enowning
Saturday, March 25, 2006
 
Ontology, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and all that.
With regard to its subject-matter, phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities--ontology. In explaining the tasks of ontology we found it necessary that there should be a fundamental ontology taking as its theme that entity which is ontologico-ontically distinctive, Dasein, in order to confront the cardinal problem--the question of the meaning of Being in general. Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation. The logoV of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of a ermhneuein, through which the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structures of Being which Dasein itself possesses, are make known to Dasein's understanding of Being. The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word, where it designates this business of interpreting. But to the extent that by uncovering the meaning of Being and the basic structures of Dasein in general we may exhibit the horizon for any further ontological study of those entities which do not have the charcater of Dasein, this hermeneutic also becomes a 'hermenenutic' in the sense of working out the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends. And finally, to the extent that Dasein, as an entity with the possibility of existence, has ontological priority over every other entity, "hermeneutic", as an interpretation of Dasein's Being, has the third and specific sense of an analytic of the existentiality of existence; and this is the sense which is philosophically primary. Then so far as this hermeneutic works out Dasein's historicality ontologically as the ontical condition for the possibility of historiology, it contains the roots of what can called 'hermeneutic' only in a derivative sense: the methodology of those humane sciences which are historiological in character.

P. 61-62
Important that, to distinguish between hermeneutic, 'hermeneutic', and "hermeneutic". I wonder if Heidegger would gesture the quotes while lecturing using one or two fingers, as appropriate.
 
Comments:
“With regard to its subject-matter, phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities--ontology. In explaining the tasks of ontology we found it necessary that there should be a fundamental ontology taking as its theme that entity which is ontologico-ontically distinctive, Dasein, in order to confront the cardinal problem--the question of the meaning of Being in general.”

This is phenomenologically kosher.

“Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation. The  of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of a , through which the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structures of Being which Dasein itself possesses, are make known to Dasein's understanding of Being.”

Possibly OK, depending on what interpretation gives to be understood. A description is not an interpretation. As long as interpretation is founded on it, as a kind of analysis, there should be no problem.

“The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word, where it designates this business of interpreting. But to the extent that by uncovering the meaning of Being and the basic structures of Dasein in general we may exhibit the horizon for any further ontological study of those entities which do not have the character of Dasein, this hermeneutic also becomes a 'hermeneutic' in the sense of working out the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends.”

Correct, with the above proviso on ‘interpretation’.

“And finally, to the extent that Dasein, as an entity with the possibility of existence, has ontological priority over every other entity, "hermeneutic", as an interpretation of Dasein's Being, has the third and specific sense of an analytic of the existentiality of existence; and this is the sense which is philosophically primary. Then so far as this hermeneutic works out Dasein's historicality ontologically as the ontical condition for the possibility of historiology, it contains the roots of what can called 'hermeneutic' only in a derivative sense: the methodology of those humane sciences which are historiological in character.”

This sounds fine, too.

There is no commitment to what I’ve called on my site an “extemporal” position or one based on an account that discusses being independently of time.

He makes the move to that commitment later on p 27 of what would have been division 3, which you cited sometime ago, and which I cited as well over on my page.

He is also pointing out that hermeneutics in the humane sciences are posterior to the hermeneutic of Dasein. So an empirical science does not hold sway over an ontology of Dasein.
 
P. 22 of Basic Problems of Phenomenology? Why do you conclude that his assertion that interpretation is different at different times is extemporal? I'm not even sure I understand you're use of that word. It traditionally means spontaneously and without forethought, but I understand you use it for "independent of time", as not within a phenomenological horizon?

If so, how can saying "Dasein is historical" be independent of time?
 
To say Dasein is historical is one thing. To say 1)that Dasein's history could be otherwise(with different accesses to beings at different times), such that 2)the distinctions drawn in Being and Time could be otherwise, is not possible in phenomenology.

He says that in that passage we have gone round and round about.

I'll leave out 'extemporal' because its baggage is over on my site.
 
Post a Comment

<< Home
For when Ereignis is not sufficient.

Appropriation appropriates! Send your appropriations to enowning at gmail.com.

View mobile version