Wednesday, July 20, 2011
John D. Caputo on Martin Hägglund‘s Radical Atheism, from The Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 11.2.
RA is organized around the assumption of the opposition, I might even say the "mortal" opposition, between religion and materialism. The question of whether there might be a religious materialism is never raised, although it is fair to say that that is today one of the most common subjects of theological debate, which is only one of the many times this books brushes up against theological issues with which it is completely unfamiliar. In fact, in my view and that of a good many other religious theorists today, religion is not opposed to time and temporality, but religion is a material practice, a mode of temporalization and historicization, of miserable and glorious bodies, of children and land, which are all primarily Biblical categories that rarely come up in Greek philosophy except as matters to be subordinated and governed. One sign of this is Heidegger‘s Being and Time which formalizes a mode of being-in-the-world that is at root, or structurally, Augustinian and Lutheran—or conversely, and this is the way Heidegger would prefer to put it, the way a certain Augustine or Luther is a "de-formalization" of the existentialia of Being and Time. Indeed, the very word déconstruction arises as a translation or gloss on Heidegger‘s Destruktion, which is itself a translation of Luther‘s destructio of scholastic theology back down to its Scriptural sources, which itself is traceable to the Septuagint apolo in Isaiah 29:14 (see I Cor. 1:19), and crucial to the analysis of time in Being and Time. Badiou‘s use of St. Paul, whom he interprets in terms of the truth-making event, while dismissing the actual content this event (the resurrected Christ) provides a more recent example. This leads to the question of which came first, the religious form of life or the philosopheme, the ontology or the "unavowed" theology. It was considerations of just this sort that led Derrida to speak of a religion without the doctrines and dogmas of religion, and this lay behind his musings on the relative priority of the messianic and the concrete messianisms or the "unavowed theologemes" that lay behind philosophy.The solution to doubts about materialism is to take a long walk on a short pier. ¶ 10:00 AM
Comments:
<< Home
John Caputo is a talented and scholarly rhetorician who seems more interested in declaring the prevalence of the tradition over innovations. That is, to return the compliment, for Caputo there is nothing new under the sun. His interpretations of Heidegger and Derrida take their references to the tradition, intended just to explain by MH and JD, as evidence that they rely on the tradition, especially its scholastic version.
Hagglund argues that JD's concept of "autoimmunity," as an inescapable ambiguity where any strength also allows weakness, undermines the whole of absolutism in the Western tradition. I expect to hear from Caputo soon, if he hasn't already, that JD's concept is just another formulation of "original sin."
To be sure, Hagglund invites such an interpretation with his insistence that JD's autoimmune conflicts are best characterized as violent. As I study Radical Atheism I shall pay attention to the possibilities of non-violent resistance or negotiated settlement of differances (sic) as equally appropriate descriptors. I shall not hold my breath, as those of us still interested in religion can look forward to a long and drawn-out disagreement about who best interprets JD's intentions.
Hagglund argues that JD's concept of "autoimmunity," as an inescapable ambiguity where any strength also allows weakness, undermines the whole of absolutism in the Western tradition. I expect to hear from Caputo soon, if he hasn't already, that JD's concept is just another formulation of "original sin."
To be sure, Hagglund invites such an interpretation with his insistence that JD's autoimmune conflicts are best characterized as violent. As I study Radical Atheism I shall pay attention to the possibilities of non-violent resistance or negotiated settlement of differances (sic) as equally appropriate descriptors. I shall not hold my breath, as those of us still interested in religion can look forward to a long and drawn-out disagreement about who best interprets JD's intentions.
scholarly rhetorician
Yeah. Philosopher, no.
So is Heidegger materialist or not?? I say...No. Cognitive a priori, Being-in-the-world, Dasein, the "es gibt"--all point at non-materialism. There are further subtleties. Furthermore I don't agree Heidegger wants to demolish scholasticism--modify it, more like. Ontology is the ..scholastic's concern. There are shall we say Hegelian aspects--temporality. Lutheran?? hell no
Yeah. Philosopher, no.
So is Heidegger materialist or not?? I say...No. Cognitive a priori, Being-in-the-world, Dasein, the "es gibt"--all point at non-materialism. There are further subtleties. Furthermore I don't agree Heidegger wants to demolish scholasticism--modify it, more like. Ontology is the ..scholastic's concern. There are shall we say Hegelian aspects--temporality. Lutheran?? hell no
Isn't the obvious question, "what is materialism?" It's not as if philosophically there has been a materialism.
"So is Heidegger materialist or not??"
Insofar as MH is not an absolutist, what is the alternative? Finitude? Is there such a thing as immaterial finiteness? I don't think so.
Merleau-Ponty makes a case for the visible versus the invisible (e.g., meaning). Yet both are material. It seems to me that Donald Davidson's "anomalous monism" is catching on. Monism with an exception? Why not? Since cosmologists can talk about dark matter and dark energy, while admitting such evidence as there is tells us nothing about what they might mean.
Insofar as MH is not an absolutist, what is the alternative? Finitude? Is there such a thing as immaterial finiteness? I don't think so.
Merleau-Ponty makes a case for the visible versus the invisible (e.g., meaning). Yet both are material. It seems to me that Donald Davidson's "anomalous monism" is catching on. Monism with an exception? Why not? Since cosmologists can talk about dark matter and dark energy, while admitting such evidence as there is tells us nothing about what they might mean.
The in/visible distinction is interesting, because shadows are visible, but not material. One of my favorite insights in this area is that being immaterial, shadows can travel faster than light.
Here I am using "materialism" as a synonym for ὕλη, or stuff.
Here I am using "materialism" as a synonym for ὕλη, or stuff.
Is there such a thing as a material "a priori"---or even materialist metaphysics? Perhaps--but some might call that... psychology.
Not sure what Monism entails but it's not usually read as materialist--mind exists in some form--where doth it go upon death? who knows--nada....Dante-land? the wheel of the dharma turns.... Finitude doesn't quite resolve it--mo' like, you will know...or you won't know, per the law of the excluded middle (...perfidious logic--)
Post a Comment
Not sure what Monism entails but it's not usually read as materialist--mind exists in some form--where doth it go upon death? who knows--nada....Dante-land? the wheel of the dharma turns.... Finitude doesn't quite resolve it--mo' like, you will know...or you won't know, per the law of the excluded middle (...perfidious logic--)
<< Home
