[A] phenomenology that has pain not only as an instrument but as an affect of scission for every phenomenal content, is immediately - in Heidegger - a phenomenology of the Absolute or the sole content of the immediately di-ffering essence, whereas it is not this in Hegel except in a preparatory and limited way where phenomenology, that is, the type of immanence that is that of pain, still does not exhaust the essence of the Absolute and remains an instrument. Difference 'finitizes' the Absolute and, due to the real transcendence of beings that is the content of pain (non-dialectizable Schmerz, yet also finite essence of the Dialectic or the work of the 'negative') -it restores it within the limits of a phenomenology. Not in the anthropological limits of a consciousness of self- since Difference and its finite non-dialectical scission, exceeds the 'particular' human being and its idealist correlate, self-consciousness - but in the limits that are those of the Da, of Da-sein. The Absolute as Difference cannot experience itself and manifest itself as finite save for in the limits of the Da, that is, the pre-dialectical scission. The Da alone is the site not of nothingness, but of finite nothingness - in the sense that even nothingness is affected by the transcendence of the real and is irreducible to the Idea- in the limits (not finite, but of essential Finitude-as-Limit) to which Difference or the Absolute is constrained in order to be able to reach its proper essence: Verwindung. This latter is the over-coming that does not over-come without appropriating itself or accepting what is over-come, more exactly without letting be and without accepting not so much what is overcome, as its very essence. This is what it is 'to enter' into metaphysics. The appropriating to the proper makes itself into a partially non ? metaphysical 'proper', into the essence of the overcome inasmuch as it is nothingness-as-One, dis-appropriation as Proper which appropriates or as tautology of the proper.

Ereignis is not impossible despite Finitude and the primacy of withdrawal, of suspension. Yet it is Ereignis of the withdrawal itself, the appropriating Turning of the Forgetting. Reversibility is not missing, but it is put at the service of Forgetting rather than Parousia, while Nietzsche, for example, would have put Forgetting at the service of Parousia.

Pp. 92-3

¶ 7:07 AM