The second way in which theory dehistoricizes the Ereignis of the it-worlds-for-me is by obliterating it as a personal Ereignis "for me." When, as a theoretically disinterested astronomer, I observe and objectify the sunrise, it now appears as a pro-cess (Vor-gang) that impersonally runs its course in front of me. "It simply goes-by-before, before my knowing I, has only the relation of being-known to this I, this paled I-relatedness reduced to a minimum of living experience....I am directed to something, but I do not live (as historical I)." Thus, Heidegger concluded, "the historical I is de-historicized to the remnant of a specific I-hood as the correlate of thinghood." Not only is the Ereignis of the sunrise no longer uniquely for the personal I, but this I has also been broken out of the Ereignis, reified and depersonalized into a present-at-hand ego, and thus deprived of its historical Ereignis-character. "The character of the situation disapears. The unity of the situation is exploded....Thereby, the situation-I, the 'historical' I, is simultaneously driven away. The 'dehistoricizing of the I' steps in. Suppression of the living relation of the I to a situation." The full sense of the dehistoricized temporalizing-sense effected by metaphysics is thus the static and impersonal presence of an objective something (being) over against a present-at-hand I. Here the something, being, does not event/enown for me. As another counterexample to the theoretical esperience of the sunrise as process, Heidegger also dealt with the Ereignis of his "seeing the lectern":Continued.But something indeed happens [in seeing the lectern]....The living experiencing does not merely go by before me like a thing that I posit as object, but rather I myself e-vent/en-own it to myself, and it e-vents/en-owns itself according to its essential presencing.There is much to digest in this passage. Let us begin by noting that the Er-eignis of lived experience has a doubled aspect of content-relation, depth/surface, nonpersonal/personal in accord with the doubled aspect of the intentional configuration of I-comport-myself-to-something. Let us first focus more on the deep, nonpersonal temporalizing-sense of the Ereignis of the primal something (being) that "e-vents/en-owns itself according to its essential presencing."
P. 272-273