Heidegger is perfectly aware of the difficulties in invoking what the current usage of Ereignis conceals, namely the element of a possibility even more originary than an optical event, more originary even than any optical event, more originary even than any ontological manifestation: the breakthrough towards the prior source, from which being itself in its epoch is to be thought. The difficulty is repeated because holding Being in a view as “Ereignis” is not derived from the discovery of a transcendental structure or correlation, but from announces itself as a sign heralding a new epoch. Such an irruption does not proceed from a decree made by thought, it emerges from what, up to the present, Being has reserved, and now offers. Thus it is the spirit of the times that is imposing this novel—indeed unsettling—way meditation on the juncture of Being and the present moment of epochality, within which the unprecedented word burst out. In it thought is no longer assigned—as in absolute idealism—to wanting to enclose emery decisive event, every effectiveness within its survey. The new meditation does not ratify history with a signature a absolute knowledge attempted to do. “Ereignis does contain possibilities of unconcealment which thinking cannot determine” (TB, 50, mod.). The open future preludes thought from closing upon itself, but not from tumbling into a blind race forward, which would happen if it forgot the originary is concealed within such a future. Das Ereignis ereignet, what happens appropriated. At the end of the book Nietzsche, Heidegger was able to delineate the unsought of the history of Being; from now on in “Time and Being” in particular, Being in its (metaphorical) history is no longer the ultimate recourse, the presence of the present is referred to destiny’s sending.

Why does this acknowledgement take place outside of the traditional chattering ways of philosophy? Why this mutation in language? But then we may just as well ask: Why are Giacometti’s statues suddenly elongated and so seriously gripping? The seriousness of creation in every domain has requirements. They are more difficult when they seem to question the meaningful character of discourse, to confront understanding. A careful reading of the text does not allow us to be entrenched within such an impression. Overcoming metaphysics never meant for Heidegger thinking without the requirements of adequation; it never meant not reasoning, denying the realm of presence. He did not aspire to the madness that fascinated Artaud and Bataille. His enterprise is subtle not aiming at “impossible,” but rather concerning possibilities yet reserved (thinking what adequation presupposes, what presence covers up, naming what up until then had received no name, unfolding the appropriation of the originary). Metaphysics thus finds itself invested in situ. It is indeed on its essences that one must meditate in order to understand its extent, and the transgression of the simplicity of the “there is” for the benefit of beings. But it is within the nearest proximity that what is to be thought is sheltered—a thought whose vocation is to liberate the tradition, and to connect it to its “essential still reserved anteriority” (sein noch aufgespartes Gewesenes) (ID, 44). It is, however, necessary to concede that even in “Time and Being” Heidegger exposes himself to misunderstandings similar to the ones that affect first the understanding of the “destruction” and then the “overcoming” of metaphysics. “To think Being without beings means: to think Being without regard to metaphysics. Yet a regard for metaphysics still prevails even in the intention to overcome metaphysics. Therefore our task is to cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself” (ZS, 25; BT, 24). Such a clarification attempts to be definite. Thought must move forward, the question of its relationship to metaphysics is secondary. The obstacles however are undeniable: Is it literally impossible to think Being without beings? Is not Heidegger once more falling prey—as he did in Sein und Zeit—to a sort of radicalism that takes him beyond what he attempted to articulate? Likewise, are we at liberty “to leave metaphysics to itself” (ibid), since it continues to determine our world and our existence under the form of planetary technology (follow what Heidegger himself has shown), and since the thought of Ereignis admits that it turns back to metaphysics while stressing the necessity not to do so any longer?

Pp. 118-9

¶ 4:32 AM