The difference between Heidegger and Lacan, by a Lacanian.

For Heidegger, all sciences belong to and continue the metaphysical tradition of forgetting the question of the being of beings. For Lacan, every proper science means a break against, within and in regard to the metaphysical tradition of philosophy. From a Heideggerian perspective, Lacan is unable to see the metaphysical implications and presuppositions of all the sciences. From a Lacanian perspective, Heidegger’s interpretation of a science is, in the end, naive and totalitarian. In other words, Heidegger includes all discourses into the totality formed by the history of the question of (the meaning of) the being of beings. Besides this, Heidegger includes all sciences into a homogenic and homological group, the totality of science, which seems to be, not only a coarse judgment, but also simply a totally blind and incompetent misjudgment. In Lacanian jargon, this means that Heidegger himself presupposes the Other of the Other: for Heidegger, the question of the being of beings functions, in the last analysis, as the Other of the Other criticized by Lacan.

This article has zero citations indicating where Heidegger actually said what is attributed to him. Instead of incompetently promulgating totalizing pronouncements about an imaginary Heidegger in order to blindly pass symbolic judgements, I'd recommend reading the real Heidegger, who distinguishes between Aristotelian and Newtonian science, between empirical and social sciences, and so on. Certainly there are many differences between the two, but how to correlate this "important" difference with those seminars where Lacan concurs that the real is hidden by metaphysics?

Earlier on enowning: Badiou on Lacan, Heidegger, and the pre-Socratics; Zizek cites Richardson on Lacan and Heidegger.  ¶ 8:44 AM