical embarrassment or some such. MH sees a continuity between Kant's ontology and Hegel's work out of Absolute Spirit. And the consequence then is Nietzsche's conclusion of metaphysics in the will to power. All of which MH critiques.

One of my Hegel profs asserted that Hegel's Logic, while once influential, was no longer held in high regard. The prof had Habermas as his mentor, so that may signify a specific bias.

Stambaugh in a couple places does relate MH's notion of truth to a kind of revelation. That also was suggested by Carl Raschke in an early publication. When I attempted to get a response from him via email to whatever had become of that idea, I got no reply. My expectation is that he dropped the idea, as Raschke's field became "cultural and religious theory."

But with the option of revelation on the table, it might help explain why MH does not rely on formal logic.

Another prof had us read McDowell on science, for whom the correspondence theory of truth was insufficient as were all other theories of truth in science. As praxis, science wins. As theory, it is a swamp.

PS. My quote from Stambaugh should have cited pages 143-44.
""the correspondence theory of truth was insufficient as were all other theories of truth in science.""

OK. but observation is happening and the scientist makes observation-statements (as Quine would say). That's not all that's happening--there's testing of a hypothesis, data-gathering, examining results, other research etc . But something like correspondence-- Id call it "evidentialism"-- is happening--whether in science, journalism, legal issues (ie, courtrooms). That's not to say a Hegelian-philosopher, or a playwright relies much on correspondence theory. But in many contexts it's important (even ..for a playwright, who should know someting about history). But granted, dull as f*ck compared to the mysteries of existentialism.
"...there's testing of a hypothesis, data-gathering, examining results, other research etc."

MH's contention is that there is nothing technological about technology, which I understand to mean that while the processes of applied science provide a common vocabulary, they can eventually be distilled into philosophical assumptions. (Maybe even ontological assumptions?)

All of us, including philosophy of science, are struggling with the difficulties entailed by the withdrawal of be-ing. Applied science, insofar as it posits the goal of achievement in the world of matter in motion, does a hell of a job...until you ask it to explain coherently what it is doing.
In terms of the bleak world of technology and computing and making gear/ware which allows finance capitalism to be ever-more profitable, or weapons systems, or SUVs more effective, I agree somewhat with QCT (as Ive said). In terms of say..researchers finding new medicines to cure all manners of new diseases (or ..potenial plagues), or ethical "green" engineering, I don't. Really, that hydro plant on the Rhine detested by Vati Heidegger probably did some good, regardless if it ruined the view for some old bourgeois. Technology does often raise normative issues.
The issue with the rhine is not whether it is good (produces cheap electicity) or bad (chews migratory fish), but that the river is merely considered a resource, and not like the olden days when the town bridge brought the two banks of the river together in poetical like harmony. Its a different way of being for the river, and if we only consider things in terms of ordering them by economic usefulness we're poorer.
Yes, I understand MH's critique of instrumentalism to some extent but....."the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few". Energy resources are drying up, scarcity's an issue--so the power supplied by the hydro's an essential commodity. At times MH sounds nearly like some eco-purist in QCT.

A similar situation is happening around SoCal where some greens are upset about wind turbines. Yes turbines are ugly and kill birds but they provide massive amounts of needed energy. As with the hydro, I say....the benefits of the turbines outweigh the costs rather significantly.
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