enowning
Wednesday, March 14, 2007
 
132. Be-ing and a Being


This distinction [between be-ing and a being] is grasped since Being and Time as "ontological difference"--with the intention of safeguarding the question of the truth of be-ing from all confusion. But this distinction is immediately pushed in the direction from which it comes. For here beingness is claimed as ousia, idea; and following these, the objectness is claimed as condition for the possibility of the object. Therefore, in attempting to overcome the first effort at the question of being in Being and Time and its emanations (Vom Wesen des Grundes and the Kantbook), varying attempts were needed to master the "ontological difference," to grasp its very origin and that means its genuine onefold. Therefore, the effort was needed to come free of the "condition for the possibility" as going back into the merely "mathematical" and to grasp the truth of be-ing from within its own essential sway (enowning). Hence the tormenting and discording character of this distinction. For as necessary as the distinction is (to think in traditional terms), in order to provide at all a preliminary perspective for the equation of be-ing, just as disastrous does this distinction continue to be. For this distinction indeed does arise from a questioning of beings as such (of beingness). But in this way one never arrives directly at the question of be-ing. In other words, this distinction itself becomes the real barrier which misplaces the inquiry into the question of be-ing, insofar as, by presupposing this distinction, one attempots to go further than this distinction and t inquire into its onefold. This onefold can never be anything but the mirroring of the distinction and can never lead to the origin, in view of which this distinction can no longer be seen as originary.

Therefore the task is not to surpass beings (transcendence) but rather to leap over this distinction and thus over transcendence and to inquire inceptually into be-ing and truth.

But in thinking in the crossing, we must sustain this ambiguity: on the one hand to begin an initial clarification with this distinction and then leap over this very distinction. But this leaping-over occurs along with the leap as the en-grounding of the ground of the truth of be-ing, by leaping into the enowning of Da-sein.

Pp. 176-177
 
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