The Young Heidegger continues, with the difference that Ereignis makes from the background, as different from what may be theorized.

Given its "Ereignis-character," the "indifference" in the formal category of the preworldly primal something is to be sharply distinguished from the empty objectified "something" in the theoretical question, "Is there somehting?," or in any traditional theoretical treatment of the category of being.

The indifference over against every genuine worldishness...is in no way identical with delivedness [Entlebtheit] or indeed with the highest stage of this, with the most sublime theorization. It does not mean the absolute interruption of the relation to life, the unwinding of deliving, the theoretical establishment and cold-clocking of something experienced.

The contrast can be summarized in the following way. The indifferent formal category of the primal something is originally the futural moment of pretheoretical life itself and, as a differentiating Ereignis, worlds-out into a "worldly something" that is "for me." But the empty generality of the traditional notion of the something (being) theorizes and reifies the primal something, so that it now amounts to the identical presence (dehistoricizing) of universal "real-being" (designifying) that is impersonally present for a cognitive ego (deliving). "The something in general, about whose 'there-is-ing/it-giving' we questioned, does not world," does not e-vent/en-own for me. The intentional content/relation/temporalizing configuration of primal being is world/person/eventing (differentiating), whereas that of theorized being is thinghood/knowing/presence (identity). In fact, Heidegger maintained here that, given the derivative status of the theorized something of "real-being," its appearance is just one more, albeit derivative differentiation of the primal something, of "the experienceable in any sense." For "the environmental is something; the valued is something; the valid is something".

P. 276

Continued.  ¶ 7:35 PM