enowning
Thursday, August 31, 2006
 
Following along the Young Heidegger, to presencing
The second way in which theory dehistoricizes the Ereignis of the it-worlds-for-me is by obliterating it as a personal Ereignis "for me." When, as a theoretically disinterested astronomer, I observe and objectify the sunrise, it now appears as a pro-cess (Vor-gang) that impersonally runs its course in front of me. "It simply goes-by-before, before my knowing I, has only the relation of being-known to this I, this paled I-relatedness reduced to a minimum of living experience....I am directed to something, but I do not live (as historical I)." Thus, Heidegger concluded, "the historical I is de-historicized to the remnant of a specific I-hood as the correlate of thinghood." Not only is the Ereignis of the sunrise no longer uniquely for the personal I, but this I has also been broken out of the Ereignis, reified and depersonalized into a present-at-hand ego, and thus deprived of its historical Ereignis-character. "The character of the situation disapears. The unity of the situation is exploded....Thereby, the situation-I, the 'historical' I, is simultaneously driven away. The 'dehistoricizing of the I' steps in. Suppression of the living relation of the I to a situation." The full sense of the dehistoricized temporalizing-sense effected by metaphysics is thus the static and impersonal presence of an objective something (being) over against a present-at-hand I. Here the something, being, does not event/enown for me. As another counterexample to the theoretical esperience of the sunrise as process, Heidegger also dealt with the Ereignis of his "seeing the lectern":
But something indeed happens [in seeing the lectern]....The living experiencing does not merely go by before me like a thing that I posit as object, but rather I myself e-vent/en-own it to myself, and it e-vents/en-owns itself according to its essential presencing.
There is much to digest in this passage. Let us begin by noting that the Er-eignis of lived experience has a doubled aspect of content-relation, depth/surface, nonpersonal/personal in accord with the doubled aspect of the intentional configuration of I-comport-myself-to-something. Let us first focus more on the deep, nonpersonal temporalizing-sense of the Ereignis of the primal something (being) that "e-vents/en-owns itself according to its essential presencing."

P. 272-273
Continued.
 
Comments:
If I understand the passage, it is a very good one that shows how MH comes to reject Husserl's reductions which MH believes tie Husserl up in the present at hand.
 
It certainly fits. And it is worth noting that the passage is from a lecture in 1919, which indicates that he's more consistent than usually understood. As Sheehan points out, the differences in his works are better understood as shifts in emphasis, rather than fundamental changes in his way of thinking.
 
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