Cambridge Forecast Group on Michael Wheeler's non-Cartesian cognitive science
Finding that Heidegger’s critique of Cartesian thinking falls short, even when supported by Hubert Dreyfus’s influential critique of orthodox artificial intelligence, Wheeler suggests a new Heideggerian approach. He points to recent research in “embodied-embedded” cognitive science and proposes a Heideggerian framework to identify, amplify, and clarify the underlying philosophical foundations of this new work.
He focuses much of his investigation on recent work in artificial intelligence-oriented robotics, discussing, among other topics, the nature and status of representational explanation, and whether (and to what extent) cognition is computation rather than a noncomputational phenomenon best described in the language of dynamical systems theory.
Wheeler’s argument draws on analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, and empirical work to “reconstruct” the philosophical foundations of cognitive science in a time of a fundamental shift away from a generically Cartesian approach. His analysis demonstrates that Heideggerian continental philosophy and naturalistic cognitive science need not be mutually exclusive and shows further that a Heideggerian framework can act as the “conceptual glue” for new work in cognitive science.