In The Philosophical Salon, Michael Marder on reading Heidegger today
As is well known, the radical temporalization of thinking in the 1920s and the rejection of transcendental subjectivity, along with its constitutive analysis, distinguish Heidegger’s phenomenology from Husserl’s. The emphasis on time, born from finite existence itself, is sufficient to throw into doubt the spatially based interpretations of German, as opposed to Jewish, being. Along these lines, I argue, in the spirit of Heidegger, that national existence no longer hinges on rootedness in a given territorial domain but in a tradition, that is to say, the historical temporality of Mitdasein. Departing from and constantly circling back to the temporality of Dasein, we must therefore be more—not less—Heideggerian than Heidegger himself in order to right the philosophical wrongs scattered on the margins of his works.