It is this mutual relationship, a 'hermeneutic' kind of circular conscious relationship in which each part of the pair mutually helps the other to attain to greater clarity and effectiveness, which Heidegger referred to as 'enowning' (Ereignis).

We have seen that it is difficult to speak of be-ing, in part because 'we' are so deeply immersed in it, and that when it happens, it happens to and as us at some level; literally, we have no words for it. It is possible to point to its vague obviousness as I have just done, but the topic of philosophy, by whatever means, is to think, say, and perhaps become, this be—ing. The phrase 'immersed in it' was just used, but this is inadequate because only a being can be immersed, and only another being can immerse something else: but what other means of speaking do we have than this language only appropriate to 'things'? A second reason for the difficulty of speaking of this event of being—here is that it hides itself from us, and is essentially self—concealing, concealing itself in order to allow humans and other beings to have their freedom, giving them the appearance or feeling that they are each individually free and not part of a onefold unity. Heidegger’s notion of how to begin to get nearer to it in his thought was to 'leap' into be-ing, and to provoke man to recognize his role, and thereafter to speak on be-ing’s behalf: to speak 'from enowning' (as the title of the book suggests).

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¶ 11:40 AM