Sunday, August 21, 2005
A few weeks ago I posted about Ten Theses on Heidegger by Thomas Sheehan, originally published by Revista de Filosofia in 2003, and nicely summarized on Mormon Metaphysics. There was an earlier version of this paper, Eleven Theses on Heidegger and on Technology, presented at the Thirty-Fifth Heidegger Conference in 2001. And I've heard that another updated version is in preparation.
I thought it might be interesting to compare the 2001 and 2003 versions of the theses to see what changed between versions. The original eleven theses were:
Geschicke des Seins: fate of beings.
die Sache selbst: the things themselves.
Seinsvergessenheit: forgottenness of being.
Geworfenheit: throwness.
Ereignetsein: being enowned.
Sein des Seienden: being or beings.
Although both sets of theses emphasize that what Heidegger is on about is not being per se, but rather what makes being possible, by 2003 Sheehan has focused in on that what, and is explicitly calling it openness, or Welt/Lichtung/Da. I'm finding that other writers today also agree that, in principle, Heidegger was on about the grounds or foundation of being and not about being itself. That was not the case earlier; witness all those Heidegger guides that twist themselves into knots trying to explain what is "being" and why it is so important.
Perhaps the most controversial thesis, in both, is the final one about unlimited technology. It's part of the general correction that must be made to the perception that Heidegger is anti-technology. Although he was certainly not a technophile, he was not against technology in itself. His general warning about technology was to not allow technological thinking to become the only form of thinking for man, and to instead always attend to the other, non-technological, ways of thinking. ¶ 8:13 PM
I thought it might be interesting to compare the 2001 and 2003 versions of the theses to see what changed between versions. The original eleven theses were:
1. Heidegger's focal topic is not das Sein des Seienden.Glossary:
2. Heidegger's focal topic is what makes possible such "is" or being.
3. Heideggerians should abandon the word "being" as a marker for die Sache selbst.
4. Being/"is" occurs only as the sense of entities.
5. Being/"is"/sense occurs only in and with Da-sein, the open-that-we-are.
6. In one formulation die Sache selbst is human finitude, the lack that generates and is the open.
7. In another formulation die Sache selbst is the apriori openedness (Geworfenheit, Ereignetsein) of the open-that-we-are, which makes possible all takings-as and occurrences of "is."
8. In yet another formulation die Sache selbst is Ereignis, the opening of the open.
9. What Heidegger calls Seinsvergessenheit is the forgottenness not of being but of what makes being possible.
10. The intrinsically hidden lack that is responsible for the apriori openedness of the open also guarantees an in-principle infinity of takings-as and givings-of-being (Geschicke des Seins).
11. The in-principle infinity of takings-as and givings-of-being also makes possible unlimited global technology.
Geschicke des Seins: fate of beings.
die Sache selbst: the things themselves.
Seinsvergessenheit: forgottenness of being.
Geworfenheit: throwness.
Ereignetsein: being enowned.
Sein des Seienden: being or beings.
Although both sets of theses emphasize that what Heidegger is on about is not being per se, but rather what makes being possible, by 2003 Sheehan has focused in on that what, and is explicitly calling it openness, or Welt/Lichtung/Da. I'm finding that other writers today also agree that, in principle, Heidegger was on about the grounds or foundation of being and not about being itself. That was not the case earlier; witness all those Heidegger guides that twist themselves into knots trying to explain what is "being" and why it is so important.
Perhaps the most controversial thesis, in both, is the final one about unlimited technology. It's part of the general correction that must be made to the perception that Heidegger is anti-technology. Although he was certainly not a technophile, he was not against technology in itself. His general warning about technology was to not allow technological thinking to become the only form of thinking for man, and to instead always attend to the other, non-technological, ways of thinking. ¶ 8:13 PM
