Let us explain this once again by an example: 'the chalk is white'. The 'is white' expresses the white-being, thus the so-and-so-being of the chalk: it is so-and-so. This so-and-so does not necessarily pertain to it, for it could also be red or green. When we say 'the chalk is a material thing', we also refer to the being of the chalk, but in this case not to anything arbitrary, rather to what must belong to it for it to be what it is. This being is not an arbitrary so-and-so-being , but a necessary what-being. When we say 'the chalk is', perhaps in response to a claim that we have only imagined it, then being means being-present (actuality). Again, if we enunciate these sentences with a specific emphasis -- 'the chalk is white', 'the chalk is a material thing, 'the chalk is present' -- then by this emphasis we also intend a specific kind of being. We now want to say that it is true -- the what-being of the chalk, the being-a-thing, the being-present. We now mean the being-true.

We have interpreted the Greek concepts of being corresponding to the first three of these meanings of being and have shown them to be grounded in 'constant presence'. In respect of being-true, however, we have thus far given no proof, remarking only that this would be too difficult and involved.

so-and-so-being (now this -- now that) apousia -- parousia

what-being (possibility) Plato: parousia

being-present (actuality) ergon parousia

being-true ?

Various investigations have shown me that understanding the first three meanings depends on clarifying the fourth. We can conclude this substantively from what we have just seen, namely being-true as that which is intended by emphasis. Even without emphasis, the meaning of being-true is included in all the others. Being-true is therefore an especially comprehensive meaning of being.

P. 52-53

¶ 9:42 PM