Void Automata on God and the ontological difference
The core of the ontological difference, as Heidegger elaborates it, is the historical claim that since Plato, being is something to be compared to an ultimate be-er, that all things are themselves modified expressions of ultimate things. The upper-bound of everything is therefore itself a type of being. Heidegger follows Kierkegaard first in breaking apart being and existence, and then suggesting that as we move into a new historical epoch of thinking, we can see that being and beings are two different things. Being, the concept, is here a series of practices that make beings or entities intelligible to the special type of being who has those practices. In other words, that the upper (and lower, a la Derrida) bounds of Being, the concept, are not themselves beings, like in Spinoza or Aquinas where God is the Most-Been, or where Atoms are the least-been who still be and Nothing is a concept of being beneath a certain threshold, but are instead the ways of encountering things which bring them to our eye in a certain light, instead of any of the other things or any of the other ways of thinking about them.