...[Aristotle] suceeded in showing for the first time that the agaqon is nothing else than an ontological character of beings: it applies to those beings which are determined by a teloV. To the extent that a being reaches its teloV and is complete, it is as it is meant to be, eu. The agaqon has at first no relation to praxiV at all; instead, it is determination of beings insofar asthey are finished, com-plete. A being that always is does not at all need to be produced; it is always already constantly there as finished. Insofar as Aristole understands the agaqon as teloV--being finished--and counts the teloV among the other causes, like ulh, eidoV, and arch kinesewV, he achieves for the first time a fundamental ontological understanding of the agaqon. If we take the agaqon as value, then this is all nonsense.agaqon: good
P. 84-85