In fact, in the 1919 lecture course in which he first dealt with the problem of theoretical ‘de-vivification’, Heidegger had paid attention to precisely this kind of experience:

In the morning I enter the study; the sun lies over the books, etc., and I delight in this Such delight is in no way an ought; ‘delightfulness’ as such is not given to me in an ought-experience. I ought to work, I ought to take a walk: two motivations, two possible kinds of ‘because’ which do not reside in the delightful itself but presuppose it. There is, therefore, a kind of lived experience in which I take delight, in which the valuable as such is given.

The delight that is experienced here is not in the first instance a consequence of the sunlight facilitating going for a walk or working. Valuing takes place in such a way that I am taken by the sun light in a ‘worth-taking’ and so delight in it. The valuing does not take place in a subject and then get laid on top of the bare objective sunlight, nor is it simply in the things and then picked up by the subject. The experience of value is an event in which ‘it values’ [es wertet] for me. It is something that takes place before the subjective and the objective have been separated out.

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¶ 5:00 AM