It was the entrenchment of this indirect representationalism against which Heidegger was fighting in Being and Time. Only by understanding the deficiencies Heidegger saw in these representationalist accounts of perception can we get a grasp on what an “analytic of Dasein” entails. We can see this in how Heidegger sets up the whole definition of “phenomena” and “phenomenology” - central to the entire project of phenomenological-ontology as we will see. He starts by defining what a phenomenon is. A phenomenon is that which shows itself to us. “Phenomena are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to light – what the Greeks sometimes identified simply with [entities].” This much is clear and I imagine most people would agree to a similar definition. But then he continues: “Now an entity can show itself from itself in many ways, depending in each case on the kind of access we have to it. Indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as something which in itself it is not” (BT 51). Here, he makes a crucial distinction between a “phenomenon” and a “semblance.” This is a simple but profound conceptual framework and understanding the force of Heidegger’s argument here is central to understanding his entire shift away from Kantian transcendentalism.

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