Friday, August 27, 2010
Heidegger on phenomenology.
The a priori character of being and of all the structures of being accordingly calls for a specific kind of approach and way of apprehending being - a priori cognition.

The basic components of a priori cognition constitute what we call phenomenology. Phenomenology is the name for the method of ontology, that is, of scientific philosophy. Rightly conceived, phenomenology is the concept of a method. It is therefore precluded from the start that phenomenology should pronounce any theses about being which have specific content, thus adopting a so-called standpoint.

P. 20
Impressive but unlike the greats he quotes (Descartes, for one) MH rarely bothered to argue for his...posits. A priori as assumed, for convenience, OK (ie...we don't need to look for evidence for pythagorean theorem, or for a valid deduction)--then does he mean...a priori truths (logic/maths), or...just Mind in general? Not really clear (tho' this is just an excerpt).

Really there's a long tradition of disputation involved with that ontological question, and simply dismissing someone like Locke's points contra a priori, or innateness--as, say Hegel and/or MH and the existentialists did, at least implicitly, won't do... Marx himself, while not reducing humans to the level of animals, generally upheld sensationism (and dare we say empiricism) of a sort. And...I doubt Marx would have been overly sympathetic to MH's programme
Hey J,

While Heidegger's references to Locke are scant (though not completely non-existent) his general ---but by no means merely assumed or undemonstrated ---response to them can be gleaned without a great deal of detective work from the most well known volumes of the GA (for example the volume quoted in the post above - Basic Problems of Phenomenology) or even from a careful first time reading of Sein und Zeit itself. Heidegger certainly does spend a very long time in his magnum opus distinguishing his own position from any sort of sensation based, cognitive knowing of the world, and, beyond that, he details the way in which he is transforming the a priori --namely, by historicizing it. Your definitely right that Heidegger invest little time or interest in the texts of Locke, but... (anyways, just a thought)
I've read quite a bit of SZ, and "Basic Writings", Pseudo. Yes, the temporality's an issue, and he does ...claim a priori cognition as fundamental ontology. YET, he does not offer a Cartesian sort of methodological argument (as, for instance Descartes' Cogito argument, however quaint)--then, granted, german metaphysicians tend to..speculation (including Kant and Hegel) rather than necessary demonstrations (or...plausible for that matter).

IM not saying "Heidegger's mistaken re a priori cognition," either. Im saying...there's no necessary argument for the a priori, anymore than Descartes had one (or Plato for that matter)--that something thinks, or appears to think...does not equal..."an immaterial soul/Being exists" (and ..Im fairly convinced Heidegger, at least of SZ sort was suggesting Dasein as an immaterial, quasi-platonic Being). So the a priori's...a posit, as is really claiming the subjectivity of time, or most of idealist metaphysics.

The leftist hegelians (not say naturalists of various sorts) eady objected to cartesianism/metaphysical dualism a. As did even Hegel, arguably---closer to "immanent" views (Aristotle's mechanismSpinoza, and french materialists/scientists, such as LaPlace influenced Hegel as much as Kant did. ). And Nietzsche had no truck with that sort of otherworldly metaphysics--if there was any Nietzschean aspects to MH that came much later (and would be completely opposed to SZ).
'scuzi hasty/poor editing.

Heidegger and phenomenologists are therefore neither Fregean sorts of analysts (Frege detested Husserlian psychologism....ergo he would not likely have approved of MH), nor were they Nietzschean naturalists (or Machist, for a technical sort of naturalists). Strange birds, like their ghost daddy Kant--yet I don't think they even uphold Kantian analysis...

Kant would not likely have allowed the psychologizing about care, or "death awareness", angst, et al. And the dogmatic attachment to Heidegger by some....I find rather odd. We don't have to agree with Jud Evans to note the political implications of that attachment
It's a return to Aristotle, ain't it? That's why it's hard to fit into modern categories of idealism/realism, difficult to convey in epistemological terms, or align with contemporary commentaries on death.
You mean Heidegger? Some Aristotle, sans logic, sans argument, or universals, categories, or...the early science. Frege's an update of Aristotle (substantial update..and uses the square of opposition with quantifiers).

Hei.'s more akin to...neo-platonism of a sort. And Guru Hei. didn't exactly invent death. I'd say the death-talk, angst, care, forlorn-ness, etc--part of his crypto-catholic heritage. Or psychology.
Care! On the ontology of Caring...by Pseudi

Maybe a Heidegger Care-bear? Cute, cuddly NSDAP Care-bear

Frege's an update of the Organon, Heidegger's contribution is chapters XV and XVI of the Metaphysics.
OK. I'm not exactly suggesting a positivist critique of Hei. suffices (whether that's via Frege, or ...the shabbier sort, Russell, Carnap, etc). Yet...there are places where MH does make claims of sorts, like..a priori cognition..if not his notion of Being itself. And then one might ask what sort of argument is provided.

Aristotle asks somewhere...can there be Being (and that means ousia, usually) without corporeality?? A legitimate question --don't really see that sort of thing in Hei., though I think he does suggest non-corporeal Being exists (ala Descartes). A rather central question. So, actually , I ask Herr Enowning , Pseudo, et al: can there be substance-less Being? Or relatedly, can there be a non-corporeal Being? Indeed, the answer to that question sort of dictates one's metaphysics (or...anti-metaphysics....the fiendish Hobbes I believe took the view that non-corporeal substances were absurd...and that would seem to apply to both idealists, and metaphysical realists ala Frege). Or something.
'OK (ie...we don't need to look for evidence for pythagorean theorem, or for a valid deduction)--then does he mean...a priori truths (logic/maths), or...just Mind in general? Not really clear (tho' this is just an excerpt).'

He means a priori cognition in the sense of what is known by Dasein prior to theoritical articulation. In SZ it would be the pre-ontological i.e. how some knowing is 'known' prior to making it explicit. In this case the a priori cognition that needs to be made explicit (or thematized as Husserl would say) is not the a priori in the sense it has been used by any thinker prior to Heidegger (including Kant) although it is now quite commonly supposed by thinkers such as McDowell and Brandom.

The argument for the a priori is given in The History of the Concept of Time (Basic Problems is a lecture course introducing students to the ideas of his own ontologized phenomenology but HCT give the formal demonstration that you are seeking - by the time of Basic Problems most of his students would have been familiar with his basic principles).

His argument for a priori cognition is pretty direct (at least for those familiar to Heidegger): if Dasein understands being without thematizing it Dasein has an a priori cognition about being. To bring this to light is the task of ontological phenomenology. That is the analysis.

Sorry for the disjointed message but I am writing this on my phone.
OK, but...one might say the entire task hinges on how one defines Being, however literal that interpretation of MH's jargon seems--as "ousia" in the classical sense, or a priori-innate Mind, or...some quasi-platonic--or crypto-theological-- transcendence perhaps.

"Ousia" was, according to my reading of Aristotle and the classics..apparent, part of nature, immanent as they say. Hegel's naturphilosophie still retains a bit of that...organicism (or Schelling, tho'...his system has definite flaws). Spinoza also understand that organicism to some degree (tho' in a deterministic sense, and sans the final cause): Mind is extended!

Is Mind extended in "ousia", ie substance--or "embedded" as some philo-hepcats say-- or not, for Herr Hei.? I say not (per his criticism of Hegelian "secularism" for one...and his reluctance to define...Dasein, being, even "ontology"...). He's a Cartesian, crypto, or otherwise. Frege while upholding metaphysical realism in regard to mathematical/logical entities would not give the same status to ...human cognition
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