Beginning with his courses in 1919, Heidegger thus took up the third requirement for rethinking the question about being that he had put forward in his qualifying dissertation, namely, "history...must become a meaning-determining element for the problem of the categories" of being in the sense of the "something in any sense." He aslo continued the analysis of historical time initiated in his 1915-16 essay on history, which defined time as the "effective context" of a unique historical Ereignis that involves a circular movement of past, future, and the present. Similarly, his KNS 1919 lecture course explored the ""Ereignis-character" of the primal something (being) that worlds and e-vents/en-owns (er-eignet) for me, and in which I e-vent/en-own it to myself. Life, he explained, is always a "situation in the context of life" and "the I is itself a situation-I; the I is histor'ical,'" a "historical I." Intentionality is not only horizontally directed to the worlding of the world, but also vertically extended through the historicity of situations that build on and "permeate each other." Heidegger provided an example by recalling his own wartime experience in the previous year: "Their durations do not exclude each other (e.g., a year in a field, a semester: no objective time-concept)....The intentionality of all lived experiences of a situation has a definite character that springs from the whole situation. Example of a situation: 'Going through the course.'" The intentionality of the situation involves a protentional "tendency" toward something futural that is guided by a retentional "motivation" from past situations. Life is "forward-reaching and backward-reaching, i.e.,...motivated tendency or, alternatively, tendential motivation." Thus, more formally, the "sight" and the concept of a situation involves both a preconception or precept and a recept.

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