Hey, I'm in that class!

And I'm no newt...
 

The Beiträge is one of favorite books, and I note that it is the only hardback to have made it into the Heidegger top ten. I look forward to a more portable paperback and book-on-tape so that everyone can get their dose of enowning with their morning commute to their place of Machenschaft. I also look forward to the other translations to come.

Are you no African newt or no European newt? It makes a différance.
 

Are there seriously Heidegger books on tape? I have to read most sentences two or three times, slowly, to make any progress. A book on tape would be pure insanity.

On the other hand, it would probably be quite a trip.
 

A few of his later lectures have been available on CD and tape over the years, read by Heidegger himself. Check amazon.de for what's currently in "print".

There was a web site last year that was posting mp3 files of the blogger reading a lecture in English, five minutes per file. I don't remember the URL but I poseted a link, so you might find if you search this blog.

As far as the insanity goes, at least with audio on media, you can pause and rewind, and give yourself time to think. I find that I get more out of Derrida and The Ister on DVD than in the theater for that reason.
 

i guess i'm not a european newt. i'm a bit stunned at the obtuseness of those people at national review. jaw-dropping.

oh, how i would love to have the ister on dvd! they won't ship it to america, however -- or at least, this is what their website says. (well, they will, but it's something like 500 newts, which i can hardly afford.) if anyone out there knows a way to circumvent this, please to inform.

avital ronell is one of the highlights of the derrida documentary; they ought to have featured her a bit more.
 

The last half of this Derrida tribute is by Avital Ronell.
 

Ownness is not what “belongs to my essence”, but what belongs to this encounter with myself, with this being sent to the space of my own truth: the space in which my essence is encountered. Yet at the same time this being-turned to this space is the essence of my truth, or the “manner” in which this truth ‘is’


Just curious. Why not say something like this: To question myself, in the ordinary sense, is to ask myself about something I’ve thought or said or done, etc. So I think about what I’ve thought or said or done, etc., reviewing it for flaws, etc., und so weiter.

Now obviously Heidegger is moving toward something deeper. He is moving toward the questioning of what I do when I question myself, making some general comment about it. So he calls this an encounter with my essence(as a questioner) in the space of my own truth(my questioning, not someone else’s). Further he notes that being turned to this space(which is simply questioning, as a questioner, my questioning of myself, by myself) is the essence of my truth(what I when I do all of this).

Without all of these high-astounding terms, it seems to me this is what Heidegger is saying.

If I'm wrong, let me know in what way. I have always been somewhat mystified by these continentals and their terms which are supposed to have a concrete foundation.
 

I don't think you're wrong. I read into your comment another call for alternative (better?) translations of these continentals.
 

“(what I when I do all of this).” Needs to be replaced “(what I do when I do all of this).” in my last post.

We have discussed some of this in a prior thread. But I want to go a bit further. This experience, which you and I agree can be described in everyday language, you’re summing with the name ‘enowning.’ I like that.

If enowning starts and stops with me, then I have no one to answer to but myself, when it comes to the matter of enowning. The call to being is my call. My putting it aside is mine, too.

If enowning starts somewhere else, then it begins with God, or an Unconscious(e.g.Freudian ), or some biochemistry, etc. Name your metaphysical, psychological, physical poison. Any of these generic poisons is a replacement of the human with that which is outside it.

It is one of the reasons I like the early Sartre, for all the other problems you might see with his work. The transparency of freedom, of consciousness, or of what he calls the ‘pour soi’, the ‘for itself’, leaves no room but that enowning rests on my free shoulders.

No exit from this.
 

Enowning rests on your shoulders, but in Sartre's case, matters rest on a subject disconnected from its world in many ways.

When you say that enowning has "no one to answer to but myself", you, yourself, are not some subject free from your world.

When you say that enowning starts somewhere, I would refer you to the discussion of ontotheology in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Things may start from the ground up (ontology: how might we describe the structure of being as such) or top down (theology: what causes beings). Enowning is not something delivered by God, science, or anything outside, but a feature of Dasein in its world.

I would refer you the original link in this post; the explanations of Beiträge 267. Enowning is en-ownment; Ereignis ist Er-eignung.

And before you from get lost in the twists and turns of Ereignis that characterize the Heidegger's eight explanations in that section, let point out the path by quoting Thomas Shehan [private communication]. Ereignis, "our openness--our ability to receive and make sense of whatever we meet--does not originate in the pure and presuppositionless transcendental ego, but is due to the ontological fact of finitude, which, as constitutive of human beings, is the ultimate praesuppositum."

Or, I believe I've mentioned this before, Heidegger's core insight is that finitude is the source of all meaning, and it is up to us to create meaning by appropriating that finitude. And that's enowning.
 

ERRATA: the penultimate paragraph above should begin with:

And before you get lost in the twists and turns of Ereignis that characterize Heidegger's...
 

We’re getting somewhere. You think that Sartre does not account for finitude in the for-itself or at least does it wrong.

You think that this “When you say that enowning has "no one to answer to but myself", you, yourself, are not some subject free from your world,” suggests that Sartre thinks that the for-itself is free from the world and that Dasein is not.

You may be right. The phenomenological account in Being and Nothingness (p 11 f) of Pierre’s absence in the café, which is supposed to show how negation arises from the for-itself, is clear in this way, that negation(a condition of questioning) comes from the questioning of being, i.e., the for-itself. It does not come from being. But the question of finitude is not explicitly addressed. What Sartre thinks is that Heidgegger’s account of Dasein masks a negative, implied in it when it asks any question at all.

Finitude, is introduced all through Sartre’s account by implication, when he talks about the limit inherent in a geometrical segment(p 24) and all sorts of other places where he introduces the notion of negatites (p 25). Finitude is an implication of there being the for-itself which introduces it in questioning, anticipation, etc.

What you appear to be saying is that Heidegger begins with finitude, while Sartre derives it from what you call this “subject free from the world” and says that what you call the “subject free from the world” is primordial.”

Are we on the same page?
 

To put it more directly, the pour soi is the Cartesian subject. The novelty in Sartre is that God is gone as the cause, leaving only nothingness. But apart from the removal of the traditional prima causa, ontology remains the same.

Heidegger's main inovation was to question the basics of the ontology that had supported Western philosophy since the Greeks. So, while Sartre picked up the importance of death, as human finitude, and states of mind from B&T Division II, he misunderstood what was radical about Heidegger's ontology. He misapporpriated being ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, and mit-dasein, into his existing Cartesian framework, and missed the fundamental innovations in being-in and there-being.

Those key aspects of Heidegger's thinking required another generation--e.g. Derrida, Foucault, et al--to be broadly appreciated in France. Probably because Descartes was so inculcated in French academic philosophy. In support of that notion, note that the ontological implications of Heidegger's thinking was first appreciated by and disseminated in France by scholars who had been educated abroad; e.g. Kojeve and Levinas.
 

I see what you’re trying to say, but I want to make sure it is not a difference in terms that we’re stuck on here. It is arguable that man’s desire to be God, his bad faith, his angst over his freedom, etc., bespeak his finitude.

It is also arguable that Sartre thinks that he has some ontological categories that underlie what Heidegger is saying about Dasein. If he does, what difference does it make? You have a stronger result, in that you have an argument for the call to being coming from nothing other than Dasein.

In a sense, the pour soi is a Cartesian subject, but it has none of the conditions that Husserl ascribed to it. The idea of phenomenology as a grand science is gone.

If you want to argue that the ontological categories that he presents are wrong, that’s fine with me. I’d just like to know what is wrong with them that is not terminological.

I have no particular love for Sartre, just for what can be argued.
 

Let me add, upon this Sunday morning that has broken, that we are about to expose some real differences between Sartre and Heidegger. After Being and Time, Sartre continued to do a kind of phenomenology, a much clearer phenomenology than Husserl’s. His is replete with case after case, and then analysis after analysis.

There are problems with Sartre, but they are not predominantly metaphysical. They lie within phenomenology itself and what it presupposes, e.g.,, a concept of presence(as opposed to something being ready to hand.).

Derrida saw this, I believe, and then took a remarkably wrong turn with it. That, however, is a subject for another day.

On the other hand, Heidegger seems at times simply to stipulate what the modes of Dasein are. It’s as if one were to say: “Humans do this, so let’s have another mode here.” By the end, we appear to leave the modes behind and trot off into the subtlety of ancient Greek to find out what thinking is.

I believe there are problems with both positions. Sartre is trying to reduce the panoply of Heideggerian modes to something he thinks is understandable. Descriptions of cases in depth and then analysis is the way he does it. Heidegger runs off and leaves the modes also, by returning to the Greek.

It’s enough to drive one mad or build pews about him.
 

Sartre grasps that an abscence of metaphysics means there is an ontological finality in death (e.g. humans don't continue on in heaven) and that moods may have ontological origins. But he doesn't get Dasein at all--it's still a Cartesian subject for him.

I agree that the idea of Husserlian Phenomenology as the next step for science imploded after B&T was published, but Sartre didn't get that, because he keeps elaborating phenomenologies through B&N. He finally realizes the cul-de-sac he's in towards the late forties, and tries to salvage his existentialism by attaching it to another "scientific philosophy", Hegelian dialectics via Marx. But he's clearly floundering by that point.

As you point out, Derrida, amongest others, grasped that the new ontology precluded grand metaphysical systems as answers to the questions philosophy asks.

Although Dasein's modes in B&T were intended as an attempt to describe the new ontology from the bottom-up, today I see them insights into our world provided by the new ontology. Much as the later Heidegger used the new ontology for insights into painting, poetry, and other human activities.

Some historical perspective is useful here. Heidegger has his basic insight early on--Ereignis, as more than a term for an ordinary event, is mentioned in his first lecture after WW1--and then spent his life elaborating it. As an assistant to Husserl, and as a candidate to replace Husserl academically after Husserl's retirement in 1929, it behooved him to appear to continue Husserl's work in phenomenology. And that's why he published what he did in B&T. His first publication since the last time he'd been required to publish something, his dissertation in 1915 . Then once he was established, he was able to concentrate on ontology. This is one of the sources of the perceived "turn" in Heidegger. It isn't that he turned away from phenomenology, but that there was no compelling reason to write about it any longer.

BTW, a good place for discussing the modes in B&T is on the Heidegger mailing lists, where they are a perennial topic.
 

“Although Dasein's modes in B&T were intended as an attempt to describe the new ontology from the bottom-up, today I see them insights into our world provided by the new ontology. Much as the later Heidegger used the new ontology for insights into painting, poetry, and other human activities.”

Without getting too deep into Sartre because he appears to dead-end himself, the question for Heidegger, just following someone like Ockham, is why multiply modes beyond necessity?

Sartre thinks he is simplifying Heidegger, by means of his account of negation. He’s entitled provisionally to think that until phenomenology is destroyed. Heidegger did not destroy it (he may have ignored it after he got established), and so it is fair for Sartre to believe that there must be some concrete foundation for the modes of Dasein. He can’t see one, so he provides one. The only way to do it that he can see is through phenomenology.

The refutation of Sartre is in the refutation of phenomenology. But at that point there still needs to be a concrete foundation for any ontology. So he weds Marxism and praxis to existentialism. Then he still gives concrete descriptions and analyses, from a different ontological point of view.

Where is the concrete foundation for Heidegger? Is it supposed to be average everydayness?
 

There are multiple modes because humans live them. Ockham's razor, which I assume you are alluding to, would be relevant in finding the simplest explanation for them, but the fact that there are many modes is simply a given.

In philosophy one always needs to be careful in defining terms. Phenomenology is one such case. Heidegger considered himself a phenomenologist, and today, so do phenomenologists writing in their journals.

This page identifies four main strains of phenomenology; two arising from texts by Husserl, and the other two (including French Existentialism) from B&T.

It's ironic that the French Existentialism is considered "an analysis of human being as a means to a fundamental ontology that went beyond the regional ontologies described by Husserl", because, correct as that is at a certain level, they still missed how deeply Heidegger questioned philosophy's understanding of ontology.

Following Heidegger's analysis of average everydayness is one of the avenues towards understanding his questioning of ontology. His writings on the "subtlety of ancient Greek" is another. Ironically, Heidegger's notion of finitude questions just how concrete any foundation can be. One of the things he takes from Hegel is the notion that any ontology is going to have to be historical, because humans are historical; they can't change the past. And he goes beyond Hegel by demonstrating that finitude precludes the absolutes Hegel sought.
 

A clean reply. Thank you.

“There are multiple modes because humans live them. Ockham's razor, which I assume you are alluding to, would be relevant in finding the simplest explanation for them, but the fact that there are many modes is simply a given.”

I am alluding to Ockham’s razor. Heidegger has more modes than John Duns Scotus has beings. Which is how Ockham got full employment in the middle ages.

The many modes “being a given” is a problem. The question is: how are they given?

Now we’re talking about existential phenomenology in your rubric cited above, which came from the Husserlian variety. The other two varieties are not relevant here unless we chase the Greek, in which case hermeutics might join us. I don’t want to chase the Greek right now. That came later with Was Heisst Denken. So we’ll leave it out.

With respect to average everydayness you have a choice. It’s a Hobson’s choice. Either Heidegger is doing phenomenology to ground Dasein and its modes with respect to everydayness or he is not. If he is, Sartre is entitled to proceed as he did with B&N. Cogito or no cogito. If Heidegger is not, he needs to show how the modes are not simply descriptions or accounts of various things humans do. He needs to show how an ontology comes out of them.

Stating that humans do something, does not by itself, constitute an ontology. Heavy, Germanic terms do not make an ontology. When we started talking I thought Heidegger was basing his work on phenomenology in some sense. If he is not, the modes need to be grounded in something else.
 

I'm feeling too constrained by this comment section (can't use all the HTML I'd like to) and I'm tired of scrolling back and forth, so I'll respond with a new post with of an example of Heidegger analyzing a mood.
 

Fair enough. I've started reading your selection. May take a little while.