Sunday, July 16, 2006
It may not be clear in every text, but here Heiddeger says that aletheia, unconcealment, does not mean truth.
Insofar as truth is understood in the traditional "natural" sense as the correspondence of knowledge with beings demonstrated in beings, but also insofar as truth is interpreted as the certainty of the knowledge of Being, aletheia, unconcealment in the sense of the opening may not be equated with truth. Rather, aletheia, unconcealment thought as opening, first grants the possibility of truth. For truth itself, just as Being and thinking, can only be what it is in the element of the opening. Evidence, certainty in every degree, every kind of verification of veritas already move with that veritas in the realm of the prevalent opening.¶ 2:03 PM
Aletheia, unconcealment thought as the opening of presence, is not yet truth. Is aletheia then less than truth? Or is it more because it first grants truth as adequatio and certitudo, because there can be no presence and presenting outside of the realm of the opening?
This question we leave to thinking as a task. Thinking must consider whether it can even raise this question at all as long as it thinks philosophically, that is, in the strict sense of metaphysics which questions what is present only with regard to its presence.
In any case, one thing becomes clear: To raise the question of aletheia, of unconcealment as such, is not the same as raising the question of truth. For this reason, it was inadequate and misleading to call aletheia in the sense of opening, truth.
Pp. 69-70
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Clark,
I think Wrathall's discussion is best on this: the openness to being (ontological aletheia) is the ground for the uncovering of being (ontic aletheia) that then allows for correspondence (propositional aletheia). The openness, as prior to the disclosing of beings, is not truth proper, but that which makes truth possible (through freedom).
I think Wrathall's discussion is best on this: the openness to being (ontological aletheia) is the ground for the uncovering of being (ontic aletheia) that then allows for correspondence (propositional aletheia). The openness, as prior to the disclosing of beings, is not truth proper, but that which makes truth possible (through freedom).
Re: coyness.
He does go on to address truth as correctness:
"In the scope of this question, we must acknowledge the fact that aletheia, unconcealment in the sense of the opening of presence, was originally only experienced as orthotes, as the correctness of representations and statements. But then the assertion about the essential transformation of truth, that is, from unconcealment to correctness, is also untenable."
What's interesting to me is that he acknowledges that his notion that truth for the Greeks originally meant un-concealed--a-letheia as the privative of lethe--has run into trouble. The scholarship does not support it.
"The natural concept of truth does not mean unconcealment, not in the philosophy of the Greeks either. It is often and justifiably pointed out that the word alethes is already used by Homer only in the verba dicendi, in statement and thus in the sense of correctness and reliability, not in the sense of unconcealment."
So, aletheia as unconcealment is pretty much Heidegger's invention, and not something Greek, that Heidegger discovered by peeling away millenia of Platonic metaphysics. It doesn't diminish Heidegger's contributions to ontology, but it does knock out a pillar supporting his notion of the historical epoch of pure Greek beginnings corrupted by metaphysics. Instead, truth reverts to the classical understanding, of Plato and Aristotle organizing and systematizing earlier thinkers.
He does go on to address truth as correctness:
"In the scope of this question, we must acknowledge the fact that aletheia, unconcealment in the sense of the opening of presence, was originally only experienced as orthotes, as the correctness of representations and statements. But then the assertion about the essential transformation of truth, that is, from unconcealment to correctness, is also untenable."
What's interesting to me is that he acknowledges that his notion that truth for the Greeks originally meant un-concealed--a-letheia as the privative of lethe--has run into trouble. The scholarship does not support it.
"The natural concept of truth does not mean unconcealment, not in the philosophy of the Greeks either. It is often and justifiably pointed out that the word alethes is already used by Homer only in the verba dicendi, in statement and thus in the sense of correctness and reliability, not in the sense of unconcealment."
So, aletheia as unconcealment is pretty much Heidegger's invention, and not something Greek, that Heidegger discovered by peeling away millenia of Platonic metaphysics. It doesn't diminish Heidegger's contributions to ontology, but it does knock out a pillar supporting his notion of the historical epoch of pure Greek beginnings corrupted by metaphysics. Instead, truth reverts to the classical understanding, of Plato and Aristotle organizing and systematizing earlier thinkers.
Re: Wrathall
Does he discuss openness in "How to Read Heidegger"? I've been debating whether to get it, but thought it might be merely just another introduction.
Does he discuss openness in "How to Read Heidegger"? I've been debating whether to get it, but thought it might be merely just another introduction.
My point wasn't really about freedom or openness or even aletheia. Rather I was thinking that within an externalist framework correspondence in the normal (Cartesian) sense just doesn't work. It doesn't make sense. In an externalist scheme clearly truth implies that the thing in question must enter into the self-same. In Cartesian internalism this never happens so we have to talk about what is outside and inside "relating" in agreement. But clearly in an externalist scheme truth is something different.
To say that aleteia is not truth is, in one sense, obvious because having an opening is not the same as having something emerge in the opening. That is the opening is the possibility of disclosure but not disclosure as such.
If I have it right anyway.
The second point in terms of Heidegger's particular form of externalism is that things don't fully join. This gets at the issues Heidegger raises in On the Essence of Truth.
Perhaps I'm wrong, but I've long thought that Heidegger's point about thinking versus philosophy is that philosophy tends to focus more on logic and propositions and perhaps intuitions but not on this disclosure. (I'm not sure that's true, mind you, but that's the caricature of philosophy most Heideggarians provide us)
To say that aleteia is not truth is, in one sense, obvious because having an opening is not the same as having something emerge in the opening. That is the opening is the possibility of disclosure but not disclosure as such.
If I have it right anyway.
The second point in terms of Heidegger's particular form of externalism is that things don't fully join. This gets at the issues Heidegger raises in On the Essence of Truth.
Perhaps I'm wrong, but I've long thought that Heidegger's point about thinking versus philosophy is that philosophy tends to focus more on logic and propositions and perhaps intuitions but not on this disclosure. (I'm not sure that's true, mind you, but that's the caricature of philosophy most Heideggarians provide us)
Wrathall discusses the three-fold notion of truth in his dissertation. I believe he also uses that distinction in the chapter on truth in How to Read Heidegger. I think it is a book worth buying; at least I've found the pre-publication manuscript to be quite useful.
Clark,
The distinction between 'philosophy' and 'thinking' in Heidegger's later thought relates to the irruption of being, to a new disclosure of being. Given being's plentitude, thinking is something that we cannot anticipate (as desired by technological/calculative thinking). Philosophy, on the other hand, rests in current disclosures of being, such as as resources (technology), substances/properties, form/matter, etc. That is why philosophy is ending: we have exhausted these current modes of disclosure and the time is ripe (we are destined) to a new disclosure through thinking.
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The distinction between 'philosophy' and 'thinking' in Heidegger's later thought relates to the irruption of being, to a new disclosure of being. Given being's plentitude, thinking is something that we cannot anticipate (as desired by technological/calculative thinking). Philosophy, on the other hand, rests in current disclosures of being, such as as resources (technology), substances/properties, form/matter, etc. That is why philosophy is ending: we have exhausted these current modes of disclosure and the time is ripe (we are destined) to a new disclosure through thinking.
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