[T]he correlationist insists that we can’t really think of human being without a world, but also insists upon the converse, we can’t think of a world without humans, so philosophy has to result in some sort of correlation beteween human and world. This is not very subtle, but seems to be somewhat accurate, For example, one need only look to Heidegger’s insistence that reality doesn’t cease to exist or exists when Dasein isn’t around (I’m thinking of his discussion of gravity in the beginning of Being and Time–when I get home maybe I’ll look up the passage). In fact, on page 8 Meillassoux himself provides an example from Heidegger, who even with critiques of representation and the subject/object binary still remains tied to correlationism with his antecedent or originary correlation of being and thought vis a vis Ereignis. All of this results in/demonstrates the “correlationist circle:”

We cannot represent the “in-itself” without it becoming “for us” or as Hegel amusingly put it, we cannot “creep up on” the object “from behind” so as to find out what it is in-itself–which means that we cannot know anything that would be beyond our relation to the world.

¶ 6:45 AM