enowning
Tuesday, March 28, 2006
 
At the end of the course following the publication of Being and Time, in which Heidegger covers the discussion of time and temporality from Division II to end up on the otological difference, he recaps by stressing that what he has done is used phenomenology as a method to investigate ontology. That done, students should now go over it again and reflect on the material covered. Then he adds,
There is no such thing as the one phenomenology, and if there could be such a thing it would never become anything like a philosophical technique. For implicit in the essential nature of all genuine method as a path toward the disclosure of objects is the tendency to order itself toward that which itself discloses. When a method is genuine and provides access to the objects, it is precisely then that the progress made by following it and the growing origiality of the disclosure will cause the very method that was used to become necessarily obsolete. The only thing that is truly new in science and in philosophy is the genuine questioning and struggle with things which is at the service of this questioning.

P. 328
I was reminded of the above when I read Lee Smolin's paper calling for less calculation and more thinking in physics (Hat tip MM).
 
Comments:
I have a feeling that these issues are going to boil to what Heidegger calls primordial time. Because it is primordial time that he suggests may be the way to the meaning of being. See the concluding paragraph of B&T.

Let me think about this. It may be that his analysis of primordial time makes him believe that the lectures you and I are discussing can draw the conclusions he lays forth there.
 
Less of a Holzwege than worrying about what is, or is not, proper phenomenology.
 
You'll cut wood both places.

If you have a phenomenology without description or where it is secondary, you've made a groundfloor error.

But if you think there is primordial time where there is not any, you've done the same. You can't get to being without it.
 
Is that not another path to the same impasse? e.g. Husserl defines primordial time as such-and-such, whereas Heidegger refines it otherwise, which is not proper primordial time.
 
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