Thursday, September 16, 2010
In-der-Blog-sein
Deontologistics on the correlationism in Ereignis.
Deontologistics on the correlationism in Ereignis.
Heidegger often says that Ereignis gives Man unto his essence. This follows from the fact that Ereignis is essentially the structural relation between Dasein and reality. To understand this, one has to appreciate two things: a) that the relation does not involve any particular Dasein or group of Dasein, but rather the very structure of Dasein as that being which opens up a horizon (or clearing) within which entities can appear to it, and b) that insofar as it is the structure of beings as a whole, Heidegger thinks that Ereignis is the very structure of reality itself. What this enigmatic statement means is that reality, in and of itself, necessarily involves the possibility of something like Dasein. What Dasein is (or the essence of Man) is not something that has contingently emerged within the world, even if the fact that there are any particular Dasein is contingent. This is the crux of Heidegger’s renowned anthropocentrism: there can be a world without Man, but not without the possibility of something like him. This is correlationism writ large, insofar as the very structure of the correlation (the relation of Man and reality) is not only taken to be a facet of the real structure of the world (or reality), but to be the only such facet that we can know.Wouldn't correlationism require that the earth, not just a world, be contingent on Dasein? ¶ 7:34 AM
Comments:
<< Home
"Correlationalism" seems a bit problematic at times as used. The clearest explanation I've found is this one at Levi's blog.
The problem is that deworlded entities within Heidegger seems to go against correlationalism. The question then becomes how to consider the deworlded within the structure of Ereignis. I think that the nature of Heidegger's externalism in which it is objects that reveal themselves as the objects they are also poses some problems. I just don't see the Kantian "in itself" in the proper form within Heidegger. As you suggest the strife between world and earth renders this problematic. If Heidegger sees a space where world and earth meet - albeit perhaps partially withdrawn - that still suggests the knower isn't essential.
The problem is that deworlded entities within Heidegger seems to go against correlationalism. The question then becomes how to consider the deworlded within the structure of Ereignis. I think that the nature of Heidegger's externalism in which it is objects that reveal themselves as the objects they are also poses some problems. I just don't see the Kantian "in itself" in the proper form within Heidegger. As you suggest the strife between world and earth renders this problematic. If Heidegger sees a space where world and earth meet - albeit perhaps partially withdrawn - that still suggests the knower isn't essential.
Levi's account of correlationism fails to properly distinguish between correlationism (e.g., Kant (weak) and Heidegger (strong)) and idealism (e.g., Berkeley and Hegel), and thus misses the real importance of the term. What's so important about it is that it actually enables us to have a more fine-grained account of the dialectic surrounding the question of realism. It distinguishes certain positions that are opposed to realism without being out and out forms of idealism.
Heidegger is a good case in point here. It's the fact that earth is properly independent of Dasein (and it's structure) that prevents Heidegger from being an idealist. Hegel takes the structure of the world in itself to be fundamentally identical with the structure of thought, and thereby that we can know this fundamental structure (cf. the Science of Logic). Heidegger by contrast takes it that the only thing we can know about the fundamental structure of reality is that it involves this relation of perpetual excess between reality and Dasein.
Now, despite the fact that Heidegger would resist using this term at all costs, I think it's legitimate to say that Heidegger's is a properly metaphysical correlationism, as opposed to the more epistemological correlationism of Kant. He locates the structure of the correlation in the in-itself, but in doing so he forecloses all else about it. While Hegel will let us deduce the historically invariant structure of Being/thought, Heidegger will let us have no such thing. He will simply let us think the source of its historical variance.
Heidegger is a good case in point here. It's the fact that earth is properly independent of Dasein (and it's structure) that prevents Heidegger from being an idealist. Hegel takes the structure of the world in itself to be fundamentally identical with the structure of thought, and thereby that we can know this fundamental structure (cf. the Science of Logic). Heidegger by contrast takes it that the only thing we can know about the fundamental structure of reality is that it involves this relation of perpetual excess between reality and Dasein.
Now, despite the fact that Heidegger would resist using this term at all costs, I think it's legitimate to say that Heidegger's is a properly metaphysical correlationism, as opposed to the more epistemological correlationism of Kant. He locates the structure of the correlation in the in-itself, but in doing so he forecloses all else about it. While Hegel will let us deduce the historically invariant structure of Being/thought, Heidegger will let us have no such thing. He will simply let us think the source of its historical variance.
# posted by 
: 1:13 PM
: 1:13 PM
Heidegger is a good case in point here. It's the fact that earth is properly independent of Dasein (and it's structure) that prevents Heidegger from being an idealist.
yes and that's why we may still read Heideggerian metaphysics--at least of SZ-- as crypto-cartesian (regardless of how much he protests DesC., or all the "existentialist" jass)--tho Hei. does not limit thought to mathematics/logic as Desc does visavisa the Res Cogitans. Being-is-in the world, but Being, at least the authentic sort, is not merely geometric/rational, but poetic, aware of death-- psychological cartesianism, then.
However the later Hei. does, I contend move to a slightly holistic position...perhaps not Hegelian....idealism, but he hints at it (then Hegelian schema doesn't seem so different from a german Aristotle)...or property dualism, rather than substance in the analytical jargon
one might say part of the problem may be philosophasters tendency to view ....categories such as Idealism and metaphysical realism as discrete and well-defined, when they are, arguably, not so discrete
Post a Comment
yes and that's why we may still read Heideggerian metaphysics--at least of SZ-- as crypto-cartesian (regardless of how much he protests DesC., or all the "existentialist" jass)--tho Hei. does not limit thought to mathematics/logic as Desc does visavisa the Res Cogitans. Being-is-in the world, but Being, at least the authentic sort, is not merely geometric/rational, but poetic, aware of death-- psychological cartesianism, then.
However the later Hei. does, I contend move to a slightly holistic position...perhaps not Hegelian....idealism, but he hints at it (then Hegelian schema doesn't seem so different from a german Aristotle)...or property dualism, rather than substance in the analytical jargon
one might say part of the problem may be philosophasters tendency to view ....categories such as Idealism and metaphysical realism as discrete and well-defined, when they are, arguably, not so discrete
<< Home
