In-der-Blog-sein

gadfly's nest on when man is a subject:

When Heidegger wishes to point out that man is not just a thing among other things but a subject, a person, he calls man the "being for whom in his being this being itself is at issue." A thing is not concerned with its being: it lies, as it were, "crushed upon itself." Man, however, is not ill just as a cauliflower is rotten, he is not a hunchback just as a willowtree is gnarled, for man is concerned with the malfunctioning of his organism, his misshapeness. He has a relationship with what he is, and he has this by saying that Dasein (existence) has a essentially is, what makes man's being differ from that of a thing. For this reason Heidegger says that for man in his being this being itself is at issue, thereby excluding that there would be merely question here of something accidental.

Something accidental is, the physicists tell us, our universe. And by chance all other possible universes must also exist; ours one in a multiverse. But do the other universes "exist", when they are not at stake for this Dasein? Doesn't time, and shape, simply collapse out of all the universes' equations as an irrelevant parameter, unless time is a concern to a Dasein in a universe?  ¶ 10:06 AM