We have already referred more than once to this phenomenon: in the actualization of caring, life occurs, encounters itself, even if for the most part in a worldly way, yet such that, in this worldliness, life appears in its genuineness (in its Being and as a certain sort of object: that it is and what it is). According to everything explicated hitherto, this occurrence should not be thought of as an Objective, factual event, a mere coming onto the scene, but is, instead, a mode of the very actualization of caring. (We are speaking here by way of a formal indication.) Now, every mode of occurrence has, as such, its determinate (factical) chairological character (Χαιρός [chairos] — time), its determinate relation to time, i.e., to its time, and this relation lies in the sense of the nexus of actualization of facticity. The chairological therefore includes categorial determinations that concern (formal) temporal relations in and for the factical. In the present context, we introduce the chairological (which, according to our considerations, is incorporated into a genuine sphere of problems relating, in principle, to facticity) only to show in it the specific ruinance of caring. i.e., of factical life. The question is how, from a chairological point of view, life as such can and does announce itself (how it occurs) in apprehension.


P. 102

¶ 10:55 AM