Sunday, December 26, 2010
Slavoj Žižek asks questions in "Is it Still Possible to be a Hegelian Today".
[O]ne should raise the question of the ontological status of the ‘power’ which sustains particular ‘philological’ configurations—for Nietzsche himself, it is the will to power; for Heidegger, it is the abyssal game of ‘there is’ which ‘sends’ different epochal configurations of the disclosure of the world. In any case, one cannot avoid ontology: historicist hermeneutics cannot stand on its own. Heidegger’s history of Being is an attempt to elevate historical (not historicist) hermeneutics directly into transcendental ontology[...]. Heidegger, however, leaves open what one might call the ontic question: there are obscure hints all around his work of ‘reality’ which persists out there prior to its ontological disclosure. That is to say, Heidegger in no way equates the epochal disclosure of Being with any kind of ‘creation’—he repeatedly concedes as an un-problematic fact that, even prior to their epochal disclosure or outside it, things somehow ‘are’ (persist) out there, although they do not yet ‘exist’ in the full sense of being disclosed ‘as such’, as part of a historical world. But what is the status of this ontic persistence outside ontological disclosure?
Zizek seems not to have encountered the schoolmarmies' rule that writers should not rely on endless hypothetical questions to suggest issues, or something, eh. I tried a good bit of the Parallax View, honestly--SZ may have set a record in terms of number of unanswered hypo. questions.

Actually Zizek impresses somewhat=--who else does the collegeboy left have??-- but he has this ...je ne sais quoi guru aspect that's not so impressive. That said, Viva Hegel! Zizek's Hegel via Marx, or Lacan & Co, well---, that's another matter (as are the Heid. questions). Hegel was a profoundly anti-psychological filosophe, IMHE--and not too fond of french intellectuals, of any sort . Spengler while not too PC was a Hegelian, without the psych. sludge.
I was taught that all is beyng being beings. So why wouldn't what is yet to be ontically described be anything other than that?

(Answer a question with a question? MH left his multitude of questions unanswered.)
what of...Being-for-itself/Being-in -itself as they once said ? Some parts of Being (ie, human) are more equal than others--even according to Hegelian trad.

That said, Jan. may be correct about the rhetorical issue. The continentalist filosophe does not prove things--vull-garity itself! He offers grand speculations, queries, suggestions--is not this the very meaning of the object petit a?

Marx/Engels themselves were in opposition to that grand tradition, filling page after page with economic and historical data. Data's not so great for the par-tay however.
"...what of...Being-for-itself/Being-in-itself..."?

For fundamental ontology, I believe those have now been replaced by the "as such." I have not yet mastered that significance. Froment-Meurice spends a good deal of attention on it. As I recall, he suggests that the "as" admits the hiddenness of beyng; we only perceive entities in their particularity, further comfirmed by the "such," although I am not confident of that.

Entities show themselves "as" something. "Such" reflects Husserl's ideal of "things themselves," but not "in" themselves. Again, I am not confident of that.
Traditionally, Being-for-itself and Being-in-itself refer to Sartre's être-pour-soi and être-en-soi.
But originating with Hegel, right?
The 'things outside the world' sounds suspiciously like a hangover of the metaphysical abstractions of the 'reality behind appearances'. If it is possible to be a Hegelian today, to me it seems only by the relation between Hegel's absolute knowing, which is directly opposed to knowing in the sense of techne, and Heidegger's ereignis, which also transgresses the knowing of techne, and both of which were the result of similar revelatory experiences.
Yes to Mitdasein, except I saw somewhere just recently that Hegel's equating of Mind and Being (which I take to be his absolute knowing) is an overstatement.

MH, on the other hand, equates Being and nothing, although that is an oversimplification.
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