In Metapsychology, Michael Gillan Peckitt reviews Heidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of Being
by Philip Tonner.
For Sheehan, Heidegger holds to the doctrine of analogy, in that the being of X will be similar to the being of Y inasmuch as they are all beings. Tonner is not arguing that that is no way in which Heidegger does not view being in terms of analogy, one need only look at Heidegger's notion of 'worlding' in his later works where he views animals and humans in degrees of being. It is not misguided to invoke analogy when talking about Heidegger, it is simply wrong to end with analogy, it leaves our understanding of Heidegger incomplete, for as Tonner argues analogy presupposes univocity. Univocity has to be ontologically prior to analogy, if it were not, how could all these instances of being show up for us all, the being of a dog is very different from the being of a human. There has to be something univocal, some aspect which is always the same for the understanding of being, and thus of those that 'have' being. As Tonner points out, for Heidegger this is time. Time, that Dasein has a temporal character is for Heidegger the horizon or condition for any understanding of being, and therefore it is because of temporality that being, for Tonner, is univocal.Univocity
: a term used in logic to describe that which speaks with one voice