One is inclined to ask whether it was all so inevitable. Does the whole history of metaphysics as inaugurated by Aristotle and Plato end by necessity (and Heidegger did use the word "notwendig" in this connection) in Hegel and Nietzsche? Does this not rule out freedom in history? The question as to the extent to which thinkers or philosophers in the history of the philosophical past decide the course of the history of philosophy and the extent to which it is rather decided for them by the way in which (through thinking on being) being sends itself out (Geschick des Seins) is a question which has already been discussed in the preliminary section on history.

Heidegger broaches the problem again in his brief but valuable work Was ist das--die Philosophie?, where he discusses the Aristotelian definition of philosophy. He insists that Aristotle's definition of philosophy must not be transferred back to Parmenides and Heraclitus. And yet he admits that the Aristotelian definition is a "free consequence" (freie Folge) of the early thinking of the pre-Socratics, and even its conclusion (Abschluss). Nonetheless, Heidegger does insist that there is not involved here the necessity of a dialectical process.

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