enowning
Thursday, April 26, 2007
 
Julian Young objects to Sein as intelligibility.
So much for being. For many readers, so much, too, for Sein as such. For them -- for indeed, most of the time at least, the author of Being and Time -- all there is to say about Sein is that it is 'intelligibility'*.

I oppose this view of things. Though there is indeed a sense of Sein in which it is just presence (truth as disclosure, 'world' in the ontological sense, intelligibility) there is another sense in which what is crucial about it is precisely the opposite -- unintelligibility ('un-truth'). In the language of 'The Otigin of the Work of Art', while in one sense Sein is just 'world' (int the ontological sense), in a different and, in the end, much more important sense its heart liesin 'earth'. More accurately, Sein in this sense is 'world' (in the ontic sense) and 'earth' taken together, in other words, 'that which really is' [P. 44] or simply 'reality' [P. 18] taken in the infinite 'plenitude' of all its 'facets'. It is this second sense I indicate by writing 'Being' with a capital 'B'.

Why should we acknowledge Being in addition to being? Why, in other words, should we acknowledge that key Heideggerian phrases -- 'house of B/being,' 'destiny of B/being,' 'truth of B/being,' 'O/other of B/beings', for example are systematically ambiguous? For a number of reasons, the first of which has to do with Heidegger's terminology.

Though by no means consistently, Heidegger sometimes observes a distinction between 'Sein' and 'Seyn'. The use of the antique 'y' suggests something both solemn and forgotten. The (generally excellent) translator of 'On the Essence of Truth' renders the 'Sein'-'Seyn' distinction in English as a distinction between 'being' and 'beyng'.

P. 12-13
 
Comments:
Once again the bifurcation of Being into givingness and the Other.
 
Post a Comment

<< Home
For when Ereignis is not sufficient.

Appropriation appropriates! Send your appropriations to enowning at gmail.com.

View mobile version