Friday, March 17, 2006
Heidegger and the difference between hedgehogs.
[W]e think of Being rigorously only when we think of it in its difference with beings, and of beings in their difference with Being. The difference thus comes specifically into view. If we try to form a representational idea of it, we will at once be mislead into conceiving of difference as a relation which our representing has added to Being and to beings. Thus the difference is reduced to a distinction, something made up by our understanding.¶ 7:20 AM
But if we assume the difference is a contribution made by our representational thinking, the question arises: a contribution to what? One answers: to bengs. Good. But what does that mean: "beings"? What else could it mean than: something that is? Thus we give to the supposed contribution, the representational idea of difference, a place within Being. But "Being" itself says: Being which is beings. Whenever we come to the place to which we were supposedly first bringing difference along as an alleged contribution, we always find the Being and beings in their difference are already there. It is as in Grimm's fairytale The Hedgehog and the Hare: "I'm here already." Now it would be possible to deal with this strange state of affairs--that Being and beings are always found to be already there by virtue of and within the difference--in a crude manner and explain it as follows: our representational thinking just happens to be so structured and constituted that it will always, so to speak over its own head and out of its own head, insert the difference ahead of time between beings and Being. Much might be said, and much more might be asked, about this seemingly convincing but also rashly given explanation--and first of all, we might ask: where does the "between" come from, into which the difference is, so to speak, to be inserted?
P. 62-63
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“[M]an's distinctive feature lies in this, that he, as the being who thinks, is open to Being, face to face with Being; thus man remains referred to Being and so answers to it. Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being, and he only this. This "only" does not mean a limitation, but rather an excess. A belonging to Being prevails within man, a belonging which listens to Being because it is appropriated to Being. And Being? Let us think of Being according to its original meaning, as presence. Being is present to man neither incidentally nor only on rare occasions. Being is present and abides only as it concerns man through the claim it makes on him. For it is man, open toward Being, who alone lets Being arrive as presence. Such becoming present needs the openness of a clearing, and by this need remains appropriated to human being. This does not at all mean that Being is posited first and only by man. On the contrary, the following becomes clear:
Man and Being are appropriated to each other. They belong to each other.”
From the above:
“For it is man, open toward Being, who alone lets Being arrive as presence.”
Is this correct? Being does not arrive in an horizon, as other beings that are ready to( or present at) hand. Yet it somehow arrives as presence, as opposed to “a presence” as one would use “presence” as opposed to “absence”.
Man and Being are appropriated to each other. They belong to each other.”
From the above:
“For it is man, open toward Being, who alone lets Being arrive as presence.”
Is this correct? Being does not arrive in an horizon, as other beings that are ready to( or present at) hand. Yet it somehow arrives as presence, as opposed to “a presence” as one would use “presence” as opposed to “absence”.
Being is not _a_ thing nor _a_ presence. Heidegger does not hypostasize being. The horizon is the "openness of a clearing", and being is the "becoming present", presence, meaningfulness, of beings.
“Being is not _a_ thing nor _a_ presence. Heidegger does not hypostasize being. The horizon is the "openness of a clearing", and being is the "becoming present", presence, meaningfulness, of beings.”
So we have the horizon, seen as “an openness of a clearing”, in which beings “become present or meaningful.” The “becoming present or meaningful” is being, hence being is not hypostasized. Is this correct?
So we have the horizon, seen as “an openness of a clearing”, in which beings “become present or meaningful.” The “becoming present or meaningful” is being, hence being is not hypostasized. Is this correct?
Good. I think we can come to some agreement, despite our differences on whether Heidegger makes an error in his later work, which has been referred to as “the turn.”
It seems to me that remarks like the one below are not covered in the first two divisions of Being and Time:
“Being is not _a_ thing nor _a_ presence. Heidegger does not hypostasize being. The horizon is the "openness of a clearing", and being is the "becoming present", presence, meaningfulness, of beings.”
The above summary, which we agree on as to meaning, characterizes something in Heidegger, which is different from what is said in B&T. Whether it is an error is another matter.
Will you assent to that?
It seems to me that remarks like the one below are not covered in the first two divisions of Being and Time:
“Being is not _a_ thing nor _a_ presence. Heidegger does not hypostasize being. The horizon is the "openness of a clearing", and being is the "becoming present", presence, meaningfulness, of beings.”
The above summary, which we agree on as to meaning, characterizes something in Heidegger, which is different from what is said in B&T. Whether it is an error is another matter.
Will you assent to that?
Our disagreement is that to me Heidegger is saying the same thing through out his career. He says it while addressing different subject matters and in different ways, but his core insights are always there. He did change his thinking as he went along, but those are really matters for specialists. His basic insights into ontology are always already there.
B&T is where he is at his most phenomenological, but I don't see him changing his basic insights after publishing it. Basically because he stated them before and after. He articulates his basic insight from 1919 onwards. If you are familiar with his way of thinking, then B&T fits into the whole.
Now, entire schools or tendencies in philosophy has evolved out of readings of B&T by itself, and other works of Heidegger's don't fit into those interpretations. But those are probalems for thos interpretations. Heidegger himself said that they had misinterpreted him.
Today, following the publication of almost 100 books, lectures and seminars from 1919 to the 1960s, rough drafts of B&T, and his personal copies with marginalia, the evidence supports his criticism of the various interpretations of B&T and those who claim that he changed his mind substantively from B&T.
B&T is where he is at his most phenomenological, but I don't see him changing his basic insights after publishing it. Basically because he stated them before and after. He articulates his basic insight from 1919 onwards. If you are familiar with his way of thinking, then B&T fits into the whole.
Now, entire schools or tendencies in philosophy has evolved out of readings of B&T by itself, and other works of Heidegger's don't fit into those interpretations. But those are probalems for thos interpretations. Heidegger himself said that they had misinterpreted him.
Today, following the publication of almost 100 books, lectures and seminars from 1919 to the 1960s, rough drafts of B&T, and his personal copies with marginalia, the evidence supports his criticism of the various interpretations of B&T and those who claim that he changed his mind substantively from B&T.
Fair enough. There is much to talk about and tie together. Show me when you have time(I’m lost in intermediate works of MH looking for something seamless) where the transition is made from phenomenology to hermeneutics and how he sees it as consistent with his earlier methods of inquiry. I assume that hermeneutics is how he gets to the meaning of ‘being’ in early Greek thought.
If that assumption is wrong, correct me.
If that assumption is wrong, correct me.
Perhaps a better way to think about it Mauberly is that there are differences in Heidegger's later works, but this is because of the difficulty of expressing what he wishes to express. However this difficulty is itself entailed in Heidegger's early thought (and I'd argue Nietzshe's as well). That is Heidegger and then many after him are doing what is demanded by the earlier logic. One can never speak Being as present in a complete way. That means always returning back to the question and respeaking it in new and "original" ways. This is the only way to be able to think Being.
Let me think about your remark. I don’t want to garbage up this blog with silliness. I’d rather do it to my own, if it turns out to be silly. The problem I see(and it is a foundational one) is talking about being through different lenses, first phenomenological, then grammatical, then hermeneutical, etc. I think I see where the “extemporal position” that I refer to in my blog gets going, but I’d like to see how it moves along, where it gets “philosophical” legs.
Both you guys have been helpful jarring old memories,even if we don’t agree. For a day or two, Vale.
Both you guys have been helpful jarring old memories,even if we don’t agree. For a day or two, Vale.
"I assume that hermeneutics is how he gets to the meaning of ‘being’ in early Greek thought."
Heidegger has an expansive understanding of hermeneutics: all his philosophical thinking is interpretive, and whence hermeneutics. So, hermeneutics is not limited to his work on the pre-Socratics.
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Heidegger has an expansive understanding of hermeneutics: all his philosophical thinking is interpretive, and whence hermeneutics. So, hermeneutics is not limited to his work on the pre-Socratics.
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