Tuesday, September 26, 2006
Kenneth Maly on das Anwesen, and all that Sache.
The German word for emergence is das Anwesen. The more usual English translation of Anwesen is "presencing" or "presence." I deliberately use the word emergence, to avoid the danger of implying a "presence" in "presencing"--thus letting thinking think in terms of presence rather than "presencing." The Sache in Heidegger is clearly not presence, but Anwesen in its work of emergence, i.e., in its work as being. The published English translation fell and slipped on this very danger. It reads: "To crewn is thus the handing over of presence [Anwesen], which presencing delivers to what is present..." (P. 52). This translation suggests that there are two realms named here: the realm of what comes to presence (beings) and the realm of presence, with Anwesen (presencing) as the movement between these two realms. Much of Heidegger scholarship has stumbled on this rock by not staying long enough or working closely enough with this realm of Anwesen itself, thus getting lost by taking the Sache of Anwesen to be one of presence. Frankly, presence as such--separated out from emerging ("presencing," if you will) is only an issue for metaphysics (named by Heidegger as Anwesenheit) and is never the Sache of being.¶ 6:02 PM
P. 231-2
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“This translation suggests that there are two realms named here: the realm of what comes to presence (beings) and the realm of presence, with Anwesen (presencing) as the movement between these two realms. Much of Heidegger scholarship has stumbled on this rock by not staying long enough or working closely enough with this realm of Anwesen itself, thus getting lost by taking the Sache of Anwesen to be one of presence. Frankly, presence as such--separated out from emerging ("presencing," if you will) is only an issue for metaphysics (named by Heidegger as Anwesenheit) and is never the Sache of being.”
If you are looking at this from the point of view of the horizon, which originated in phenomenology, you are going to have that which is present and the emergence of its presence. Metaphysics is about what is present. The flux or action in the emergence of the presence is what you talk about when you talk about being. This is the territory of ontology.
So the confusion in the scholarship is to confuse what is present with the emergence of what is present.
If this is not what this passage is about, then tell me.
If you are looking at this from the point of view of the horizon, which originated in phenomenology, you are going to have that which is present and the emergence of its presence. Metaphysics is about what is present. The flux or action in the emergence of the presence is what you talk about when you talk about being. This is the territory of ontology.
So the confusion in the scholarship is to confuse what is present with the emergence of what is present.
If this is not what this passage is about, then tell me.
I think that, roughly, traditional metaphysics is concerned with presence (being-ness of beings) and Heidegger is concerned with its emergence, with what makes presence possible.
However, my sense is that, taken with the passage excerpted last week, Maly is saying that Heidegger's key concern is more than just the (ontological) difference between the two. And as Capobianco says in his paper, would be beyond (ahead) of the canonical understanding of Heidegger.
However, my sense is that, taken with the passage excerpted last week, Maly is saying that Heidegger's key concern is more than just the (ontological) difference between the two. And as Capobianco says in his paper, would be beyond (ahead) of the canonical understanding of Heidegger.
"Heidegger's key concern is more than just the (ontological) difference between the two. And as Capobianco says in his paper, would be beyond (ahead) of the canonical understanding of Heidegger."
What does 'canonical understanding' mean here?
What does 'more than just the (ontological) difference' mean, as well.
What does 'canonical understanding' mean here?
What does 'more than just the (ontological) difference' mean, as well.
Here you have the classical "third man" problem, which Maly has written into reality.
There are presences, presencing and now a third between them.
That is why I asked the question: what do you mean by 'more'?
Parmenides took poor Socrates to the cleaners with the problem in the dialogue bearing his name.
There are presences, presencing and now a third between them.
That is why I asked the question: what do you mean by 'more'?
Parmenides took poor Socrates to the cleaners with the problem in the dialogue bearing his name.
This post is from where we were talking on my site. I put it there as well.
"When we first started talking I thought I could drive a wedge, using phenomenology, between absolutism and relativism.
In theory it should have been possible.
Husserl thought it was a presuppositionless science that he was fashioning. He thought descriptions got him there. They do get you there in their way.
But he had an implied ontology, without knowing it. He imported it all by assuming intentionality as the undisputed structure of consciousness. That is where he began describing.
That is where he and his scions, including Sartre go wrong.
What you are running into over on your sight are the third man problems of Husserl's presuppositions.
Heidegger swallowed them whole as well.
Throw away intentionality; throw away the horizon and you are free of the third man.
Matters become much simpler.
There is, among other things, talk to describe."
7:10 AM, September 27, 2006
"When we first started talking I thought I could drive a wedge, using phenomenology, between absolutism and relativism.
In theory it should have been possible.
Husserl thought it was a presuppositionless science that he was fashioning. He thought descriptions got him there. They do get you there in their way.
But he had an implied ontology, without knowing it. He imported it all by assuming intentionality as the undisputed structure of consciousness. That is where he began describing.
That is where he and his scions, including Sartre go wrong.
What you are running into over on your sight are the third man problems of Husserl's presuppositions.
Heidegger swallowed them whole as well.
Throw away intentionality; throw away the horizon and you are free of the third man.
Matters become much simpler.
There is, among other things, talk to describe."
7:10 AM, September 27, 2006
The 'canonical understanding': In metaphysics being is just a property of all beings; beingness. For Heidegger, something is missed by metaphysics, the being from/by which things become beings. The difference between beings (das Seiende) and being (das Sein) is the ontological difference.
Maly, and others, argue that Heidegger is really on about another beyng (Seyn). I tend to agree with that, but I'm not yet ready to take my orals and defend that thesis.
Maly, and others, argue that Heidegger is really on about another beyng (Seyn). I tend to agree with that, but I'm not yet ready to take my orals and defend that thesis.
It's certainly the case that Parmenides is the most difficult dialog I ever studied. I thought I understood the arguments when I studied them. Now I don't remember them. Kind of like thesolutions to several partial differential equations; I'm sure it was a good exercise for the grey matter at the time.
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