The ontological difference, as we saw, is not a difference between identifiable entities - Being and beings--but is rather the condition of possibility for identifying and differentiating between beings. The ontological difference is itself, to use Deleuze’s terminology, a differenciator of difference. Furthermore, Heidegger will also refer to the ontological difference in its capacity as differenciator of difference by the term 'event’ (Ereignis). Thus, in Time and Being. Heidegger claims, 'What determines both, time and Being, in their own, that is, in their belonging together, we shall call: Ereignis, the event of Appropriation. This event, moreover, is not simply one state of affairs among others, or one identifiable occurrence among others, but as the differenciator of difference the event is the condition of possibility for identifiable occurrences: an "event" is not simply an occurrence, but that which makes any occurrence possible'. Heidegger also refers to these events, as does Deleuze, as singularities, or as a condition which is non-identifiable, unique, and incomparable: ‘The term event of appropriation here no longer means what we would otherwise call a happening, an occurrence. It now is used as a singulare tantum. What it indicates happens only in the singular, no, not in any number, but uniquely.

These obvious parallels between Heidegger and Deleuze did not go unnoticed by Deleuze. In Difference and Repetition, for example, Deleuze argues that with Heidegger's notion of the ontological difference he appears to set forth an understanding of the differenciator of difference, though Deleuze believes that ultimately Heidegger did not follow through on this attempt to set forth a philosophy of difference which thinks difference as difference. To see why Deleuze makes this claim, it will be helpful if we first turn to Deleuze’s critique of Aristotle. This will prove useful, for although both Deleuze and Heidegger believe Aristotle never adequately thought difference as difference, an examination of Deleuze’s critique of Aristotle will ultimately reveal why Deleuze feels this same criticism applies to Heidegger as well.

Deleuze’s criticism of Aristotle occupies only a few pages of his work Difference and Repetition; and yet the significance of these pages, especially as they relate to Deleuze’s criticism of Heidegger, should not be underestimated. Deleuze's criticism of Aristotle, in short, is that while Aristotle recognizes the importance and productive nature of difference, this difference nonetheless is subordinate to identity, and in two fundamental ways.

P. 131-132

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