Monday, February 21, 2011
Martin Heidegger on all things shining-forth-from-themselves.
Let us think back to Homer, who likewise already, almost reflexively, brings the presencing of a what-is-present into relation with light. We may recall a scene during the homecoming of Odysseus. With the departure of Eumaeus, Athena appears in the form of a beautiful young woman. The goddess appears to Odysseus. But his son Telemachus does not see her, and the poet says: οὐ γἀρ πως πάντεσσι θεοὶ φαίνονται ἐναργείς (Odyssey XVI, 161). “For the gods do not appear to everyone ἐναργείς”—this word is translated as “visible.” Yet ἀργὀς means gleaming. What gleams, shines forth from itself. What shines forth thus, presences forth from itself. Odysseus and Telemachus see the same woman. But Odysseus perceives the presencing of the goddess. Later, the Romans translated ἐνάργεια, the shining-forth-from-itself, with evidentia; evideri means to become visible. Evidence is thought in terms of the human being as the one who sees. In contrast, ἐνάργεια is a feature of presencing things themselves.-- On the Question Concerning the Determination of the Matter for Thinking ¶ 8:48 AM
According to Plato, things owe their shining to a light. This relation of the ideas to light is understood as a metaphor. Nevertheless, the question remains to be asked: What is it about the proper nature of presencing that its determination requires and allows a transference to light? For long enough, thinkers have troubled over in what way determinations such as identity, otherness, sameness, movement, which belong to the presencing of what-is-present, can still be thought of as ideas. Is here concealed a completely different issue that becomes entirely inaccessible because of the modern reinterpretation of ἰδέα, namely, from the outward appearance of what-is-present to perceptio, to a constituted representation by the human I? The presence of what-is-present has as such no relation to light in the sense of brightness. But presence is referred to light in the sense of the clearing.
Comments:
<< Home
The necessity of the clearing is one of those things that never occurred to anyone before, but is obvious once it's pointed out. At least that's my sense.
I still haven't come across any usefulness in being aware of the role of the clearing, but then usefulness is the death knell of proper philosophy, or something.
I still haven't come across any usefulness in being aware of the role of the clearing, but then usefulness is the death knell of proper philosophy, or something.
We Telemachuses may not perceive what Odysseus perceived...and don't have Odysseus's arrest record or collection of human skulls neither. Or somethin' like that (ie. one could compare, say, Dante's presentation of Ody. to Heidegger's..and greeks for that matter).
usefulness is the death knell of proper philosophy
Heh heh. Does Plato (or his spokesman Socrates) agree with that? Given his comments in favor of geometry and the sciences, such as they were--and against the Bogus fields such as rhetoric, imitative arts etc-- Im not sure he was adamantly opposed to something like pragmatism, in certain situations. Perhaps the ancients are against an instrumental view of the Good--which is an absolute. But in terms of...building good ships--they have to float, one, and not just look pretty
Heh heh. Does Plato (or his spokesman Socrates) agree with that? Given his comments in favor of geometry and the sciences, such as they were--and against the Bogus fields such as rhetoric, imitative arts etc-- Im not sure he was adamantly opposed to something like pragmatism, in certain situations. Perhaps the ancients are against an instrumental view of the Good--which is an absolute. But in terms of...building good ships--they have to float, one, and not just look pretty
We, Homer's Greeks, Dante's Medievals, all live in different worlds; have different understandings of being.
Back in Plato's days, philosophy meant reasoning about all things. Since then, all the different reasonings about practical things has spun off into specialized areas, so what's left to philsophy is the impractical.
I don't completely disagree, Enk. Philosophy has become...Macro in a sense--e.g. Camus's reflections on Hiroshima--not verifiable, and not really "normative"ala Rawls or something. But that Macro in itself...generally turns to Absurdity (tho I doubt MH cared for Camus's literary aspects, not altogether flattering to Deutschland...) . Structure remains at some levels, however quotidian
"Philosophy has become...Macro in a sense..."
As I used to tell my fellow philosophy classmates, "All the easy questions have been answered already. All that's left are the hard ones."
As I used to tell my fellow philosophy classmates, "All the easy questions have been answered already. All that's left are the hard ones."
Heh. Answers may have been provided to the questions--easy or hard-- for centuries, but not sure they've been resolved. As with the freedom/determinism issue. Peruse the "Garden of forking paths" site on that chestnut--quite a few of the official philosophical minds of America (and some scientists as well) wrestled with that for over a year--it's still going actually.
Im against ugly materialism and reductionism, but ...IMHE the platonists (theological, or logical-scientific sorts) still wield a great deal of power in academia. Sort of like Frege vs Quine or something--the continentalists are mostly disregarded (and hardly a unified voice. Hegelians do not usually agree to MH and PoMo).
Im against ugly materialism and reductionism, but ...IMHE the platonists (theological, or logical-scientific sorts) still wield a great deal of power in academia. Sort of like Frege vs Quine or something--the continentalists are mostly disregarded (and hardly a unified voice. Hegelians do not usually agree to MH and PoMo).
Found an answer to my question about epiphany in Eldred's essay on Aristotle, to wit:
"Whoness is a shining-forth into and shining-back from the world in a value interplay. As such, it is not substantive, standing on its own, but interrelational and situational (sumbebhkos). Nor is the look of whoness a universal look, but rather a singular, idiosyncratic one shown to and reflected in the world. Who a being is is always the look of this-here in this singular moment, in this singular, inimitable situation, in an interplay of reflection in which a singular who inimitably and idiosyncratically shows itself and is estimated. The look of whoness is in the middle, in between. On the one hand, it is the look a being shows off of itself and, on the other, it is the look taken by those looking who, in turn, reflect this look in how they evaluate the being to be.
"A being does not merely show itself, but shows itself off, as who because its self-showing is from the outset oriented toward the reflection of its showing in the world. The looks presented by beings, however, can only be seen by beings who are open to seeing such looks. Such beings are human beings, gifted (and cursed) with exposure to looking at and evaluating the looks of beings as such. The reflection of showing-off in the world is therefore a reflection in the eyes of others who reflect an individual's showing-off by, in turn, comporting themselves toward it in a certain way. Such modes of valuing comportment can be either positive (affirmation, acknowledgement, appreciation, estimation, esteem, etc.), negative (rejection, depreciation, devaluation, denigration, contempt, etc.) or indifferent (ignoring, disinterest, formal politeness, etc.).
"From this it follows that the value interplay in which beings show themselves off and are mutually evaluated as who they are can only truly come into play among beings who look and can see the reflections of their looks in other beings who can see whoness, i.e. whoness is the value interplay among human beings, mutually evaluating who each other is in a shining back and forth in varying situations that come about. Other beings not gifted and cursed with ontological sight, i.e. with the ability to see the sights of beings as such, only enter into the value interplay indirectly in being valued by human beings and hence deriving value in a value interplay among themselves."
"Whoness is a shining-forth into and shining-back from the world in a value interplay. As such, it is not substantive, standing on its own, but interrelational and situational (sumbebhkos). Nor is the look of whoness a universal look, but rather a singular, idiosyncratic one shown to and reflected in the world. Who a being is is always the look of this-here in this singular moment, in this singular, inimitable situation, in an interplay of reflection in which a singular who inimitably and idiosyncratically shows itself and is estimated. The look of whoness is in the middle, in between. On the one hand, it is the look a being shows off of itself and, on the other, it is the look taken by those looking who, in turn, reflect this look in how they evaluate the being to be.
"A being does not merely show itself, but shows itself off, as who because its self-showing is from the outset oriented toward the reflection of its showing in the world. The looks presented by beings, however, can only be seen by beings who are open to seeing such looks. Such beings are human beings, gifted (and cursed) with exposure to looking at and evaluating the looks of beings as such. The reflection of showing-off in the world is therefore a reflection in the eyes of others who reflect an individual's showing-off by, in turn, comporting themselves toward it in a certain way. Such modes of valuing comportment can be either positive (affirmation, acknowledgement, appreciation, estimation, esteem, etc.), negative (rejection, depreciation, devaluation, denigration, contempt, etc.) or indifferent (ignoring, disinterest, formal politeness, etc.).
"From this it follows that the value interplay in which beings show themselves off and are mutually evaluated as who they are can only truly come into play among beings who look and can see the reflections of their looks in other beings who can see whoness, i.e. whoness is the value interplay among human beings, mutually evaluating who each other is in a shining back and forth in varying situations that come about. Other beings not gifted and cursed with ontological sight, i.e. with the ability to see the sights of beings as such, only enter into the value interplay indirectly in being valued by human beings and hence deriving value in a value interplay among themselves."
Other beings not gifted and cursed with ontological sight, i.e. with the ability to see the sights of beings as such, only enter into the value interplay indirectly
Interesting...though one can imagine the response of euro left to that (or...science people)--"ontological sight"?? Some might read it as elitist, J. (and not lacking in mystic elements). That may be the case: not everyone perceives natural phenomena the same. Georgia O-Keefe might have seen the world differently than you or I.
Eldred's essay on Marx and Heidegger, and related political themes was quite good (he didn't always seem to be rooting for Team Heidegger).
Post a Comment
Interesting...though one can imagine the response of euro left to that (or...science people)--"ontological sight"?? Some might read it as elitist, J. (and not lacking in mystic elements). That may be the case: not everyone perceives natural phenomena the same. Georgia O-Keefe might have seen the world differently than you or I.
Eldred's essay on Marx and Heidegger, and related political themes was quite good (he didn't always seem to be rooting for Team Heidegger).
<< Home
