Saturday, January 08, 2011
Er-eignung as beyng making us as a property of beyng, from George J. Seidel's "Heidegger’s Last God and the Schelling Connection".
The subtitle of Beiträge zur Philosophy is Vom Ereignis (Concerning the Event). However, the word Ereignis has rich connotations in the Heideggerian vocabulary. In Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology there is no special meaning attached to the word Ereignis. When he comes to the Philosophy of Revelation, however, the word does take on a special meaning.29 In Heidegger's Beiträge the word is often hyphenated (Er-eignis), to indicate that he wishes it taken in its deeper etymological sense. Thus, the event is an eye-opener (er-augen, open up one's eyes to). The word is also made to relate to an-eignen and zu-eignen, which mean make one's own, take to oneself, ap-propriate. In this connection he uses the neologism Er-eignung to indicate that Seyn determines that human beings should become the property (Eigentum) of Seyn (Beiträge, p. 263) as a result of their encounter with (Ent-gegnung), and decision for (Ent-scheidung), Da-sein, the "being" that is very much "there."

The encountering of the divine and the human occurs in this Er-eignung (Beiträge, p. 477). And Da-sein — the word is generally hyphenated in this work — is the "in between" (das Zwischen) between the human and the divine. Thus, in the Beiträge Heidegger speaks of Da-sein as the Between (das Zwischen) in between the human, as the basis for history, and the divine, in its history (Beiträge, p. 311). Seyn is the "in between" between the divine and the human. As noted above, a similar position is adopted by Schelling in his Philosophy of Revelation : the Christ is neither divine nor human but something in between.
This particular quote does not offer encouragement to me to read the work. The suggestion that Schelling can help us understand the Beitrage is not supported in MH's book on Schelling. After many compliments to Schelling on his work, MH concludes that Schelling continues to be liable to the problems deriving from classical metaphysics, where the ontological distinction remains unexamined.

I find greater pertinance in Eldred's comments on "the last god," even while Eldred makes active use of "between" applied to Seyn or beyng. He offers nothing quite as efficient as suggested here. Nor does he confirm my hunch that it is useful to envision "the last god" to indicate that is a limit concept--we might only know a god after we have been passed by.
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