Saturday, September 11, 2010
In-der-Blog-sein
Minds and Brains explains stuff.
Minds and Brains explains stuff.
Entities are independently of disclosure insofar as they exist as natural entities but their being “is” only insofar as there is an understand of being, that is, only insofar as entities are taken to be meaningful in relation to prior teleological interests. The ontology of being, of meaning, is thus equivalent to the affordance ontology of ecological psychology. The ground will afford support whether any animal is around to walk on it, but the perception of the affordance is relative to the perceiver. In this way, we can say that the perception of affordances (the disclosure of meaning, of being) is both subjective and objective, but neither taken in isolation. Objective, because what the environment affords is related to what it actually is. Subjective, because an organisms history of structural coupling determines the perception of what the environment affords.¶ 3:44 PM
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According to my reading then, Heidegger’s ontology is internally coherent insofar as it combines entity realism and being idealism without collapsing into Cartesian subjectivism.
this kid writes well I guess. The correlationism critique in a sense relates to about Heidegger's own critique of Descartes--in brief Heidegger at times encounters traditional metaphysical issues such as the mind-body problem, and he doesn't so much settle the issue or refute the Cartesian... but re-positions it (or brackets it ala phenom.), and psychologizes it in a sense. Being-is-in-the external world, the ontic, right--MH takes that as a posit of "entity realism" (spacetime another issue, and the ideality of spacetime seems to encapsulate any supposed realism--but I don't think Heidegger was quite a Kant). But that doesn't really address "the brain in the vat" problem--tho' in a sense Heidegger's contra-cartesian position--and holism for lack of a better term-- also suggests the traditional metaphysical disputes are themselves a type of limitation, perhaps. The Ontic could be read as slightly Leibnizian perhaps (Pseudita could probably offer some thoughts on that)-- Dasein while aware of entity realism--being is in the world--, doesn't seem quite sympathetic to Leibnizian realism
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this kid writes well I guess. The correlationism critique in a sense relates to about Heidegger's own critique of Descartes--in brief Heidegger at times encounters traditional metaphysical issues such as the mind-body problem, and he doesn't so much settle the issue or refute the Cartesian... but re-positions it (or brackets it ala phenom.), and psychologizes it in a sense. Being-is-in-the external world, the ontic, right--MH takes that as a posit of "entity realism" (spacetime another issue, and the ideality of spacetime seems to encapsulate any supposed realism--but I don't think Heidegger was quite a Kant). But that doesn't really address "the brain in the vat" problem--tho' in a sense Heidegger's contra-cartesian position--and holism for lack of a better term-- also suggests the traditional metaphysical disputes are themselves a type of limitation, perhaps. The Ontic could be read as slightly Leibnizian perhaps (Pseudita could probably offer some thoughts on that)-- Dasein while aware of entity realism--being is in the world--, doesn't seem quite sympathetic to Leibnizian realism
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