The bee is simply ‘given over’ to the sun; the relations it has with its things are ‘preprogrammed’ as it were, organically and unknowingly, i.e. it has no relation to present-at-hand, particular beings. In captivation, the animal is suspended “between itself and its environment, even though neither is experienced as a being”. The crucial question must then become how to characterize these non-ontological ‘things’ which the animal exhibits ‘openness for’., if not ontologically Heidegger finally describes the animal’s captivation within an environment through the metaphor of ‘encirclement’ in ‘rings’; a holistic and hierarchical system of drives in which the animal orients itself instinctively, in automated fashion.
Did a very quick read through. Was impressed with how useful the issue of man-other animal can be for sorting out a variety of commentators on MH's lack of interest in the issue. Philosophy of nature invites comprehensive commentary and offers an issue where ontic consequences can be measured.
As I have settled on pursuing Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of nature (so far even more than I can handle) the contemporary MH critics this paper employs will have to await one of them becoming unavoidably required reading, for me.
The author makes his preferences clear while seeming (as I do not know some of the sources from personal study) to give all their due. Good to see MH worthy of so much attention.