Concerned being-in-the-world has opened-up its world relative to this possibility to encounter it. As concern, it has entrusted itself to the guidance of the surrounding world. Signification is the way in which we encounter the surrounding world. When we are concernfully immersed in the world [besorgende Aufgehen], as well as when we lose ourselves in it, we allow ourselves, as it were, to be carried along by these significations. So we have now identified the basic character of encountering the world — signification [Bedeutsamkeit].
Hence ‘signifying’ does not mean that natural objects, having previously been there as mere object-like things, are then endowed by a subject with value properties that are not truly characteristic of these entities. On the contrary we identity signification as the world’s primary ontological characteristic [primären Seinscharakters der Welt] in order to provide a basis on which to show that the ontological characteristics of the natural world [Seinscharaktere des Naturseins] have a specific origin. We can only fully explicate signification by producing a well-founded ontological exposition of Dasein’s being that clarifies the following: a) why ontological research initially skipped over signification and has continued to do so: b) why signification is still seen as requiring explication and derivation, even though an ersatz phenomenon [Ersatzphänomen] in the form of the natural object with added-on value properties has been put forward; c) why signification is explained through its dissolution in some antecedent reality; d) why this foundational reality is sought in the being of natural objects.
Regarding the "as," I saw this in my current study:
"The 'self' of the 'self' in general, takes place with before taking place as itself and/or as the other. This 'aseity' of the self is anterior to the same and to the other and, therefore, anterior to the distinction between a consciousness and its world. Before phenomenological intentionality and the constitution of the ego, but also before thinglike consistency as such, there is co-originarity according to the with. Properly speaking, then, there is no anteriority: co-originarity is the most general structure of all con-sistency, all con-stitution, and all con-sciousness."—Jean-Luc Nancy, BEING SINGULAR PLURAL, pp 40-1.
He is a most thoughtful critic of Heidegger who, as with Derrida, admits his inspiration from MH. On the topic of originarity (where J-LN prefers 'constant' creation) he crosses swords both with causality and MH's Seynsgeschichte..