Yet if what I am calling time out towards the clearing is said in many ways in the lecture, that which the lecture ventures finally to say can, it seems, not be said otherwise. Or, rather, as soon as it is named Ereignis, one has already named it otherwise, already represented it as something present (SD 20). Even if one were somehow to elude this trap, going on then to formulate the decisive question, the question that philosophy will always formulate, the question "What is Ereignis?"-- one will only have stumbled on into another trap. For in asking about the "what," about the essential Being of Ereignis, one asks about that which is now only to be determined from Ereignis, almost as if one wanted to derive the source from the stream (Zur Sache des Denkens 20-21, 24).

P. 72

¶ 6:27 AM