Monday, April 05, 2010
In Inside Higher Ed Jason Stanley, professor of analytic philosophy, wonders why no one takes his colleagues seriously.
Perhaps philosophy has fallen into disfavor among humanists because philosophy has not been true to its roots. According to one sort of myth of this sort, traditional philosophers were commentators on culture. In the 1920s, philosophy was then ruined by the Logical Positivists, who created a new, dry, vision of philosophy. In their quest to declare the traditional questions of metaphysics meaningless, they divorced philosophy from the broader connections with culture and politics that give it life. The Positivists lost favor on the continent, and obtained posts in the barren intellectual wastelands of Chicago and New Haven, bringing their dry, logical methodology with them from Vienna.Yeah, sure. Who leads more people to read philosophy? Not that I recommend Hegel to my friends, but who's been inspired to read philosophy by Kripke? Analytical philosophers appear to be stuck in an echo chamber that reinforces their prejudice that they're to culmination of the tradition, rather than a detour to a dead end. A visit to the Philosophy section of their local bookstore, or Amazon's rankings, should indicate that their notion of what is philosophy is very different from that of the general reader - who considers philosophy to be something similar to what it has been for the last twenty-five centuries. How many analytic philosophers read Greek, or anything prior to Frege? ¶ 6:35 PM
This story is false in every detail.
[...]
Logical Positivism, in its embrace of the transformational power of science and reason, does not mark a break with traditional philosophy. Rather, it is a continuation of it.
[...]
It is Slavoj Zizek who is markedly out of place in this tradition, and not Saul Kripke.
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Kripke's a poor example, agreed--and quite a few analytical types would probably not agree he represents AP, but a sort of analytical metaphysics. That said , continentalists can no longer just ignore Frege/Russell/Carnap/Quine etc. At least the early figures (Fr., Russ. ) read the greeks--yet in many ways, platonism was what they were escaping along with the kantian-hegelian dreams--at the same time, there were arguably two strands--the logicists (ie Frege), and the more empirical sorts (Vienna Circle). Witt. of Tractatus perhaps straddling....and howevermuch I dislike say Carnap's somewhat reductionist tactics his comments re Heidegger and Hei's odd sense of negation (not to say much of the jargon, Dasein, etc) still carry some weight....
So you are sort of mistaken if you think they didn't adequately "deal with" the classics.
So you are sort of mistaken if you think they didn't adequately "deal with" the classics.
Russell certainly deals with the Greeks, and rest of the tradition, in his history of philosophy. My problem there is that he's closing that chapter, in order to get on with what he considers the proper way to do philosophy. So his followers needn't bother with that tradition.
I find Russell and his followers dull, and I find that the interesting philosophers are the ones who are engaging with and reinterpreting the tradition.
I welcome thoughtful critiques of the tradition from analytic philosophers, and happy to be mistaken.
I find Russell and his followers dull, and I find that the interesting philosophers are the ones who are engaging with and reinterpreting the tradition.
I welcome thoughtful critiques of the tradition from analytic philosophers, and happy to be mistaken.
Much of the debate, if there is one, concerns Hegelianism, I believe. AP types don't care for it, whereas continental types generally approve or come out of that romantic tradition of the "dialectic"--including the marxist variety.
That said, I don't think the usual analytical philosophy geek really understands Hegel (and Hegel's not the most understandable of Greats). Conversely the hegelians, marxists or humanists don't generally understand the foundational aspects of analytical philosophy.
Russell associated with scientists. AS did the Vienna Circle. Philosophy and logic were going to be part of the sciences, or at least help clarify matters. Metaphysics was mostly purged--not completely.
Really, one could object to both schools--some have. I understand the continentalists' rejection of the positivists, if not entire empirical tradition to some extent. Positivism did not provide a Weltanschauung, except that of academic science, more or less (tho' obviously some AP types were interested in politics, culture, ethics, etc).
Really the analytical philosophy vs continentalist battle seems sort of dialectical itself--unfortunately, both sides are chockful of corrupt, self-serving opportunists and hackademics. That said, at least Hegel believed the world existed in some sense. No exit, y'all
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That said, I don't think the usual analytical philosophy geek really understands Hegel (and Hegel's not the most understandable of Greats). Conversely the hegelians, marxists or humanists don't generally understand the foundational aspects of analytical philosophy.
Russell associated with scientists. AS did the Vienna Circle. Philosophy and logic were going to be part of the sciences, or at least help clarify matters. Metaphysics was mostly purged--not completely.
Really, one could object to both schools--some have. I understand the continentalists' rejection of the positivists, if not entire empirical tradition to some extent. Positivism did not provide a Weltanschauung, except that of academic science, more or less (tho' obviously some AP types were interested in politics, culture, ethics, etc).
Really the analytical philosophy vs continentalist battle seems sort of dialectical itself--unfortunately, both sides are chockful of corrupt, self-serving opportunists and hackademics. That said, at least Hegel believed the world existed in some sense. No exit, y'all
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